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Abstract
A Middleware-Independent and SEcure Peer-to-Peer SIP architec-
ture (MISE-P2PSIP)
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is the de facto standard for multimedia
multiparty sessions signaling in Next Generation Networks (NGN). It is at the
basis of a wide range of IP multimedia services. SIP specification and current
usage relies on centralized servers. However, research has recently started on the
integration of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) principles into SIP for harnessing the benefits
of decentralization. The contribution of this thesis is fourfold.
Firstly, this thesis contributes to this research by proposing a novel architecture
for P2P SIP. Our architecture is an overlay composed of a set of self-organized
proxies and distributed registrars. Unlike other architectures proposed so far, our
proposal does not require an extension to SIP messages and is P2P middleware-
independent. This eases implementation, interoperability with legacy, and ensures
portability.
Secondly, the thesis discusses the routing issues related to such environment.
Indeed, introducing proxies in a P2P SIP overlay raises two important issues
namely the proxy topology building and proxy-level routing. Thanks to proxy topol-
ogy building, a proxy joining the P2P SIP finds its neighbors in the network of
proxies. Proxy-level routing enables messages to be correctly routed in the network
built by proxy topology building. This part of the thesis proposes a new framework
for proxy topology building and proxy-level routing in our proposed architecture.
Our framework is P2P infrastructure independent and general enough to be used
by any P2P SIP architecture that meets a minimal set of requirements. It relies
on a simple algorithm that builds the network of proxies as a ring, and on routing
algorithms specially designed for the ring topology.
Thirdly, the thesis handles the Network Address Translation (NAT) traversal
problem. Whereas P2P SIP architectures come with several benefits, they inherit
NAT traversal issues from SIP world. NAT traversal issues occur because SIP
messages must carry important communication parameters, including the IP ad-
iv
dress and port number to be used for signaling and media streams. SIP clients
behind NAT device are not aware of how they are seen from the public network.
Consequently, SIP packets sent by a client behind a NAT device, contain private
IP addresses in the message headers and in the message body. These addresses
being private, cannot be used by the destination node for answering. Then, we
propose in this thesis, an efficient solution that enables nodes behind a NAT device
to participate in the P2P SIP network.
Fourthly, effective operation of our architecture relies on collaboration between
the nodes playing important roles such as, proxy and registrar servers. Therefore,
we provide solutions for identifying and alleviating non-cooperative behavior. We
focus on proxy servers because they perform an important role in the transmission
of signaling messages. Proxy servers can misbehave by misrouting the signaling
messages or by hijacking SIP call sessions. This thesis proposes techniques to
secure the routing of SIP signaling messages.
Keywords: SIP protocol, P2P computing, P2P SIP networks, Network topology,
NAT traversal, Secure routing.
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Re´sume´
A Middleware-Independent and SEcure Peer-to-Peer SIP architec-
ture (MISE-P2PSIP)
SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) est un protocole standard de signalisation
pour les sessions multime´dia multi-parties dans les Re´seaux de Nouvelles Ge´ne´ration
(Next Generation Network). Il est a` la base d’une large gamme de services mul-
time´dia pour Internet. La spe´cification SIP et son utilisation actuelle reposent
sur des serveurs centralise´s. Cependant, la recherche a re´cemment commence´ sur
l’inte´gration des principes des re´seaux Pair-a`-Pair (P2P) a` la technologie SIP, pour
exploiter les avantages de la de´centralisation. La contribution de cette the`se est
quadruple.
Premie`rement, cette the`se contribue a` cette recherche en proposant une nou-
velle architecture P2P SIP. Notre architecture est un re´seau de recouvrement
compose´ d’un ensemble de serveurs mandataires (“proxy”) auto-organise´s et de
serveurs d’enregistrement distribue´s. Contrairement a` d’autres architectures pro-
pose´es jusque la`, notre proposition ne ne´cessite aucune extension pour les messages
SIP et demeure inde´pendante de l’infrastructure P2P utilise´e. Cela facilite la mise
en œuvre, l’interope´rabilite´, et assure la portabilite´.
Deuxie`mement, la the`se aborde les proble`mes de routage lie´s a` un tel environ-
nement. En effet, l’introduction de serveurs proxy dans un re´seau de recouvre-
ment P2P SIP, soule`ve deux questions fondamentales a` savoir: la construction de
la topologie des serveurs proxy et le routage par le biais de ces serveurs. Graˆce
a` cette topologie, un nouveau nœud proxy joignant le re´seau, pourra de´couvrir
ses voisins dans le re´seau des nœuds proxy. Le routage par l’interme´diaire des
nœuds proxy permet aux messages d’eˆtre correctement achemine´s dans le re´seau.
Cette partie de la the`se propose donc un nouveau syste`me pour la construction
de la topologie des proxys et le routage par le biais des proxys dans l’architecture
que nous avons propose´e. Notre syste`me est inde´pendant de l’infrastructure P2P
sous-jacente et est suffisamment ge´ne´ral pour eˆtre utilise´ par n’importe quelle ar-
chitecture P2P SIP qui re´pond a` un ensemble minimal d’exigences. Il s’appuie
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sur un algorithme simple qui construit le re´seau des proxys en anneau, et sur des
algorithmes de routage spe´cialement conc¸us pour la topologie en anneau.
Troisie`mement, la the`se traite le proble`me de la traduction d’adresses (Net-
work Address Translation). En effet, bien que les architectures P2P SIP viennent
avec plusieurs avantages, ils he´ritent le proble`me de traduction d’adresses propre
a` la technologie SIP. Ce proble`me survient parce que les messages SIP doivent
transporter des parame`tres de communication importants, y compris l’adresse IP
et le nume´ro de port utilise´s pour les flux de signalisation et de me´dia. Les clients
SIP se trouvant derrie`re un dispositif NAT, ne sont pas conscients de la fac¸on
dont ils sont vus depuis le re´seau public. Par conse´quent, les paquets SIP envoye´s
par un client derrie`re un pe´riphe´rique NAT, contiennent des adresses IP prive´es
dans les en-teˆtes et dans le corps des messages. Ces adresses e´tant prive´es, ne
peuvent pas eˆtre utilise´es par le nœud de destination dans sa re´ponse. Ainsi, nous
proposons dans cette the`se une solution efficace permettant aux nœuds derrie`re
un pe´riphe´rique NAT de pouvoir participer au re´seau P2P SIP.
Quatrie`mement, le bon fonctionnement de notre architecture repose sur une
bonne collaboration entre les nœuds jouant des roˆles importants tels que, les
serveurs proxy et les serveurs d’enregistrement. Par conse´quent, nous proposons
des solutions permettant d’identifier et d’atte´nuer les comportements non coope´ra-
tifs. Nous nous concentrons sur les serveurs proxy, car ils jouent un roˆle tre`s im-
portant dans la transmission des messages de signalisation. Les serveurs proxy
peuvent mal se comporter en optant pour un mauvais acheminement des messages
de signalisation ou en de´tournant les sessions d’appels SIP. Cette the`se propose
des techniques pour se´curiser l’acheminement des messages de signalisation SIP.
Mots cle´s : Protocole SIP, Syste`mes pair-a`-pair, Re´seaux P2P SIP, Topologie de
re´seaux, Traduction d’adresse NAT, Routage se´curise´.
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Part I
Introduction and Background
T his part of the thesis is composed of two chapters. Chapter I defines the problem to
solve and underlines the original contributions in the thesis. Subsequently, it outlines the thesis
structure. Chapter II introduces the background on the main concepts discussed in our work such
as VoIP, P2P, P2P SIP, etc.
Chapter I
Introduction
T he worldwide success of the Internet and of its technologies has overthrown the world of
telecommunications. Today, most Internet users have become familiar with Internet Protocol (IP)
telephony (also known as Voice over IP or VoIP) thanks to the popularity of applications like Skype
[2]. Thanks to IP telephony, voice, data, and video can be exchanged using the same communica-
tion infrastructure. Recently, many capabilities targeted to enterprises have been added to VoIP,
supporting using IP telephony on corporate Wide Area Networks (WAN). An important benefit of
IP telephony is cost savings, especially for corporations with large data networks. VoIP relies on
a variety of protocols, including H.323 [20], MGCP (Media Gateway Control Protocol) [21], and
SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) [1] for signaling and RTP (Real-time Transport Protocol) [18]
for media stream transport. Among the existing open signaling protocols, the most widespread
are H.323 and SIP. The H.323 protocol was originally created for multimedia sessions on Local
Area Networks (LAN). It is at the same time a protocol and a whole architecture, including a
family of other protocols and standards. SIP is a system of signaling specifically designed for IP
networks. For this reason, in spite of the fact that SIP is less wealthy in services provided by its
direct competitor, it has raised a great interest in Internet and telecommunication community.
P2P VoIP refers to the jointly usage of the P2P technology and VoIP. This method is used to
carry out voice using Internet in a decentralized manner. The absence of a central server allows
communications to be faster because users are directly connected to each other, so that voices
do not pass through an intermediate server. Skype is the first implementation of this technology.
Other important P2P VoIP systems are Google talk, Google voice, Yahoo Messenger, etc [71].
In order, to circumvent all drawbacks of centralized systems that rely on SIP, a Peer-to-Peer
(P2P) SIP-based communication system was proposed, since conventional SIP-based communica-
tions are strongly based on centralized servers. Initially, P2P SIP was the name of the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) Working Group (WG) in charge of the standardization of decen-
tralized SIP architectures. Many research activities are being carried out on the integration of P2P
principles into SIP to capitalize on the benefits of decentralization. In 2003, the SIPpeer project
at Columbia University [10, 19] and the SOSIMPLE project at William & Mary College [6] did
some pioneering works in the field of P2P SIP communication systems. In the following years,
P2P SIP research has attracted great attention both from academia and industry (e.g. Cisco,
Nokia, Ericsson, HuaWei, etc). Many other solutions have been proposed [22, 23, 24]. However,
P2P SIP cannot yet be considered mature. Many of the proposed P2P SIP techniques to date
are not interoperable and portable because they extend SIP standard protocol and are based on
specific P2P middleware. In this thesis, we contribute to P2P SIP research by proposing a novel
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architecture for P2P SIP. Our architecture is an overlay composed of a set of self-organized proxies
and distributed registrars. Unlike other architectures proposed to date, it does not extend SIP
messages and is P2P-middleware-independent. This eases implementation, interoperability with
legacy systems and ensures portability. The following sections detail our research question and
provide the motivation of our original contributions to this topic.
I.1 Problem statement and goals
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is an IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) proto-
col for the establishment, modification and tearing down of multimedia sessions [1]. It has been
selected by most Next Generation Network (NGN) forums as the standard signaling protocol for
multimedia multiparty sessions.
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks are logical overlay networks built on top of physical networks.
P2P computing is an alternative to the centralized client/server computing on which SIP is cur-
rently based. Research work has recently begun on the integration of P2P principles into SIP. The
objective is to bring to the SIP world the benefits generally associated with P2P systems (e.g.
self-organization, scalability, decentralization).
Interoperability is an important feature in P2P SIP because it allows developers to use existing
SIP toolkits. In order to ensure interoperability at SIP level, SIP extensions should be avoided or
at least kept to a minimum. Portability is also an important feature of P2P SIP as it eases the
reuse of existing P2P SIP systems on various P2P middleware.
This thesis contributes to research activities on P2P SIP by proposing a novel architecture
that achieves interoperability with legacy by not extending SIP messages and ensures portability
by being P2P-middleware-independent. Our architecture is an overlay where SIP entities such as
clients, proxies and registrars communicate using the SIP protocol as currently specified. Proxies
and registrars are self-organized and registrars are distributed. Moreover, our proposal contains
efficient proxy topology building and routing mechanisms. Furthermore, we define a NAT traversal
solution to allow effective transmission of SIP signaling messages and media streams in presence
of NAT devices. Finally, we propose a technique to secure signaling messages routing in our P2P
SIP framework. The next section will explicitly detail our original contributions.
I.2 Original contributions
As argued in the previous section, this work mainly aims to describe a P2P SIP-based com-
munication system which enables effective end-to-end communication by being fully compliant to
SIP standard and allows portability by being middleware-independent. The proposed system uses
its own routing algorithm among its proxy servers and handles NAT traversal issues. In addition,
we propose new mechanisms to secure the routing of SIP signaling messages.
I.2.1 Interoperable and portable P2P SIP architecture
Unlike other proposals, our P2P SIP architecture is P2P middleware-independent and does
not extend standard SIP messages. We review the P2P SIP architectures proposed to date and
pinpoint their shortcomings. Then, we illustrate the principles of our new architecture and the self-
organization (Join/Leaving) procedures underlying P2P SIP network set up. We provide a proof-
of-concept prototype using JAIN SIP [17], JXTA (Juxtapose) [16] and Chord implemented upon
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ProActive [67] middleware. In addition, we provide more performance results through simulation
and discuss them.
I.2.2 Topology building and proxy-level routing
In P2P SIP architecture, the service for locating SIP nodes on the network is executed by
peer entities in the P2P overlay. Having SIP proxies as first-class entities raises two important
issues: proxy topology building and proxy-level routing. Thanks to proxy topology building, a
proxy joining the P2P overlay knows how to find its neighbors in the network of proxies. Then,
proxy-level routing enables messages to be routed in the SIP network built by proxy topology
building.
This part of the work proposes a novel framework for proxy topology building and proxy-level
routing. The framework is general enough to be used on any P2P overlay that meets a minimal
set of requirements. Independence from the P2P infrastructure is aimed at supporting seamless
integration of multiple SIP communication environments. Our framework relies on an algorithm
that builds the network of proxies in a ring and uses its own routing algorithm to route calls. We
describe our novel routing algorithm used between proxies on the ring and evaluate its performance
through simulations.
I.2.3 NAT traversal solutions in P2P SIP
Whereas P2P SIP architectures come with several benefits, they inherit Network Address
Translation (NAT) [77] traversal issues from SIP world. Indeed, NAT traversal issues occur because
SIP messages contain important communication parameters including the IP address and port
number to be used for signaling and media streams. However, SIP clients are not aware of how
they are seen from the public network. Consequently, SIP packets sent by a client behind a NAT,
contain private IP address in the message headers and in the message body. These addresses being
private, they cannot be used by destination for answering. Many NAT traversal solutions have
been proposed to solve this problem. However, they are not suitable for our framework because
they do not fit our performance and portability requirements. We describe a technique designed
for our P2P SIP architecture that provides efficient NAT traversal.
I.2.4 Secure SIP signaling message routing
Within the P2P SIP overlay, where no central authority is present, each node acting as a
server can misbehave. More servers can also collude to misbehave. For instance, a proxy node
could drop, wrongly alter, delay or misroute a message. There is a need to secure the routing of
SIP signaling messages in such a way that those messages are delivered correctly, since misrouting
may disrupt call set up. In this part of our work, we focus on attacks performed by a malicious
proxy server because the proxy node has a critical and important role in SIP networks. We have
performed different misrouting attack tests considering different scenarios. In addition, we propose
secure schemes in order to secure the routing of SIP signaling messages.
I.3 Thesis structure
The thesis is structured in several parts.
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1. The remainder of part I includes Chapter II which introduces the overall background on rel-
evant topics covered by P2P SIP research area. Basically, we describe VoIP system, P2P
computing and SIP protocol specification. We finally focus on P2P SIP communication sys-
tems. Basically, we introduce the P2P SIP network, the P2P SIP reference model and the
current available projects.
2. In part II on P2P SIP architecture, chapter III describes the main requirements and provides
the analysis of the related work on the existing P2P SIP architectures. Moreover, chapter IV
gives a full description of our novel P2P SIP architecture. Indeed, the chapter includes the
assumptions and the main principles of this architecture. Furthermore, it describes the self-
organization procedures, useful for nodes joining and leaving and shows the call procedures.
Finally, the prototype and other relevant simulation results have been discussed.
3. In part III on routing issues, chapter V presents the motivation of proposing a proxy topology
building and proxy-level routing algorithm for our framework. It also makes a survey of related
work on existing routing algorithm. Subsequently, it describes our proposed framework on
topology building and routing by emphasizing the requirements, the routing algorithm and
the simulation results. Finally, chapter VI highlights the motivation and the state of art
on NAT traversal solutions. In addition, it describes our NAT traversal solutions for SIP
signaling messages and for media streams. Relevant experimental results have been provided.
4. In part IV on security challenges, chapter VII gives the motivation and point out the re-
quirements on security in P2P SIP. Moreover, it discusses the related work on secure routings
protocols and mechanisms. Finally, chapter VIII underlines two main attack models which
are misrouting attack and call hijacking attack and defines secure approaches to tackle those
attacks in our P2P SIP framework.
5. Part V includes the last chapter IX which concludes the thesis and suggests future works.
6
Chapter II
Background
T his chapter provides some background to our research. It emphasizes the key concepts
regarding the P2P overlay networks. Subsequently, we describe the basics of the SIP signaling
protocol including its components, the kind of messages used and its operations. Finally, the main
concepts behind P2P and SIP are underlined and the P2P SIP reference model released by IETF is
described following by the introduction of the current available P2P SIP projects implementation.
II.1 P2P overlay
This section gives a basic background on P2P overlay. First, it provides an overview of
P2P paradigm. Subsequently, we classify the different types of P2P networks according to their
structure. Finally, we discuss the Distributed Hash Table concept.
II.1.1 Overview
In Client-Server (C/S) models, each node plays the role of either client or server. The resource
such as storage or computing capability can be shared between client and server. The server in
C/S model is factually a central control point. A traditional C/S model is illustrated in figure II.1.
Instead, in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) model, each node plays role of client and server. As a client, it can
query and download its wanted objects from other peers. As a server, it can provide objects to
other nodes at the same time.
Figure II.1: Traditional C/S model
A simple definition of P2P has been given by Oram in [25] as: “P2P is a class of applications
that take advantage of resources storage, cycles, content, human presence available at the edges
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of the Internet. Peer-to-peer nodes must operate outside the DNS (Domain Name System) and
have significant or total autonomy of central servers” [25], because accessing these decentralized
resources means operating in an environment of unstable connectivity and unpredictable IP ad-
dresses, In other word, P2P is a special distributed system on the application layer, where each
pair of peers can communicate each other through an application layer routing protocol. The
participants in the P2P network can act as a server and a client at the same time. They are
accessible by other nodes directly, without going through intermediary entities. A general P2P
network is pictured in figure II.2. Each peer keeps an object (such as file, music, MP3, MPEG,
etc.) database. Each peer can request an object from other peers through a logical connection on
P2P layer.
Figure II.2: A general P2P model
There are several concepts underlying P2P systems [123]: resources sharing, decentralization
and self-organization. Resource sharing implies that applications cannot be set up by a single node.
The resources shared can be physical resources such as disk space, CPU or network bandwidth,
as well as, logical resources such as services or different kinds of information. Decentralization
feature is an immediate consequence of resources sharing. Decentralization is in particular in-
teresting in order to avoid single point of failure and bottlenecks. When a p2p system is fully
decentralized, there exists no longer a node that centrally coordinates its activities or a database
that stores global information about the system in centralized way. Therefore, nodes have to self-
organize themselves, based on whatever local information is available and interacting with locally
reachable nodes that are their neighbors. Self-organization also allows the overlay to be built in
a distributed manner and be robust enough to support dynamic changes of the peers which take
part in the overlay. Moreover, the overlay should continuously adapt to changes in the network
such as bandwidth and latency variances. The system should be self-improving, meaning that the
overlay should evolve towards a better structure as more information becomes available.
There are in general four phases for a P2P node according to lifetime cycle: join, query, down-
load, and leaving. First, a just entering node must actively join the P2P system. During joining
procedure, it may get some basic information (such as its neighbors) to start up, and simulta-
neously publish information about the objects it holds. Secondly, the node can issue query for
objects it wants. At this time, P2P location protocol will allow the node to determine destination
node, while P2P routing protocol can route query messages to destination node. Third, the node
can directly download the object from the destination node if the query successes. Finally, the
node will announce its departure in the ideal case. Thus, three important components of P2P
are: neighbor finding, location protocol, and routing protocol. These components use the P2P
topology, which is structured or unstructured, and self-organized by P2P nodes themselves.
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II.1.2 P2P overlay architectures
Overlay networks are built on top of one or more existing networks. The links in the overlay
network are virtual and can correspond to a multi-hop path on the underlying IP network. Some
examples of overlay networks are cloud computing, Peer-to-Peer networks, and client-server ap-
plications since their nodes run on top of the Internet. P2P overlay networks aim to implement
services that are not available in the underlying IP network [119].
Because of the virtual nature of the links between the peers, the topology of the P2P overlay
network differs from the IP network it is built on. The P2P overlay network topology is determined
by a specific algorithm that defines which peers should have a virtual link between each other. P2P
networks are distributed systems in nature, without any hierarchical organization or centralized
control.
As anticipated in the previous section, the literature identified two classes of P2P overlay
network [52]: Unstructured and Structured.
a) Unstructured architectures
Unstructured P2P networks are so many and each P2P network has so many different prop-
erties, that there is no single classification criterion. Therefore, the classification is usually made
according to the differences of search mechanisms and logical topology. Unstructured P2P net-
works do not impose any structure on the overlay networks. Peers connect in random way. As
discussed previously, decentralization is one of the major concepts of P2P systems and is related
to distributed storage, processing, information sharing and also control information. Ideally, un-
structured P2P systems would have absolutely no centralized system, but in practice there are
several types of unstructured systems with various degrees of decentralization. Thus, the current
unstructured P2P architectures can be classified in two types [26]: Decentralized or pure P2P
architecture and hybrid architecture.
1) Decentralized or pure P2P architecture
Decentralized P2P systems are serverless networks where every peer has equal functionality
and responsibilities for routing messages. Object query is executed hop-by-hop, on the P2P net-
work till success/failure or timeout. Searches in pure P2P networks are often done in a broadcast
manner with a flooding algorithm where the query messages have a Time To Live (TTL) field
defining the number of hops, through which the query message can travel.
Pure P2P systems are inherently scalable. Scalability in the system is usually restricted by
the amount of centralized operation necessary. These systems are inherently fault-tolerant, since
there is no central point of failure and the loss of a peer or even a number of peers can easily be
compensated. They have a greater degree of autonomous control over their data and resources.
However, such systems present slow information discovery and there is no guarantee about quality
of services. In addition, it is difficult to predict the system behavior because of the lack of a global
view of the system.
An example of the lookup process in a decentralized unstructured P2P network is depicted in
figure II.3. Peer A initiates a lookup and the requests are flooded in the network with the TTL
field value of 2 in the first message. The requested resource is found in peer B.
As we can see from figure II.3, only four messages (phases 1-4) are needed to complete the
lookup and data is exchanged directly between peer A and B at phase 5. However, the lookup
sends lots of additional messages that do not reach any peer holding the desired resource. In
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large networks with thousands of peers, the unstructured decentralized approach does not scale
well because of the amounts of traffic it produces. The lookup process is also slow, because when
queries are flooded, only the neighbor peers can be contacted using one routing hop. To reach a
more distant peer, the number of hops becomes very large. Some decentralized P2P networks use
random walk queries where the targets of the query messages are chosen randomly. This improves
the search efficiency but even with random walk, efficiency still remains lower than in the cen-
tralized P2P networks [29]. Freenet and early implementations of the Gnutella protocol [28] are
examples of the decentralized model.
- Example of Gnutella
In Gnutella [28], there is neither a centralized directory nor any precise control over the net-
work topology or object placement in such architecture as the typical “Gnutella”. Gnutella is a
decentralized file-sharing system whose participants self-organize a virtual mesh network running
in a P2P fashion for distributed file search. In order to participate in Gnutella, a node first must
connect to a known Gnutella node to get lists of some existing Gnutella nodes for start-up. To
find a file, a node issues queries to its neighbors. The most typical query method is flooding,
where the query is broadcasted to all neighbors within a certain radius or constrained by P2P
TTL mechanism. This unstructured architecture is very resilient to nodes entering and leaving the
system. However, the current flooding-based lookup mechanism is un-scalable, since it generates
large loads on the network participants.
Recently, some works [26] try to overcome this disadvantage proposing two mechanisms: “dy-
namic TTL setting or expanding ring” and “k-walker random walk”. But “k-walker random
walk” may have large lookup length (latency). So, object replication mechanisms [39][40] (such
as uniform replication, proportional replication, square-root proportional replication, and log-form
replication) are proposed at the same time to reduce the lookup length. Lookup messages amount
and length can be simultaneously decreased using cache mechanisms such as: cache some objects
in the reverse path of queries.
2) Hybrid architectures
In hybrid P2P systems, there is a central server that maintains directories of information about
registered users to the network, in the form of meta-data. The data exchange is done between two
peer clients. Two kinds of hybrid systems exist: centralized indexing and decentralized indexing.
- Centralized indexing
In this type of hybrid P2P systems, a central server maintains an index of the data or files
that are currently being shared by active peers, in the form <object-key, node-address>. Each
incoming node needs to actively notify this server about the object it holds. Each peer maintains a
connection to the central server, through which the queries are sent. Such systems are simple and
operate quickly and efficiently for discovery information. Searches are comprehensive and can be
guaranteed. However, because of central servers, those systems have a single point of failure. They
are not inherently scalable, because of limitations on the size of the database and its capacity to
respond to queries.
An example of this P2P architecture is Napster [27]. Figure II.4 illustrates the lookup process
in a centralized indexing architecture. The requesting peer sends the query to the server pool
(phase 1) which holds the information about the connected peers and their resources. The server
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pool then performs the search for the requested resources (Phase 2) and responds with the address
of the peer holding the requested resource (Phase 3). Only the actual data transfer (data exchange)
is made directly between the peers (Phase 4).
Figure II.3: Lookup in the pure P2P network architecture
Figure II.4: Centralized indexing in hybrid P2P network
- Decentralized indexing
In decentralized indexing, a central server registers the users to the system and facilitates the
peer discovery process. In these systems some of the nodes assume a more important role than
the rest of nodes. They are called “supernodes”. Supernodes maintain the central indexes for the
information shared by local peers connected to them and forward search requests on behalf of these
peers. Thus, queries are sent to Supernodes and not to other peers. Only the supernodes participate
in the peer and resource lookup [30]. Modern Gnutella implementations (e.g. Gnutella2) as well as
Kazaa [124] and Morpheus [123] are examples of decentralized indexing systems. In such systems,
peers are automatically elected to become Supernodes, if they have sufficient bandwidth and
processing power. A central server provides to new joining peers, a list of one or more Supernodes
to which they can connect.
Figure II.5 illustrates the lookup process in a decentralized indexing architecture. As it can
be seen, from the perspective of an ordinary peer, the decentralized indexing is similar to the
centralized one. The difference is that in the decentralized indexing, the supernodes perform the
search for the requested resources among themselves in a decentralized way (phases 2-5).
11
II. BACKGROUND
Figure II.5: Decentralized indexing in hybrid P2P network
In comparison with purely decentralized systems, hybrid decentralized indexing systems reduce
the discovery time and reduce the traffic on messages exchanging between nodes. With respect to
centralized indexing, hybrid decentralized indexing systems reduce the workload on central server
but they present slower information discovery. In addition, decentralized indexing systems do not
present unique point of failure and are inherently scalable. If one or more supernodes fail, the
nodes connected to them can open new connection with others, and the network will continue to
operate. In the case a large number or even all supernodes go down, the ordinary peers become
supernodes themselves.
In conclusion to this sub-section on unstructured P2P architectures, best choice of architec-
ture depends on what the P2P network will be used for and who will be using it. If an entity
wants or must be in control of the network, as it may happen where the P2P network is used to
deliver commercial services, decentralized indexing architecture is out of the question. For hybrid
networks, some degree of operator control can be included because of their dependency of servers
or super-peers [31].
b) Structured architectures
This type of architecture has no central directory server, but has a significant amount of struc-
ture. “Structure” means that the P2P network topology is tightly controlled (such as Mesh [32]
[33][34][41], Ring [35] [43] [45], d-dimension Torus [36], K-ary tree [42], SkipList [46] and butter-
fly [37][38]), and files are placed not at random nodes but at specified locations that will make
subsequent queries easier to satisfy. Such structured P2P systems often support a hash-table-like
interface, and it is currently quite prevalent in the research literature. It uses precise placement
algorithms and specific routing protocols to make the searching efficient. The object query is also
executed hop-by-hop through the structured topology and is sure to be successful after some de-
terministic hops under ideal case. Each peer is given an identifier when it joins the network. The
identifier defines the logical location of the peer in the overlay and thereby also the set of other
peers it connects to. The resources that are stored in the network also get identifiers. With these
identifiers the address of the node holding that resource can be found. The algorithms that are
used for these purposes are called Distributed Hash Tables (see next section) [33][36].
Peer and content lookup is efficient in the structured P2P networks because the search mecha-
nisms can be made simple, as based on the identifier being searched the querying node already has
an idea of the location of the searched resource. Structured architectures can guarantee location
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of a given target within a bounded number of hops. This guarantee holds also for queries for
resources that do not exist in the network. Non-existence can also be verified within the same
bounded number of hops.
Examples of P2P middleware that belong to this category are: Plaxton [18], Tapestry [33],
Pastry [34], Chord [35], CAN (Content Addressable Network) [36], JXTA [54], and Kademlia [55].
Following, we give some details on Chord, JXTA, ProActive [67] and Kademlia middleware which
have been used in the thesis to carry out our simulations and implementations.
i. Chord
Chord is a scalable protocol for lookup in a dynamic Peer-to-Peer system with frequent node
arrivals and departures. It provides a decentralized P2P lookup service that stores key/value pairs
for distributed data items. The Chord protocol supports just one operation: given a key, the node
responsible for storing the key’s value can be determined using a hash function that assigns an
identifier to each node and to each key (by hashing the node’s IP address and the key) [35]. Chord
uses a variant of consistent hashing [53] to assign keys to Chord nodes. Consistent hashing tends
to balance load, since each node receives roughly the same number of keys, and involves relatively
little movement of keys when nodes join and leave the system. Each key k is stored on the first node
whose identifier ID is equal or follows k in the identifier space. In Chord, active nodes will form a
connected ring topology under ideal case. An example of a Chord ring is depicted in figure II.6.
Figure II.6: Chord ring
A key k is assigned to the node whose identifier is equal to or greater than the key’s identifier.
This node is called successor(k) and is the first node clockwise from k. Each node maintains a
routing table with information for only about O(logN) nodes. In fact, a Chord search is similar to
a binary one, where the searching space is reduced by half after each search/routing-hop. So the
number of nodes that must be contacted to resolve a query in a N-node network is O(logN). As an
extension of Chord, K-ary tree search [42] has been proposed. Then, the search hop will decrease
to O(logkN), while the items of routing table in each node will increase to O((k − 1) ∗ logkN).
There are some other variants of Chord, such as Viceroy [43], Multi-Ring [44][45], etc.
ii. JXTA
The JXTA middleware is a set of open Peer-to-Peer (P2P) protocols that allow any connected
device (Cell phone to PDA, PC to Server) on the network to communicate and collaborate [54][16].
JXTA is an open source project that was originally conceived by Sun Microsystems, Inc. and
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designed with the participation of a small number of experts from academic institutions and
industry. The goal of project JXTA is to develop and standardize basic building blocks and
services to enable developers to build and deploy interoperable P2P services and applications. The
term JXTA is short for juxtapose, as in side by side. It is a recognition that P2P is juxtaposed to
client-server or Web-based computing, which is today’s traditional distributed computing model.
JXTA provides a common set of open protocols and an open source reference implementation
for developing P2P applications. The three (3) main objectives were to achieve interoperability,
platform independence and ubiquity. JXTA defines a set of six protocols that can be used to
construct P2P systems using a centralized, brokered or decentralized approach but its main purpose
is to facilitate the creation of decentralized systems. Below, we provide a list of the main JXTA
protocols:
• The Peer Resolver Protocol (PRP) is the mechanism by which a peer can send a query to one
or more peers, and receive a response (or multiple responses) to the query.
• The Peer Discovery Protocol (PDP) is the mechanism by which a peer can advertise its
own resources, and discover the resources from other peers (peer groups, services, pipes and
additional peers).
• The Peer Information Protocol (PIP) is the mechanism by which a peer may obtain status
information about other peers, such as state, uptime, traffic load, capabilities.
• The Pipe Binding Protocol (PBP) is used to connect pipes between peers.
• The Endpoint Routing Protocol (ERP) is used to route JXTA Messages.
• The RendezVous Protocol (RVP) is the mechanism by which peers can subscribe or be a
subscriber to a propagation service.
Each peer operates independently and asynchronously from all other peers, and is uniquely
identified by a Peer ID (identifiers). Peers publish one or more network interfaces (advertisements)
for use with the JXTA protocols, which are passed around the network in datagrams (messages).
Peers can form transient or persistent relationships (peer groups). Each published interface is
advertised as a peer endpoint, which is used to establish direct point-to-point (but not fixed)
connections between two peers (pipes). Figure II.7 shows the JXTA architecture [54].
Figure II.7: JXTA architecture
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iii. Kademlia
Kademlia is a P2P network protocol that was originally proposed to decentralize other file
sharing P2P networks. It has been conceived by Petar Maymounkov and David Mazie`res in 2002
[55]. Kademlia nodes communicate using UDP protocol. Inside Internet network, Kademlia creates
a new network in which every node is identified by an ID (160 bits). After a joining phase which
consists of contacting a node of the overlay in order to get an ID, a mathematical operator computes
the “distance” between two nodes and asks many nodes according to this distance in order to find
the looking information. The eXclusive OR operator, also called XOR, allows using the notion of
distance between two nodes giving a result as an integer number: the  distance . This later does
not have any relation with the geographical location of the participants, but model the distance
inside a chain of IDs. Then, it may happen that a node in Italy and a node in Australia are neigh-
bors. Nodes are considered as leaves of a binary tree. The XOR topology is symmetric unlike the
ring topology used in Chord. The information in Kademlia is kept in  Values , each value being
associated to a  key . For this reason, Kademlia is often called <value, key> network. Both keys
associated to a given node are related to the address of the node. So knowing a key, the algorithm
can determine the approximated distance that separates the requestor from the node holding the
value associated to this key. In other words, in order to look for a key located in a node N, a node A
needs to look for a neighbor B with Distance(B,N) < Distance(A,N) and asks for the information.
If the latter node does not have the response, it will contact a neighbor, closest to the key and so
on, until getting the value of the key (or until being sure that the key does not exist). The size
of the network does not impact much the number of nodes contacted during the lookup phase. It
can easily be shown that if the number of participants of the overlay doubles, the number of nodes
that need to be consulted in each search increases by one only. Other advantages are inherent to
the distributed network structure, increasing for instance the resistance to Denial of Service attack.
iv. ProActive
ProActive [67] is a middleware for easily programming and running java applications on Grids
and P2P systems. Released under the LGPL license, ProActive is a Java library for parallel, dis-
tributed, and concurrent computing, also featuring mobility and security in a uniform framework.
With a reduced set of simple primitives, ProActive provides a comprehensive API allowing to
simplify the programming of applications that are distributed on Local Area Networks (LAN), on
clusters, or on Internet Grids. ProActive does not require any modifications to Java or to the Java
Virtual Machine (JVM), therefore allowing the deployment of applications using the ProActive
API on any operating system that provides a compatible JVM. ProActive is based on the concept
of active object, which is an entity with its own configurable activity. A distributed or concurrent
application built using ProActive is composed of a number of entities called active objects. Each
active object has one distinguished element, the root, which is the only entry point to the active
object.
Communication between active objects is realized through method invocations, which are rei-
fied and passed as messages. These messages are serializable Java objects which may be compared
to TCP packets. Indeed, one part of the message contains routine information towards the different
elements of the library, and the other part contains the data to be communicated to the called
object. The goal of ProActive is to deploy any application anywhere without having to modify the
source code. The resources acquired through the deployment process are called nodes. Nodes are
the containers of active objects. The second key principle is the capability to abstractly describe
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an application, or part of it, in terms of its conceptual activities. The ProActive deployment
framework relies on XML deployment descriptors to hold the infrastructure configuration.
II.1.3 Distributed Hash Table
Structured P2P networks tightly control their topology and place the indexing information for
the advertised resources at specified locations. Thus, queries can be routed to these locations and
lookup can be efficiently performed. The great majority of modern structured P2P systems use
Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) as a communication infrastructure. A DHT evenly distributes
the data items and query load across the network. The data item is stored as <key, value> pairs
and the node responsible for storing each data item is determined by the DHT algorithm. DHTs
make it possible to find an object from a network of thousands of peers based on the object’s key
[49].
The keyspace is divided among the participating nodes. Each node has an identifier called
node ID, which defines its logical location in the network. The stored data is also identified by a
resource ID generated by a hash function. The key for a data value can be hashed for example
from the file name or from the objects keywords. Indexing information is placed deterministically
at the corresponding peers whose identifier is “closest” to the key. DHT algorithms vary in how
they define this distance. DHTs provide a scalable way to store and retrieve data objects under
given keys. Each key lookup is resolved in multiple steps, resulting in a multi-hop path to be taken
in the overlay. Thus, the core operation that is provided by DHTs is the efficient routing of the
query to the final destination, given a key.
The size of the keyspace a node is responsible for, is determined by the number of nodes in
the network. Although the keyspace is divided evenly among participating nodes, there can be
differences in the number of keys that nodes have to store. This is due to the fact that the hash
algorithms are not always optimal, especially when there is churn affecting the network. DHTs
aim to balance the responsibilities evenly on every node. Various load balancing methods have
been proposed to address this problem [51].
DHT algorithms typically have four design constraints [50]. The “Few neighbours” constraint
means that each node keeps routing information for usually only log N other nodes in a network
of N nodes. By distributing the routing information evenly on every node, DHTs can handle
the arrival and departure of nodes in a decent number of update messages. When the routing
information is distributed, the node arrival or departure process affects only a small number of
nodes and only those nodes need to update their routing table information. The “Low latency”
constraint indicates that all nodes should reach any other node in the network in a small number
of hops. Usually this means that the maximum hop count between two nodes is log N. Nodes
also need to be able to make their own routing decisions. This constraint called “greedy routing
decisions” ensures that node lookups are efficient and every node can make its own routing decisions
without the help of other nodes. Network should also be able to withstand the effects of churn
and retain connectivity and ability to route packets correctly as the nodes arrive and leave. DHTs
should balance the load evenly so that there would not exist any overloaded nodes and links. These
characteristics are demanded by “robustness” constraint [50].
Various DHT algorithms have a different routing geometry for the keyspace. The keyspace
can take the form of a hypercube, ring, tree or a butterfly. The routing geometry affects route and
neighbor selection as well as the DHT’s performance and resilience.
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II.2 SIP Protocol
II.2.1 Overview
SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) is a signaling protocol defined by IETF (Internet Engineering
Task Force) for the establishment, modification and release of multimedia sessions [1] (RFC 3261).
The SIP protocol is an Application Layer protocol designed to be independent of the underlying
Transport Layer; it can run on Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), User Datagram Protocol
(UDP), or Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP).
SIP inherits some features of HTTP (Hyper Text Transport Protocol) used to browse the Web,
and SMTP (Simple Mail Transport Protocol) used to transmit electronic messages like e-mails.
SIP is based on a transactional client/server model as HTTP. The addressing uses the concept
of SIP URL (Uniform Resource Locator) that looks like an e-mail address. Each participant in a
SIP network is addressable by a SIP URL. Moreover, SIP requests are made by way of responses
identified by a numerical code. Furthermore, most of SIP response codes were borrowed from the
HTTP protocol. For example, when the recipient is not located, a response code “404 Not Found”
is returned. SIP messages also consist of headers as an HTTP message. SIP is a textual protocol
such as HTTP.
SIP is not a vertically integrated communication system. Rather, SIP is a component that
can be used together with other protocols to build a complete multimedia architecture. Typically,
this architecture includes protocols such as RTP (Real-time Transport Protocol) for transporting
real-time data, and RTCP (Real-time Transport Control Protocol) designed to work in conjunction
with RTP in order to convey on quality of service feedback and membership information. Moreover,
there are RTSP (Real-Time Streaming Protocol) which is an application-level protocol used for
controlling delivery of streaming media with real-time properties and RSVP (Resource ReSerVation
Protocol) which is the network control protocol that allows data receiver to request a special
end-to-end quality of service for its data flows and to reserve necessary resources (bandwidth,
quality of service) at routers along the transmission paths. In addition, SDP (Session Description
Protocol) is used for describing multimedia sessions for the purposes of session announcement,
session invitation, and other forms of multimedia session initiation. Indeed, the SDP part of SIP
messages includes the type of media (video, audio, etc.), the transport protocol (RTP/UDP/IP,
etc.), the format of the media (H.261 video, MPEG video, etc.), and information to receive those
media (IP addresses, ports, formats and so on). Furthermore, SIP makes use of “Media Control
Protocols” responsible for the creation and tearing down of media connections. They are used to
open and close media pin-holes on VoIP gateways and to process notifications coming from those
gateways. The main “Media Control Protocols” are MGCP (Media Gateway Control Protocol)
[21] and SIP-based media control protocols such as NetAnn (Network Announcement Protocol)
[64], MSCML (Media Server Control Markup Language) [61] and the new Media Control Channel
Framework [65].
Therefore, SIP should be used in conjunction with other protocols to provide complete services
to the users. However, the basic functionality and operation of SIP do not depend on any of
these protocols. SIP has been extended to support many other services such as presence, instant
messaging (similar to SMS in mobile networks), call forwarding, conferencing, value-added services
of telephony, etc.
In the next few sections dedicated to SIP, we will introduce the major SIP entities. Subse-
quently, we will give an overview of SIP messages and focus on SIP protocol functionalities.
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II.2.2 SIP components
In SIP, there are two logical entities: User Agent Client (UAC) and User Agent Server (UAS),
often just called User Agent (UA).
A UAC is a logical entity that creates a new request, and then uses the client transaction
state machinery to send it. On the other hand, a UAS is a logical entity that receives a request
and generates a response to that SIP request. The UAS accepts, rejects, or redirects the request.
Therefore, all IP phones supporting SIP protocol can be either UAC or UAS depending on the
direction of the call request. Figure II.8 depicts SIP network with the different entities.
It is possible to make a call directly between endpoints, but in most cases, servers are involved
in the communication for authentication, call routing, advanced feature services, and so on. There
are four servers in SIP: Registrar, Redirect and Proxy servers and a Back-to-Back User Agent
(B2BUA). Here is the description of each server.
• Registrar: A registration server that accepts REGISTER requests and places the information
it receives in those requests into the location service for the domain it handles. It maintains
a list of bindings (UA’s SIP URI and the related IP address or addresses) that are accessible
to proxy servers and redirect servers within its administrative domain.
• Proxy server: An intermediary entity that acts as both a server and a client for the purpose of
making requests on behalf of other clients. A proxy server primarily plays the role of routing,
which means its job is to ensure that a request is sent to another entity “closer” to the target
user. A proxy server is also useful for enforcing policy. It intercepts, and if necessary, rewrites
specific parts of a request message before forwarding it.
• Redirect server: This is a server that accepts SIP requests, translates the SIP address of
destination in one or more network addresses and returns them to the UAC. Unlike the proxy
server, the redirect server does not route SIP requests. For instance, in the case of call
forwarding, the proxy server has the ability to translate the called number in the SIP message
received, into a new number (forwarding number) and route the call to the new destination,
and this is transparent to the source UAC. For the same service, the redirect server returns
the new number (forwarding number) to the source UAC that is responsible for establishing
a new call toward the new destination.
• Back-to-Back User Agent: This is a logical entity that receives a request and processes it as
a UAS. To determine how the request should be answered, it acts as a UAC and generates
request. Unlike a proxy server, it maintains dialog state and must participate in all requests
sent on the dialogs it has established. Because it is a concatenation of a UAC and UAS, no
explicit definitions are needed for its behavior.
These servers could be separate entities physically, or integrated in a single device. The
gateway in Figure II.8, allows connectivity between SIP network and PSTN (Public Switched
Telephone Network). It interfaces to the PSTN on the one hand and to SIP network on the other
hand [122]. The Gateway has two main functions:
• Translation of ISDN User Part (ISUP) signaling (the signaling protocol mostly used in PSTN)
to SIP signaling and vice versa.
• Conversion of audio signals in RTP packets and vice versa.
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Figure II.8: SIP components
All messages sent from the PSTN and targeted to a UA in the SIP network, go through one or
more proxy servers and vice versa.
II.2.3 SIP messages
As mentioned before, SIP is a text-based protocol. The formatting of SIP messages is based
on the syntax of HTTP version 1.1. There are two types of messages: requests and responses.
a) Message format
The format of a request is shown in figure II.9.
Figure II.9: SIP requests format
In the message, end of line is always denoted with the two octets <CR><LF>. The format of
the response is very similar to what has been shown above. The only difference is the first line.
The response format is illustrated by figure II.10.
Below, we show a sample of SIP message:
IINVITE sip:13@10.10.1.13 SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 10.10.1.99:5060;branch=z9hG4bK343bf628;rport
From: "Test 15" <sip:15@10.10.1.99>tag=as58f4201b
To: <sip:13@10.10.1.13>
Contact: <sip:15@10.10.1.99>
Call-ID: 326371826c80e17e6cf6c29861eb2933@10.10.1.99
CSeq: 102 INVITE
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Figure II.10: SIP responses format
User-Agent: Asterisk PBX
Max-Forwards: 70
Date: Wed, 06 Dec 2009 14:12:45 GMT
Allow: INVITE, ACK, CANCEL, OPTIONS, BYE, REFER, SUBSCRIBE, NOTIFY
Supported: replaces
Content-Type: application/sdp
Content-Length: 258
v=0
o=root 1821 1821 IN IP4 10.10.1.99
s=session
c=IN IP4 10.10.1.99
t=0 0
m=audio 11424 RTP/AVP 0 8 101
a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000
a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000
a=rtpmap:101 telephone-event/8000
a=fmtp:101 0-16
a=silenceSupp:off - - - -
a=ptime:20
a=sendrecv
The above example shows an INVITE message. This is the message that a SIP endpoint needs
to send in order to establish a call. The message was sent by an Asterisk PBX running at the IP
address 10.10.1.99. It starts a call from extension number 15 to extension number 13 at the IP
address 10.10.1.13.
b) Message headers
We now briefly describe some message headers used in the example above.
The request start line: The string “INVITE sip:13@10.10.1.13 SIP/2.0” tells that this is an invi-
tation to a call. It also gives the SIP address of the receiving endpoint (sip:13@10.10.1.13) and
identifies the version of the protocol (SIP/2.0).
• Call-ID: This is a unique identifier of a given SIP session. It usually consists of a random
string and the IP address of the sender.
• CSeq: This is an ID that identifies the particular SIP transaction. The same CSeq: is always
shared by a request and its related response(s).
• From: This field (’From: “Test 15” <sip:15@10.10.1.99>;tag=as58f4201b’ in the example
above) contains the address of the caller with an optional display name and with optional
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tags. From: is a mandatory field in all SIP requests and responses. In SIP responses, From:
is always a copy of the From: field in the related request message.
• To: This field contains the address of the called party. To: is a mandatory field. The To:
fields in responses are copied from the related request message.
• Via: The Via: headers are used to record the route of the request. Each proxy server on the
path of the message will add one Via: entry. Thanks to this, the replies can be routed back
along the same path.
• Content-type: This field describes the media type of the message body. The type is usually
“application/sdp”, denoting the Session Description Protocol. The message body can be
sometimes empty (e.g. the REGISTER message) and then the Content-type: header is not
present.
• Content-length: This is the length of the message body in octets. This header is always
present but can be 0 (denoting there is no message body).
The message body carries a message of the SDP. This message contains a description of the
audio (and possibly video) channel that the calling endpoint wants to establish.
c) SIP Requests
SIP originally included only six requests (also called methods). These requests have been a
part of the standard since SIP 1.0. Below, we describe these core methods:
• INVITE: This is a request to establish a call (a session). We have seen an example of the
message above.
• CANCEL: This method is used to stop an INVITE that is in progress (that is, the call has
not been established yet).
• ACK: The ACK request is used to confirm that the endpoint has received a final response in
a transaction. Typically, after the called party accepts a call, the caller confirms the receipt
of the accepting response (200 OK) with the ACK method.
• BYE: The BYE method is used to end an established call (comparing with CANCEL that is
used to stop the session before it has been established).
• REGISTER: The REGISTER method is used to register the SIP endpoint at the registrar
server. In fact, this method does the same thing as the Registration Request (RRQ) in H.323
protocol.
• OPTIONS: This request is used to ask the other party for the list of SIP methods, it sup-
ports. The response may also contain the set of capabilities (i.e. audio/video codecs) of the
responding party.
Later, many other SIP methods have been added, either in SIP 2.0 or in other RFCs. The
INFO method was defined in IETF RFC 2976. It can be used to carry application-level information
that are relevant to the session, for example participant images or account balance information.
Moreover, the SUBSCRIBE, NOTIFY (RFC 3265), and MESSAGE methods extend SIP with
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instant messaging features. The REFER method (RFC 3515) redirects the receiver to a resource
identified in the method and the PRACK method (RFC 3262) has been defined to acknowledge
the reception of provisional response of type 1XX. The UPDATE method (RFC 3311) allows a SIP
terminal to update the parameters (e.g. media streams and their codecs) of a multimedia session.
Finally, the method PUBLISH (RFC 3903) is used by an entity to publish its state.
d) SIP Responses
Like other IETF protocols, SIP uses 3-digit response codes. SIP responses fall into six (6)
categories.
• Class 1xx: Information, the request has been received and is being processed.
Example: 100 Trying, 180 Ringing, 181 Call forwarded.
• Class 2xx: Success, the request has been received, understood and accepted.
Example: 200 OK
• Class 3xx: Redirection, the call requires further treatment before whether it can be done.
Example: 300 Multiple Choices, 301 Moved Permanently, 302 Moved Temporarily.
• Class 4xx: Client Error, the request cannot be interpreted or served by the server. The
application must be modified before being returned.
Example: 400 Bad Request, 401 Unauthorised, 403 Forbidden, 404 Not Found.
• Class 5xx: Server Error, the server fails in processing a request apparently valid.
Example: 500 Server Error, 501 Not Implemented, 503 Service Unavailable, 504 Timeout.
• Class 6xx: Global Failure, the application cannot be processed by any server.
Example: 600 Busy Everywhere, 603 Decline, 604 Does not Exist, 606 Not Acceptable.
II.2.4 SIP Protocol operation
This section shows how registration occurs in SIP and how call can be established, modified
and terminated through a proxy server.
a) Registration
Let’s take a look at how SIP user agents register with a SIP registrar. The example explained
in this section shows a situation where a SIP softphone (namely, the Ekiga client) registers with
an Asterisk PBX (Private Branch eXchange). The Asterisk’s IP address is 10.10.1.99, while the
client is at 10.10.1.13 and wants to register the telephone number 13. Figure II.11 illustrates the
registration scenario.
In order to register, the SIP telephone needs to send the REGISTER request. The registrar
server will immediately reply with the provisional response “100 Trying”. This indicates that
the request has been received (and thus the client does not need to retransmit it) and that it is
being processed. While processing the request, the registrar discovers that the user agent needs to
authenticate itself. It therefore responds with “401 Unauthorized”. For the user agent, this means
that it has to send the REGISTER request once more, this time providing authentication.
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Figure II.11: SIP registration scenario
Following is an example of the REGISTER request:
REGISTER sip:10.10.1.99 SIP/2.0
CSeq: 1 REGISTER
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 10.10.1.13:5060;
branch=z9hG4bK78946131-99e1-de11-8845-080027608325;rport
User-Agent: Ekiga/3.2.5
From: <sip:13@10.10.1.99>
;tag=d60e6131-99e1-de11-8845-080027608325
Call-ID: e4ec6031-99e1-de11-8845-080027608325@vvt-laptop
To: <sip:13@10.10.1.99>
Contact: <sip:13@10.10.1.13>;q=1
Allow: INVITE,ACK,OPTIONS,BYE,CANCEL,SUBSCRIBE,NOTIFY,REFER,MESSAGE,
INFO,PING
Expires: 3600
Content-Length: 0
Max-Forwards: 70
The “401 Unauthorized” message is as follows:
SIP/2.0 401 Unauthorized
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 10.10.1.13:5060;
branch=z9hG4bK78946131-99e1-de11-8845-080027608325;
received=10.10.1.13;rport=5060
From: <sip:13@10.10.1.99>;
tag=d60e6131-99e1-de11-8845-080027608325
To: <sip:13@10.10.1.99>;tag=as5489aead
Call-ID: e4ec6031-99e1-de11-8845-080027608325@vvt-laptop
CSeq: 1 REGISTER
User-Agent: Asterisk PBX
Allow: INVITE, ACK, CANCEL, OPTIONS, BYE, REFER,
SUBSCRIBE, NOTIFY
Supported: replaces
WWW-Authenticate: Digest algorithm=MD5, realm="asterisk",
nonce="343eb793"
Content-Length: 0
In the “401 Unauthorized” response, the important header is WWW-Authenticate:. It instructs
the client to authenticate using the digest authentication (RFC 2617). The nonce (a short for
“number used once”) is a “challenge string”. The client will combine the challenge string with
the user’s password and compute the MD5 hash of the resulting string. The server will compute
its own hash using the same method and compare it with the MD5 hash provided by the client.
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The digest authentication is the most frequently used because the password is never sent over the
network in plain text. The “basic” authentication method has been deprecated in SIP 2.0 as it is
insecure. In general, sending a password in plain text over the method is obviously not secure.
Once the client computes the MD5 digest, it will re-send the REGISTER request. The message
is similar to the previous REGISTER request but includes a new header called “Authorization”
with the “CSeq” header set to 2 like this:
CSeq: 2 REGISTER
Authorization: Digest username="test13", realm="asterisk", nonce="343eb793",
uri="sip:10.10.1.99", algorithm=MD5,response="6c13de87f9cde9c44e95edbb68cbdea9"
The registrar server will again first respond with “100 Trying” and then compare the two
MD5 hashes (the one provided by the client with the one computed by the registrar itself). If they
match, the registrar will respond with “200 OK” and insert the endpoint to the location database.
The database is usually shared between the registrar and the proxy server so that the proxy can
use it to establish the calls.
Finally, the response “200 OK” is sent by the registrar and contains one important parameter,
Expires. It tells the client that the registration will expire after the given number of seconds and
the client will be required to register again.
b) Basic call flow
The call flows between SIP clients and servers are various depending on the service architecture.
One of the common call flows is shown in figure II.12, assuming that servers share the registration
information of users, and clients have to send INVITE to a redirect server first when initiating a
call [56].
Figure II.12: Basic call flow with servers
Here is a brief comment for each message in the figure II.12.
• M1: User A (UAC) sends INVITE message to a Redirect Server, first to make a call to User
B (UAS).
• M2: The redirect server returns 302 Moved Temporarily response containing a contact header
with User B’s current SIP address.
• M3: Acknowledgement.
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• M4 and M5: User A then generates a new INVITE with SDP and sends to User B via a proxy
server.
• M6: This step notifies that the proxy server received the request and continues to process it.
• M7 and M8: User B sends 180 Ringing when the telephone is ringing.
• M9 and M10: User B sends 200 OK with SDP when picking up the phone.
• M11 and M12: Acknowledgment. After this, the media channel is opened.
• M13 and M14: User B sends BYE when hanging up the phone.
• M15 and M16: Confirmation of disconnection.
II.3 P2P SIP
This section presents some background related to the main concept of P2P SIP network.
We provide first an overview of P2P SIP network and describe the P2P SIP reference model
released by IETF. In addition, we introduce the current available candidate projects for P2P SIP
implementation.
II.3.1 Overview
Most VoIP systems rely on permanent set of SIP servers and suffer from performance, bottle-
necks, and single point of failure issues. As in a P2P system, there is no centralized server, such
a system has greater robustness, scalability and fault tolerance. Then, it was thought that if SIP
can be made to work over P2P systems, it will improve the performance of traditional SIP systems
and eliminate the problems of using centralized SIP servers. However, SIP was already ready for
P2P with little changes. SIP already uses symmetric, direct client-to-client communication and the
proxies and the registrar only perform lookup and routing. Then, all that user agents lack to build
a P2P network is lookup and routing. The lookup/routing functions of the proxies/registrar can be
replaced by a DHT overlay built in the user agents. By adding join, leave and lookup capabilities,
a SIP user agent can be transformed into a peer capable of operating in a P2P network.
Then, P2P SIP is the combination of a P2P network and SIP which provides an alternative
solution to the session establishment that conventional client/server SIP offers. It replaces the
somewhat fixed topology of SIP with a DHT-based structured Peer-to-Peer overlay network. The
P2P overlay nodes, called peers, collaborate and provide the same location service function that
maps Addresses of Records (public URIs) to overlay locations (SIP URIs) as conventional SIP does.
In P2P SIP network, this is done in a distributed manner, every peer taking responsibility over
routing and location information storing. To be able to provide the distributed location service
function, P2P SIP offers distributed database and transport functions.
However, SIP and P2P can be combined using two approaches [3]: P2P-over-SIP and SIP-
using-P2P. The former approach focuses on using SIP messages to maintain P2P overlay networks.
SIP provides the P2P overlay with control functions and establishes multimedia sessions over
unreliable P2P overlay networks. The disadvantage of the approach is that P2P-over-SIP needs
to maintain many SIP dialog and transaction states during the overlay control procedure since all
the P2P operations are carried by SIP messages. According to the statistics on [19], more than ten
(10) SIP messages need to be exchanged from the node joining the DHT to the user registration,
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and each SIP message has its own dialog states in user agents. The advantages of this approach
include the use of existing SIP components and the independence from the external P2P networks.
Using the latter approach named SIP-using-P2P, the underlying P2P overlay networks such
as Chord, CAN, Pastry, etc provides SIP with the peer locating service. This means that the
traditional centralized SIP trapezoid is replaced by the decentralized P2P location service. Thus,
the deploying cost of P2P SIP is reduced and the robustness of the network increases. One of
the essential design targets of SIP is to find the peer anytime and anywhere using DNS. However,
when the DNS and SIP Proxy are replaced with P2P overlays, connectivity problem needs to be
addressed [4][60].
A comprehensive analysis of the related work on research activities belonging to the two
approaches will be presented in the next chapter.
II.3.2 High level description
The P2P SIP Working Group (WG) was founded by the IETF in 2007 to develop standards for
serverless use of SIP. P2P SIP is still largely under development. There are many IETF Internet
Drafts discussing potential solutions for different mechanisms of P2P SIP. The current state of the
general P2P SIP framework is documented in a WG draft [62].
In P2P SIP, P2P nodes are organized to make SIP based real-time communication possible.
The P2P SIP network consists of P2P SIP peers and P2P SIP clients. P2P SIP peers participate
in the P2P SIP overlay and provide storage and transport services to other peers in that overlay.
The role of a P2P SIP client is still under debate. One approach is that the client is not itself
part of the P2P overlay network but interacts with the overlay through an associated peer. Under
this assumption, clients can store information in the overlay and retrieve information from it, but
they do not contribute any resources to the overlay, and thereby do not route messages or store
information for other nodes. The services offered by every P2P SIP node are needed to provide
the location function which is a core function of the client/server SIP. This also causes a certain
degree of interference (“cross-layering”) between the SIP protocol and the P2P layer, as the P2P
overlay needs to be aware of the services its peers support, in order to know which functions it
must provide [62].
A specific “Peer Protocol” is needed for P2P SIP to enable communication between the peers.
The peer protocol routes messages within the P2P overlay, maintains the overlay, stores data in
and retrieves data from the overlay. It was first suggested that SIP should be used for this inter-
peer communication [62]. The P2P SIP WG is working towards a new protocol for this purpose.
Several drafts for the peer protocol have been proposed. At the moment, the P2P SIP WG has
one peer protocol draft as a working group item. It is called REsource LOcation And Discovery
(RELOAD).
A “Client Protocol” to allow communication between clients and the peers is also needed. This
protocol might be a logical subset of the peer protocol. This means that any operation supported
by the client protocol is also supported by the peer protocol [62].
II.3.3 Reference model
It is expected that most P2P SIP peers and clients will be coupled with SIP entities [62]. The
P2P SIP Reference Model illustrates this assumption in figure II.13. The scenario presented in the
figure is only an example of a possible P2P SIP overlay. Other compositions are also possible.
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Peer names refer to the SIP entity the peer is coupled with. Proxy peer is coupled with a
SIP proxy, Redir peer with SIP redirect server and UA (User Agent) peers with a SIP UA. It is
also possible that a peer is coupled with more than one SIP entity. A Gateway peer connects the
overlay to other networks.
The nodes can connect to a P2P SIP overlay in several ways. In figure II.13, user agent
peers A and B are directly connected to the overlay while UA peer C is behind a Network Address
Translation (NAT) device. Peer D is an ordinary peer with no SIP capabilities. The client connects
with the overlay via peer D using the P2P SIP client protocol. The Client uses client protocol to
obtain information from the overlay, but has not inserted itself into the overlay, and therefore does
not participate in routing messages or storing information.
The SIP user agent interacts with the overlay through the proxy peer using SIP to communicate
with the proxy peer. SIP UA can also use the Redir peer as an adapter node to interact with the
P2P SIP overlay. The Proxy peer and the Redir peer speak both SIP and the peer protocol
used in the overlay (RELOAD for instance). The overlay can connect to other networks such as
PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network) through the gateway peer that speaks the appropriate
protocols.
Figure II.13: P2P SIP Reference model
II.4 Current candidate projects for P2P SIP implementation
Several drafts of P2P SIP implementations have been proposed. These proposals are: Cisco’s
P2P SIP project, the P2PP project of the Columbia University, the SIPDHT2 project, Kademlia
dSIP of the University of Parma, Huawei’s P2P SIP implementation, P2PNS from the University
of Karlsruhe, 39 Peers project, P2Pship project by Helsinki Institute for Information Technology
and the P2P SIP RELOAD approach. Following, we shortly introduce each of these projects.
II.4.1 CISCO P2P SIP Project
The CISCO P2P SIP project uses a binary P2P signaling protocol, called Address Settlement
by Peer-to-Peer (ASP). ASP supports Chord as a DHT algorithm, SIP for localization, STUN and
TURN services, a security framework on the base of an abstract enrollment server and a protocol
extensibility model [11]. The implementation is written in C++, it seems very clean and small
but a good documentation for the code is not available. The project development seems to have
been stopped since the last code update was done in July 2007.
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II.4.2 Columbia P2PP Project
OpenVoIP (Open Peer-to-Peer VoIP and IM System) is an open source peer-to-peer VoIP
and IM system of approximately 1000 nodes running on arount 300 PlanetLab (a P2P simulator)
machines. OpenVoIP runs Peer-to-Peer Protocol (P2PP) [130] which can be used to implement
well-known DHTs or unstructured protocols (e.g. Kademlia, Bamboo, or Chord). Routing can
be done in an iterative or recursive manner. Additional functions of P2PP are the support for
four different hash algorithms (SHA1, SHA256, MD4, MD5) and the support for NAT traversal.
OpenVoIP provides NAT traversal services using STUN, TURN, and ICE. OpenVoIP also provides
a Google Map Interface to check the health of the system. Nodes provide routing and storage
services to the overlay. Latest version (Version 0.21) of the project has been released on 11/03/09
[131].
II.4.3 SIPDHT2 Project
SIPDHT2 is an open source project and is a candidate solution for P2P SIP. The primary goal
of the SIPDHT project is to provide a library to be used in applications for creating and using
SIP based distributed hash tables. SIPDHT2 aims to develop a public API, which can be used
by other applications to build Real Time Systems. It uses PCAN (Passive Content Addressable
Network) [136] as the DHT algorithm which is a variant of CAN. PCAN provides a robust overlay
even if most peers are behind a NAT system. SIPDHT2 uses SIP as its signaling protocol. The
integrated SIP stack is the Sofia-SIP library. SIPDHT2 offers a good documentation and is written
in pure C. A main concern with this project is the strong dependency on external Linux specific
libraries like avahi and glib. STUN and ICE are used to connect peers behind NATs. The latest
version has been released at June 2007 [132].
II.4.4 Kademlia dSIP
The dSIP [4] protocol uses the SIP syntax for signaling. dSIP provides STUN, TURN, and
ICE for NAT traversal through the use of conventional SIP messages. Chord and Kademlia are
used as DHT algorithms. Kademlia dSIP is implemented in the programming language JAVA,
leading to a high availability on nearly all operating systems. The implementation is currently
limited to SIP INVITE requests and development seems to have been stopped (last updates in
2007).
II.4.5 Huawei’s SEP Peer and Client Protocol
Huawei’s implementation uses the Service Extensible Protocol (SEP) for communication be-
tween P2P SIP peers and maintenance of the DHT service. SEP distinguishes between a peer
[20] and a client [21] protocol. According to the P2P SIP specification, peers offer routing and
storing services and clients will not offer these services. The client protocol controls the behavior
between a client and its allocated peer. The code of SEP is written in C++ but it is very heavy
and complex.
II.4.6 P2PNS: A Secure Distributed Name Service for P2P SIP
P2PNS (Peer-to-Peer Name Service) [13] is a distributed name service using a peer-to-peer
network. The current focus of P2PNS is to provide a secure and efficient SIP name resolution for
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decentralized VoIP. P2PNS is developed at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Institute
of Telematics (research group Prof. Zitterbart) within the scope of the ScaleNet project. An
experimental implementation of P2PNS for OverSim is currently under development. There is
also a live demonstration of P2PNS deployment in the PlanetLab and G-Lab research networks.
The experimental P2PNS implementation consists of two parts: A modified OpenSER SIP proxy
and the overlay framework OverSim. The SIP proxy connects to the OverSim P2PNS service
via an XML-RPC interface. The implementation is still in an early stage and several security
mechanisms are not implemented yet [133].
II.4.7 39 peers project
The 39 peers project aims at implementing an open-source P2P Internet telephony software
using SIP. The 39 peers project is developed for student developers and researchers to experiment
with new ideas. It is written in Python scripting language. It supports open protocols such as
SIP and RTP. It is released by Kundan Singh under GNU/GPL license (an alternate commercial
license is available as well) [134].
II.4.8 Peer-to-Peer SHip
P2Pship is a P2P framework for various applications. The P2Pship system is an experimental
application that provides P2P communication capabilities for different applications. The system
was originally designed for SIP-based communication applications (a SIP proxy), allowing users
to make P2P voice / video calls, without the help of a centralized SIP infrastructure. The Host
Identity Protocol (HIP) was used as data transport, making the connections secure and enabling
features such as mobility and multihoming. P2Pship is developed inside a project called Secure
Peer-to-Peer Services Overlay Architecture (SPEAR) of the Networking Research group at Helsinki
Institute for Information Technology. Currently the P2Pship proxy supports applications like SIP
with media proxying, P2P HTTP and P2P web caching. P2Pship is under GNU/GPL license and
the last version (version 3.0) has been released the 30th September 2011 [135].
II.4.9 RELOAD
As mentioned before, P2P SIP working group of IETF is moving towards the development
of applications that can use both P2P and SIP technologies in conjunction. RELOAD is a P2P
signaling protocol, which is still strongly under development and there is currently no available
implementation. RELOAD works in environments where there are NATs or firewalls. RELOAD
can support various applications and provides security frameworks. RELOAD also allows the use
of various Distributed Hash Table (DHT) algorithms in the form of topology plugins.
II.5 Conclusion
This chapter allows understanding the main concepts behind both P2P and SIP paradigms.
Moreover, an overview of the P2P SIP telephony makes clear the main goals pursuing by the
P2P SIP working group. Furthermore, current candidate projects for P2P SIP implementation
have been shortly described. Next chapter will focus on the related work on the existing P2P
architectures.
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Part II
P2P SIP architecture
T his part of the thesis proposes a new P2P SIP architecture called MISE-P2PSIP. MISE-
P2PSIP architecture is an overlay composed of a set of self-organized proxies and registrars wherein
clients, proxies and registrars communicate using the standard SIP protocol. It functions inde-
pendently of the middleware used to map the logical P2P network onto the real physical network.
This part of the thesis is composed of two chapters. The first chapter (Chapter III) points out the
requirements of MISE-P2PSIP architecture and discusses the related work on the P2P SIP archi-
tectures that have been proposed to date by underlining their shortcomings. The second chapter
(Chapter IV) presents the principles of the new architecture, the software architecture and the
proof-of-concept prototype. It also provides a discussion of the evaluation results.
Chapter III
Related work on existing P2P SIP
architectures
T his chapter identifies the requirements of MISE-P2PSIP architecture and discusses the
existing architectures in light of these requirements.
III.1 Requirements
In order to clarify the discussion of related work, we now briefly summarize some requirements
that we think a P2P SIP architecture has to meet.
These requirements will be used to clarify the specific contributions of related approaches.
The first requirement is that the architecture should bring to the SIP world all the benefits
inherent to the P2P paradigm. This means that it should enable self-organization, especially when
nodes join and leave the overlay. It also should scale in terms of the number of peers participating
in the overlay, and none of the peers should act as a permanently centralized node.
The second requirement is that the architecture should be independent from the P2P middle-
ware and architectures used to map the logical P2P overlay onto the physical network. This will
ensure portability, since today there is a plethora of non-interoperable P2P middleware.
A third requirement is that the architecture should be, as much as possible, compliant with
existing SIP specifications. SIP extensions should be avoided whenever possible. This will ease
implementation by allowing the re-use of existing SIP tool kits, and will also make interoperability
with existing SIP implementations easier.
The fourth requirement is performance. SIP is used for multimedia session signaling, and
session signaling messages are real-time messages. This implies for instance, that the discovery
mechanism of the peers’ contact information should be time efficient.
III.2 Related work and analysis
As we have seen, three core features of P2P networks are self-organization, distributed data
storage and efficient location of data items. P2P SIP leverages these characteristics to support
distributed data discovery and self-organization in SIP networks, eliminating (or at least reducing)
the need for centralized servers [3]. Instead of storing the SIP peers’ contact information (i.e. IP
address and port) in a centralized server as per current SIP specifications, most of the existing P2P
SIP networks replace the SIP location service by using the P2P overlay to store the information.
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We refer to this technique as “SIP-using-P2P” in the rest of this section. While SIP-using-P2P
architectures rely on location and distributed storage mechanisms provided by existing general
purpose P2P architectures, other approaches use SIP as a protocol for managing the P2P overlay.
We call these approaches “P2P-over-SIP”. We review the former approach first, and then the
latter.
III.2.1 SIP-using-P2P
The P2P SIP proposals belonging to this category can be divided in two sub-categories: flat
architecture and hierarchical architecture.
a) Flat architectures
The IETF P2P SIP Working Group has the goal to develop a protocol that can be deployed
on any DHT overlay network. The working group has proposed REsource LOcation And Discovery
(RELOAD) Base Protocol as P2P SIP protocol reference model [11]. RELOAD is a Peer-to-Peer
(P2P) signaling protocol for use on the Internet which provides a generic, self-organizing over-
lay network service. RELOAD implementation is strongly based on Chord algorithm [15]. One
important use of RELOAD is the SIP usage described in [12]. The SIP usage of RELOAD pro-
posal’ goal is to replace SIP proxy and/or SIP registrar by RELOAD services implemented on
the overlay. Indeed, the SIP usage of RELOAD involves two main functions: Registration and
Rendezvous management. Registration allows SIP UA to use the RELOAD overlay to store a
mapping between their SIP AoR (Address of Record) and their Node-ID (Node Identifier) in the
overlay. The Rendezvous management function allows a SIP user agent to use the RELOAD mes-
sage routing system to set up a direct connection with the destination user agent to exchange SIP
messages, once it has identified the Node-ID of the user agent it wishes to call. Consequently,
the SIP UA must be running on a RELOAD peer and must have a complete RELOAD imple-
mentation. For instance, a user Bob will store the mapping between his Node-ID, “1234”, and
his AoR, sip:bob@dht.example.com into the overlay. When Alice wants to call Bob, she looks up
for “sip:bob@dht.example.com” in the overlay and gets back Bob’s Node-ID which is 1234. Then,
Alice uses the overlay to route an AppAttach (a RELOAD specification message) message to Bob’s
peer. Bob responds with his own AppAttach and they set up a direct connection. At this step,
Alice can send a SIP INVITE message to Bob using the connection.
While RELOAD provides a complete “SIP-using-P2P” solution, it raises some concerns with
respect to our requirements. RELOAD proposal is not fully compliant to the standard SIP since
the SIP messages are not sent using the node IP address but using the Node-ID.
Other techniques belonging to the “SIP-using-P2P” category have been proposed. For in-
stance, the authors of [7] proposed a DHT-based architecture. The approach provides an extended
location service for SIP entities registration and discovery in the P2P overlay. The architecture
is composed of some of the nodes with high capacity (bandwidth, CPU, memory) and availability
(uptime, public IP address) which act as supernodes and form the DHT, and other ordinary nodes
which connect themselves to one or more supernodes without being part of the DHT. User location
is obtained using the SIP module if the node is ordinary peer or using the DHT module, if the node
is a supernode. The DHT module maintains the peer information and performs DHT operations
such as find, join and leave. Peers should use DHT-based messages to interact with the DHT.
Once the user location is done, the call setup or instant messages can be sent directly via the SIP
module. Authors validated their approach using OpenDHT middleware [8]. The architecture can
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easily work with other DHT-based middleware but cannot interoperate with non DHT-based P2P
protocol. Then, the approach is middleware-dependent.
Another example of “SIP-using-P2P” solution, proposed by Holger Schmidt et al. in [9], uses
JXTA-based P2P architecture. A JXTA-based SIP location service called JXTA-LOC has been
deployed and used by standard SIP entities. This leads to SIP entities that externally behave
according to standard SIP but internally use P2P mechanisms to interact with the JXTA-LOC
database which resides in the JXTA overlay. It is used by the SIP registrar to store information
about UAs and by the SIP proxy which discovers the target UA in the JXTA network and directly
forwards the message to it. While this approach intends to be compliant to SIP standard, it is not
middleware-independent.
Chuan Zhu et al. have also proposed in [14] an approach for a communication system for
wireless networks through which various devices in mobile networks can communicate with each
other. Their architecture is made up two logical overlays: the JXTA-based P2P overlay and the
SIP overlay. Two main modules have been defined. The first module called JXTA-SIP bridging
is responsible for the conversion between SIP messages and JXTA messages. The second module
called SIP TU (SIP Transaction User) is responsible for the registration of nodes as well as the
session establishment between them. The SIP TU module performs all SIP operations except the
SIP location mechanism which is replaced by the JXTA location service. The main drawback of
this approach is that the network building and functionalities are strongly based on JXTA network.
This makes the approach being middleware-dependent.
In the architectures mentioned in [7], [9] and [14], the SIP REGISTER messages sent by
the UACs result in the UAC contact information being published in the P2P overlay, using the
mechanisms provided by the underlying P2P layer (i.e. DHT or JXTA). The contact information
is stored according to the UAC’s SIP URI (Uniform Resource Identifier), which acts as the key
in the overlay. SIP messages that require routing (e.g. INVITE, REGISTER), trigger contact
information discovery in the overlay using the SIP URI as a key and employ the available overlay
mechanism (i.e. DHT or JXTA). The discovered contact information is then used to send the SIP
message to the targeted node. Both approaches are middleware-dependent.
The author of [13] has proposed a Secure Distributed Name Service for P2P SIP (P2PNS).
The goal of the proposal is to provide a distributed name service on a DHT overlay to resolve
AoRs (Address of Record) to Contacts URIs without relying on DNS (Domain Name System) and
centralized SIP servers. The approach is based on a modular architecture composed of four separate
layers. The Key Based Routing (KBR) layer allows messages routing to the nodeIDs while the
Distributed Hash Table (DHT) layer provides distributed data storage. The P2PNS Cache layer
provides name resolution service in addition to cache the AoRs records while P2P SIP proxy layer
allows connecting legacy SIP UAs to the P2PNS service. The work includes a two-stage name
resolution mechanism to handle frequent IP address changes in order to reduce communication
cost in dynamic environments and provides security mechanisms in a decentralized environments.
Indeed, the first name resolution stage resolves the node’s AoR in nodeID at DHT layer and the
second name resolution stage resolves the nodeID in IP address at KBR overlay layer. According
to the author, the motivation of the two-stage resolution is that modification of data records on
DHT is expensive due to security mechanisms while IP address changes are efficiently handled on
KBR layer. The approach ensures also uniqueness of the AoRs by preventing identity theft. When
a Peer X wants to establish a call to the AoR A of Peer Y, firslty the UA of Peer X sends a SIP
INVITE to its local P2P SIP proxy. Subsequently, the proxy queries P2PNS service to resolve
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A. The P2PNS layer first fetches the corresponding nodeID for AoR A from the DHT. Then, the
obtained nodeID gets resolved to the current IP address of peer Y from the KBR. Finally, the
SIP INVITE message is forwarded to the UA of Peer Y through its proxy. While this approach
could efficiently work on any DHT-based P2P infrastructures, it remains DHT-based middleware
dependent.
b) Hierarchical architectures
Other approaches [4] and [60] belonging to SIP-using-P2P have been explicitly proposed to
deal with the connectivity issue of heterogeneous P2P overlay and the overhead problem of SIP
messages when SIP extension is used to maintain the overlays. In reference [4], various P2P
overlays (such as Pastry, CAN) are respectively used as the underlying route discovery protocol.
To connect peers from heterogeneous overlays, an upper level overlay (global overlay), is formed,
to interconnect the local overlays. That is, each overlay elects one or more powerful peers to be the
gateway-like nodes that route messages among heterogeneous overlays. The elected gateway-like
node is defined as the P2P proxy. The benefits of introducing such hierarchical architecture are
that peers in heterogeneous overlays can be interconnected and the balance between low signaling
overhead and easy management can be achieved. The approach is middleware-dependent because
the peer discovery is strongly based of the P2P infrastructure used. In addition, this approach
adds two new headers to SIP messages in order to insert the node ID and the overlay ID. Due to
its hierarchical architecture, the destination peer’ contact information discovery could also lead to
low performance of the communication if the SIP messages should go through many heterogeneous
overlays.
Reference [60] proposed the H-P2PSIP (Hierarchical P2PSIP) approach similar to [4]. The
user on the H-P2PSIP node acts as the SIP UA and uses the DHT service to locate other users.
After that, nodes with higher capacity are elected to be Higher Level Overlay Peer (HiLO-Peers).
The H-P2PSIP node with lower capacity acts as Lower Level Overlay Peer (LoLO-Peer). The
LoLO is based on specific DHT algorithms such as Chord, Pastry, etc. An overlay within the
same DHT could also split into several LoLOs based on the geographic information to reduce the
session setup latency. However, the HiLO-Peer has two main functionalities. Firstly, HiLO-Peer
acting as the SIP proxy invokes both local and upper level DHT services to interconnect various
P2P SIP overlays. Secondly, it also performs operations of stateful SIP servers. A universal DHT
algorithm for HiLO is required and Bamboo is suggested to perform the role. Then, the HiLO-Peer
with multi-stack (LoLO DHT stack and HiLO DHT stack) performs the gateway-like behavior to
connect heterogonous LoLOs. Peers within the same LoLO speak the private P2P protocol for
DHT operations. Peers within HiLO and peers between HiLO and LoLO speak the SIP protocol.
SIP elements such as SIP UA and SIP Proxy employ the DHT block as a resolver to determine
IP address, port and transport protocol of the next hop element. Authors use DHT rather than
DNS to implement the location function. To ease developers to port multiple DHT stacks to
an H-P2PSIP node, authors leverage the common API to make various DHTs pluggable. While
being DHT-based middleware-independent, this approach is not fully middleware-independent. In
addition, as in [4], the session could be delayed due to the contact information lookup operation
which is performed at many levels (caller overlay, interconnection overlay and the callee overlay).
This could lead to performance issue.
To summarize, a major limitation of existing “SIP-using-P2P” architectures is that the ar-
chitectures based on JXTA ([9] and [14]) are middleware-dependent by virtue of their design. As
for the architectures proposed in [7] [13] [4] and [60], even though it may be possible to plug the
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proposed mechanisms into different DHT-based middleware, they will not be able to work with
non-DHT-based middleware and then are not middleware-independent. In addition, the perfor-
mance requirement could be compromised in hierarchical architectures.
III.2.2 P2P-over-SIP
This category of architectures uses SIP messages to maintain the P2P overlay and/or to publish
and discover contact information. A very few works belong to this category.
Bryan et al. proposed dSIP [5] which falls in this category. dSIP is a SIP-based system that
uses P2P mechanisms to remove the need for central servers in SIP and SIMPLE (SIP for Instant
Messaging and Presence Leveraging Extensions) based communications systems. dSIP evolved
from early work done by the same authors on the SoSIMPLE [6] P2P SIP project. We will focus
only on giving an analysis of dSIP.
dSIP extends the SIP REGISTER message via additional headers to perform overlay mainte-
nance and location service procedures. It organizes the overlay peers using a DHT P2P structure,
where each peer or resource/data is assigned a Globally Unique IDentifier (GUID), calculated us-
ing the DHT algorithm. The dSIP architecture requires the support of Chord, but other DHT
algorithms can be added.
The overlay maintenance includes nodes joining and leaving and messages transfer between
peers. When a peer wishes to join the overlay, it sends a REGISTER message to a bootstrap
peer in the overlay. The REGISTER is then routed towards the peer closest to the joining peer’s
GUID. The message can be routed using different routing schemes. Following the iterative scheme,
for instance, the bootstrap peer looks up the peer it knows, is nearest to the joining GUID and
responds with “302 redirect” to this closest peer. The joining peer sends a REGISTER to that
peer and the process repeats until the closest peer (according to the DHT algorithm) is found. The
closest peer then sends to the joining peer, its DHT state information, which allows the joining
peer to learn about other peers in the overlay (neighbors). This process is referred to as node
registration. REGISTER messages are also periodically exchanged between peers to maintain
information about the overlay as nodes join and leave.
After a peer joins the overlay, it publishes its contact information, making it discoverable by
other peers. This process is referred to as resource registration. It publishes the contact information
using the peer SIP URI as the key. The joining peer sends a REGISTER message, routed as in the
node registration phase, to the peer closest to the resource GUID (calculated from the peer SIP
URI). The closest peer stores the mapping between the resource ID and the contact information,
and replies with a SIP OK message.
To discover the contact information of another peer, an overlay peer sends a REGISTER
message to the peer closest (among its known peers) to the resource URI. The target peer answers
with a SIP OK response including a special header that contains the required contact information.
The location service in dSIP is either located in the SIP UACs or in an adapter. The adapter
connects the standard SIP UACs to the P2P SIP overlay.
A major limitation of this category of architectures is that they explicitly extend standard
SIP messages and then are not compliant to SIP standard.
Table III.1 summarizes the different approaches reviewed in this section with respect to our
requirements.
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wireless networks [14]
YES NO YES N/A
Secure distributed name service
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Dsip[5]
YES YES NO N/A
SoSIMPLE[6]
YES YES NO N/A
MISE-P2PSIP
(our proposal)
YES YES YES Reasonable
Table III.1: State of art summary
III.3 Conclusion
This chapter presented the requirements of our MISE-P2PSIP architecture and provided an
analysis of the existing P2P SIP architectures. Unlike the existing architecture, our architecture
aims to be fully middleware-independent and compliant to SIP standard. The next chapter will
mainly describe the principles of our architecture followed by our prototype and performance
simulation results.
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Chapter IV
MISE-P2PSIP architecture
I n this thesis, we follow an entirely different line of research with respect to existing pro-
posals. Namely, we propose a middleware-independent P2P SIP architecture called MISE-P2PSIP
(Middleware-Independent and SEcure Peer-to-Peer SIP architecture). Our solution is targeted to
support VoIP signaling applications where user agents can be simple devices like IP phones, and
the P2P overlay can be selected at deployment (as opposite to design) time, depending on which
middleware is available in the specific deployment situation.
Our architecture integrates the location service into the proxy and distributes the registrar.
Our P2P SIP proposal belongs to “SIP-using-P2P” category already discussed in the previous
chapter. The main difference with the current SIP-using-P2P proposals on one side is that the
user does not register directly its contact information in the overlay. In our architecture, the
user registration happens at SIP layer as specified in RFC 3261. Then, the SIP client simply
creates a SIP REGISTER that it sends to its Registrar server. Instead of keeping the user contact
information (IP address/port) in a centralized database, the Registrar server stores the information
in the overlay. This allows us to provide distributed storage of the contact information by being
compliant to conventional SIP. On the other hand, the SIP location service is performed by the
proxy at SIP layer as in conventional SIP. When a Registrar server gets a contact information
request from a proxy, it resolves the request into overlay lookup request and retrieves the contact
information from the overlay and sends the response to proxy as specified in RFC 3261. A major
difference with the current “P2P-over-SIP” proposals is that during call establishment, we do not
use the DHT or other overlay routing mechanisms to send the SIP messages and we do not perform
any SIP message extensions. This gives us the advantage to be almost fully independent from the
P2P infrastructure and being compliant to conventional SIP.
In this chapter, we first introduce the overall architecture and assumptions, followed by the self-
organization procedures. The call procedures and an illustrative scenario have been also presented.
Moreover, we fully describe the software architecture and present our prototype. Finally, some
simulation results have been released.
IV.1 Assumptions and overall architecture
In this section, we assume our system functions in a single SIP domain. The domain may
have many proxies and each proxy can manage a limited number of client peers. Our architecture
is depicted in figure IV.1. It defines four functional entities: Domain Controller (DC), Group
Registrar (GRx), Proxy (Px) and Client (Cx). The default DC is the first node that joins the overlay
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and is a non-permanently centralized SIP registrar entity that acts as the overlay bootstrapping
node. However, the default DC is replaced by a participating GR, when it leaves or fails. Upon
joining the overlay SIP domain, each node should first contact the DC. We assume that the joining
node knows the contact information of the current DC (e.g. preconfigured with the DC address).
The DC assigns appropriate roles (i.e. Client, proxy, or GR) to the joining nodes and provides
support functions for self-organization. In addition, the DC keeps the list of all participating
servers (proxy and registrar) and stores it in the overlay. The GR node is SIP registrar entity
that has the capability to store, in part or as a whole, the SIP client contact information. GRs
provide for a distributed storage of client contact information in the overlay. The proxy peer is
a non-permanently centralized SIP proxy server which has the role to transmit a message from a
source client peer to a target client peer in the P2P overlay. It integrates the location service. For
performance reasons, as a peer with higher capabilities, it integrates a caching mechanism to store
previously obtained contact information to avoid querying before each call. The client peer is a
SIP client participating in the P2P overlay.
The peer nodes are organized in several groups. Each group is composed of one proxy, one GR
and 0 to N clients. Each domain has a single DC, which is responsible for creating and managing
the groups. We assume for simplicity sake in this version of the architecture that every node can
play any of the roles.
Our overlay is composed of two levels. The first level contains the contact information storage
nodes, meaning the GRs, along with the entry point, i.e. the DC. The second level includes the
client peers, which initiate and receive calls, and proxy peers, which act as application-level routers,
just as in the SIP standard.
Figure IV.1: MISE-P2PSIP Overall architecture
IV.2 Self-organization
Self-organization is an important feature of P2P networks. In general, it ensures that the peers
can easily join and leave the overlay. In our architecture, an important characteristic which is the
group creation is added to allow the efficient management of nodes due to the coupling of peer
38
IV. MISE-P2PSIP ARCHITECTURE
node with different SIP entities. This section describes the group creation, the DC election and
the joining/leaving procedures. We take into account both voluntary and involuntary departures.
IV.2.1 Groups’ creation
When a node (Ni) joins a domain, it contacts the DC. The DC checks if there is a group (Gi)
with number of clients < N, where N is a configurable number. If it is the case, the DC adds Ni
to that Gi. If there is already a proxy in the group, the DC sets the incoming node as a client. If
there is no proxy, the incoming node is set as the proxy.
If no suitable group exists, the DC creates a new group and sets the incoming node as the GR.
Each group is identified by its ID. The DC maintains the list of the groups and for each group, it
updates and stores the GR and proxy addresses, and the number of clients.
IV.2.2 DC node’ setting up procedure
The default DC is considered to be trusted. The default DC provides to each GR a certificate
signed by itself. The certificate contains an ID which is the number of entering of the GR in the
overlay. Then, at specific time all GRs should hold a certificate signed by the current DC. Each
GR has public and private keys generated by the DC. DC provides its public key to all GRs. When
a DC leaves or fails, it should be replaced by one of the attending GRs. Following the technique
used in the “Web of Trust” [128], a GR that wants to become DC will be considered reliable or
trusted only if it is able to provide a certificate signed by the old DC (the previous one). Thus, in
order to avoid that unauthorized node becomes the new DC, the candidate DC should present the
certificate it holds to the other GRs. The other GRs then verify the certificate using the public
key of the DC (the old one). If the verification successes, the candidate DC receives a kind of
agreement from each GR in a SIP NOTIFY message. The candidate DC answers with an OK.
The candidate DC is elected when it receives agreements from all GRs. The new DC creates for
each GR a new certificate that it signs and sends to it. Along with the signed certificate, the
new DC sends also its public key to each GR. The new certificate replaces the old one and each
GR that receives it, knows that a new DC has started working. Therefore, in the case where two
candidates DC trigger together the election procedure, a given GR answers (by sending the SIP
NOTIFY) to the candidate DC with higher ID.
IV.2.3 Node joining procedures
Figure IV.2 summarizes the joining procedures. When a new node joins the network, it
sends a SIP REGISTER message to the DC. In a 200 OK message, the DC notifies the joining
node of its role (i.e. GR, Proxy, or Client). The information is inserted in the body of the OK
message by piggybacking the optional attribute “u” (containing the URI of description). Then,
no SIP extension is needed to do this. This SIP REGISTER message is only used to establish a
preliminary communication of the joining node with the DC.
If the joining node is a client, it gets its role, its group’ ID and the addresses of the proxy/GR
of the group to which it is added (in the 200 OK ). The joining node should properly register itself
to its own GR. In addition, the client might send a SIP SUBSCRIBE message to the DC, to its
GR and its proxy in order to be notified about important events (e.g. proxy or GR leaving).
If the joining node is a GR, the node is also given its role and the ID of its group. The DC sends
a SIP SUBSCRIBE message to the new GR. The GR registers to the DC and sends SUBSCRIBE
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Figure IV.2: Joining procedures flow charts
message to the DC. In addition, the GR gets a signed certificate, its public and private keys along
with the DC’ public key from the DC. The DC sends also the list of the participating GRs to the
new coming one. The list is updated by the DC every time that a GR joins or leaves.
When a proxy joins the network, it gets its role, its group’ ID and the address of the GR of
its group. The proxy registers itself and sends a SUBSCRIBE message to the GR and the DC.
Subsequently, GR and the DC subscribe to that proxy. The DC gives to the proxy the list of
participating proxies and updates it every time that a proxy joins or leaves.
IV.2.4 Node leaving procedures
This section describes first, voluntary nodes leaving procedures and subsequently the involun-
tary leaving procedures.
a) Graceful leaving
i. A client is leaving
The client sends a REGISTER message to the GR to unregister itself. The REGISTER mes-
sage is the same as that used in the joining procedure except that the ‘Cseq’ is different and the
‘expires’ parameter in the header is set to 0 (zero). The GR sends a SIP NOTIFY message to
the DC indicating that one client has left group Gi. This step allows the DC to know the current
number of clients in each group.
ii. A GR is leaving
If the group includes at least one client, the GR (randomly) chooses one client (Ci) to set as
the new GR (N-GR). The GR sends a NOTIFY message to Ci to inform it about its new role. It
also sends a NOTIFY to the other clients to inform them about the substitution of the GR. The
clients then register to the N-GR. To keep the DC informed, the leaving GR sends a NOTIFY
message to the DC to announce that it is leaving and that Ci is the new GR. It then unregisters
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from the DC that SUBSCRIBEs to N-GR. The DC updates the list of GRs, it held and sends it
to all GRs.
If the group only has a proxy, that proxy becomes the new GR. If the GR is the last node in the
group, the GR sends a REGISTER message to the DC to unregister itself and the group is deleted.
iii. A proxy is leaving
The leaving proxy (Ni) sends a REGISTER message to the GR to unregister itself. If there
is at least one client in the group, the GR chooses one client in the same group and sets it as the
new proxy. The new proxy is informed about its new role via a SIP NOTIFY message. The GR
also notifies all the clients in the group about the new proxy, and informs (using a SIP NOTIFY )
the DC about the newly elected proxy and the departure of the old one. The DC updates the list
of proxies, it held and sends it to all proxies.
If there is no client in the group, the GR notifies the DC that Ni has left.
iv. The DC is leaving
The DC contacts one GR in the overlay. This GR will become the new DC by using the DC
setting up procedure described above. In this case, a new GR needs to be set up in the group,
the old registrar was responsible for, using the procedure described above. The new DC should
broadcast its contact information to the proxies.
b) Involuntary departure
Involuntary departure refers to the case the node has left without notifying its departure
because of power failure, battery lost, etc.
The failure of a Client node should be detected by its proxy. The failure of a proxy is detected
by the GR of its group and the GR failure is detected by the DC. We provide also mechanism to
allow replacing the DC which acts as bootstrap node when it fails.
i. Client failure
The proxy sends periodically keep-alive messages to the client nodes under its responsibility.
When the responses to these keep-alive messages are delayed the proxy infers that the concerned
client node has failed. Then, the proxy sends SIP NOTIFY messages to the DC and the GR
to inform them. The DC will update the number of client node of this group and the GR will
unregister the node.
ii. Proxy failure
The GR sends periodically keep-alive messages to the proxy of its group. If the response to
a given keep-alive message is not received, the GR infers that the proxy has suddenly left. The
remainder of the procedure is the same as in the case of graceful leaving.
iii. GR failure
The DC sends periodically keep-alive messages to the GRs of its domain. When the DC does
not receive response from a given GR, it triggers the procedure of replacement of this GR. The
procedure is as following.
The DC informs the proxy of the group which will have in charge the setting up of the new
GR. If the group includes at least one client, the proxy chooses randomly one client (Ci) to set as
new GR (N-GR). The proxy sends a NOTIFY message to Ci to inform it about its new role. It
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also sends a NOTIFY message to the other clients to inform them about the substitution of the
GR. The clients should register to N-GR. The proxy should also register itself. When the N-GR
is set, the proxy sends to the DC the address of the N-GR in the NOTIFY message. The DC
subscribes to N-GR in order to get notifications in the future. N-GR might register to the DC and
send also the SUBSCRIBE message to it.
If the group only has a proxy, the proxy becomes the new GR. If the GR is the last node in
the group, the DC unregisters the old GR and deletes the group.
iv. DC failure
The first node that joins the overlay is configured as default DC which is like a bootstrap node
for the overlay. However, all nodes acting as registrar servers can also act as DC when needed.
In order to handle the DC failure, the other GRs send periodically keep-alive messages to the
DC. When the DC does not answer the keep-alive messages, the first GR that detects the DC
failure triggers the procedure to become the new DC of the SIP domain. This procedure has been
described above.
Note that each node holds different kinds of SIP modules with are activated according to the
role played by the node. Those modules will be described later in the chapter.
IV.3 Call procedures
During a call setup, the role of the proxy is mainly to forward the SIP INVITE message based
on the SIP URI of the target’s node. There are two communication scenarios:
• The source Peer Client and the target Peer Client are in the same group. The request should
be sent to the proxy of the group. The proxy will request the contact information of the
target client to the group’s GR, if the information is not in its cache or has expired. The GR
replies by sending the requested information. Note that the contact information is retrieved
from the overlay and converted in non-SIP messages (i.e. database lookup) as specified in
RFC 3261. The proxy forwards the INVITE request to the target node and caches/updates
the contact information received from the GR.
• The source Peer Client (Ci) and the target Peer Client (Cj) are in different groups. After
checking the local cache and GR, the proxy (Pi) sends the INVITE message to all proxies
in the domain. When a proxy receives the INVITE, it processes it as in the previous case.
The proxy (Pj) that is responsible for the target node will then forward the request to the
target node. The response from the target node should take the same path back to reach the
call initiator. When the proxy Pi receives a response from Pj, it forwards the response to the
source Peer Client and stores in its cache that the target node (Cj) is accessible via the proxy
Pj.
IV.4 Call scenarios
This section gives examples of the call scenarios that we mentioned in the previous section.
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IV.4.1 The two communication parties are in the same group
Figure IV.3 shows a call scenario where a client C1 in group1 is willing to establish a SIP
session with a client C2 in the same group. The two clients register each to the group registrar
GR1 at steps 1 to 4. Subsequently, Client C1 creates the SIP INVITE request and sends it to its
proxy P1 at step 5. P1 checks its cache (step 6) and does not find the IP address of C2 which is
the target client. Then, P1 asks C2’ IP address to GR1 and gets it since C2 is the same group
as C1 (steps 7 and 8). P1 forwards the INVITE to C2 (step 9). C2 answers with the SIP OK
response which is sent to C1 through P1 (steps 10 and 11). P1 stores the IP address of C2 for
future uses at step 12.
Figure IV.3: SIP Call in the same group
IV.4.2 The two communication parties are in different groups
Figure IV.4 shows a scenario where a client C1 in group1 is willing to establish a SIP session
with a client C2 in group2. First, the two clients register to their respective GRs (steps1 to 4). In
step 5, C1 sends a SIP INVITE message to its proxy (i.e. P1). P1 checks its cache and its GR
but does not get anything about C2’ IP address (steps 6 to 8). Then, P1 forwards the request to
the other proxies at step 9. When P2 gets the request, it checks its cache at step 10, but the cache
does not include any information about C2. It then asks its GR for C2’ contact information (steps
11 and 12) and forwards the request to it at step 13. The response of C2 is forwarded back to C1
via P2 and P1 (steps 14 and 15). P1 forwards the OK response to C1 (step 16) and stores in its
cache the information that C2 is accessible via the proxy P2 (step 17).
IV.5 Multi-domains communication
Each SIP domain is mapped to a single overlay. Taking into account multiple SIP domains,
the SIP call scenario might change. Due to our requirement on the SIP compliance, the inter-
domain call cannot occur without the help of the DNS. According to RFC 3263, a specific host
name could be added to the DNS for a given domain. Then, we record a specific DC’ host name
in the DNS. The query of the domain name will then display only the DC contact information for
this domain. When a DC enters in a domain or is newly elected, it should add its information in
the DNS so that DCs’ list in the DNS is always updated. Actually, when a proxy is looking for a
client which is not in its domain, the request is forwarded to the DC which resolves the domain
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Figure IV.4: SIP Call between different groups
name in the DNS and gets the address of the DC of the destination domain. Thus, the request is
directly forwarded to this DC. The DC of the destination domain sends the request to a random
proxy in the domain. At this point, the request is handled as in a single domain. The response is
forwarded following the same procedure. DCs’ addresses are not locally caching in a single domain
because of the constant change of the network.
IV.6 Implementation
This section focuses on the implementation of our P2P SIP network. We present the software
architecture of the nodes and the prototype.
IV.6.1 Software architecture
The overall software architecture, including the interactions between the different types of
nodes, is presented in figure IV.5. We define three (3) main modules: “P2P SIP”, “SIP to Overlay”
and “Overlay Peer Management” that are described below.
Figure IV.5: Software architecture
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a) P2P SIP Proxy, P2P SIP Registrar and P2P SIP Client modules
P2P SIP proxy, P2P SIP registrar and P2P SIP client are modified standard SIP proxy, SIP
registrar and SIP client in the sense that they implement the joining and the leaving procedures
previously described in addition to the standard SIP multimedia sessions procedures.
From the joining perspective, this means, for instance, that P2P SIP proxy, P2P SIP registrar
and SIP client modules start by creating a SIP REGISTER message that is sent to the DC. Then,
the DC uses P2P SIP registrar module to process the request and to create an OK response with
the assigned role to the joining node.
P2P SIP proxy, P2P SIP registrar, and P2P SIP client modules also interact with “SIP to
overlay mapping” that interacts with the “overlay peer management”. The interaction with the
“SIP to overlay mapping” is used to isolate the P2P SIP proxy, registrar and client from the
specifics of the middleware. The P2P SIP modules contain many useful procedures which process
SIP messages. Among them, there are:
• Process Request: It processes SIP requests.
• Process Response: It processes SIP responses.
• Send SIP message: It allows sending SIP messages between SIP nodes.
b) The Overlay Peer Management
“Overlay Peer Management” is the middleware-dependent part of the architecture and inter-
acts with the “SIP to overlay mapping” module. It mainly includes procedures which allow joining
nodes to become peers and then to get a Peer ID in the overlay. It also enables the storage and
retrieval of contact information. Those procedures are:
• Become peer: It allows a node to become a peer and to get a unique peer ID.
• Store contact information: It allows the storage of contact information in the overlay.
• Retrieve conctact information: It allows the retrieval of contact information from the overlay.
c) SIP to Overlay mapping
The SIP to Overlay mapping segment understands/speaks SIP on one side, and understands/speaks
the specific middleware primitives on the other side. It enables the mapping of SIP messages to
overlay messages and vice versa. The main procedures in this module are:
• Mapping of SIP message to overlay message: it allows information to be extracted from SIP
messages in order to create specific overlay messages. This procedure is used, for instance,
when the GR receives a SIP REGISTER message from a Peer Client or a Peer proxy and has
to store the contact information in the overlay. The appropriate overlay message is generated
by this procedure and sent to the “overlay peer management”, which has in charge to store
it using the overlay protocol stack.
• Mapping of overlay message to SIP: it allows the creation of SIP messages containing infor-
mation that is retrieved from the overlay. This procedure is for instance used by the GR
to send the contact information requested by a proxy. The appropriate response message is
generated by this procedure and sent to the “P2P SIP registrar” module which then sends it
to the proxy using the SIP protocol stack.
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IV.6.2 Prototype
We have prototyped a sub-set of our architecture on top of two different middleware. The
prototype provides call establishment between two SIP clients. For each middleware implementa-
tion, the two communication parties run on two laptops with 1.6 GHz of processor frequency and
1Go of memory. The prototype is basic but the goal is to show the successful integration of P2P
and SIP leading to a real SIP signaling messages exchange between two parties.
The P2P part of the prototype is implemented using JXTA middleware on one side and
Chord-based ProActive middleware on other side, while the SIP part is implemented using JAIN
SIP [17].
For both prototype implementations, the “P2P SIP”, the “SIP to Overlay” and the “Overlay
Peer Management” described in the previous section, have been implemented on client side.
a) Prototype on Jxta middleware
JXTA [16] is used as the middleware. It is a set of XML (Extensible Markup Language) based
protocols and a Java reference API that provides a generic implementation framework for P2P. The
framework provides the basic elements for P2P computing, including peers, peer groups, discovery,
service, and messages routing. All JXTA network resources are represented by an advertisement.
An advertisement is created using language-neutral meta-data structures and is represented as
XML document.
Two communication transport types have been implemented:
• Using SIP ports: The P2P node uses TCP/UDP as transport protocol to send signaling
messages.
• Using JXTA Pipes: The P2P node uses JXTA pipes to send signaling messages. Indeed the
pipes are like ports used in JXTA to create communication channels in order to send messages
between peers. The pipes could be asynchronous, unidirectional and non reliable.
We have successfully tested the following functions:
• The client successfully enters in the overlay, publishes directly an advertisement containing
its IP address in the overlay since the GR has not been implemented.
• A client node can successful initiate a SIP call (generating and sending an INVITE) toward
a target client without knowing a priori its IP address.
• The IP address of the destination node is successfully discovered by the source node.
• The two clients can successful exchange SIP signaling messages (INVITE, OK and ACK).
Figure IV.6 shows the call interface provided by the prototype. As said before, there are the
possibilities to initiate/receive call using SIP port or to initiate/receive call using JXTA pipes.
The peer successful joins the overlay, creates input JXTA pipe in order to be able to receive
message and publish its IP address in the overlay.
In the example shown here, we choose to make SIP call using SIP ports. Then, a source
peer pushes the Play SIP call button to initiate a call (by creating a SIP INVITE). Figure IV.7
shows important additional messages. At this step, the source peer has found the IP address of
the destination node and sends the INVITE to it.
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Figure IV.6: Launching interface
Figure IV.7: Destination node IP address discovery
The INVITE message created and sent by the source node to the destination node is shown
in figure IV.8. Once the callee received the INVITE, it creates the OK that it sends to the caller
and receives back the ACK message. Figure IV.9 depicts the rest of messages transaction on the
destination node side.
Figure IV.10 depicts an example of the IP address/port advertisement sent by the source node
into the overlay.
b) Prototype on Chord-ProActive
The P2P part of the prototype is implemented using the open source implementation of Chord
based on ProActive middleware called Chord-ProActive [68]. Indeed, Chord network behaviors
(architecture, functionalities, etc) are implemented using ProActive middleware. Chord-ProActive
used the concept of tracker in order to maintain references of peers in a Chord P2P network. This
allows having at any time entry points into the network. In theory, the references of all peers
are not stored but a large set is kept to tolerate a certain number of failures. Each tracker is
associated with a Chord network and keeps a reference to peers belonging to this network. The
tracker contains node IDs calculated automatically when node joins and the key.
We suitably modify the available source code of Chord-ProActive to fit our needs. For instance,
upon node registration in the overlay, the tracker is modified to contain the node IP address and
port of each node in addition to the information mentioned above and an additional function is
implemented to allow a physical node to join the Chord network.
The following functionalities have been successfully tested:
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Figure IV.8: INVITE message sent by the source node
Figure IV.9: SIP messages on destination node side
• Nodes are able to join the network from different computers and become chord peer.
• Nodes can gracefully leave the network and the tracker is successfully updated.
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Figure IV.10: Example of published IP address/port advertisement
• Nodes in the chord network have a kind of contact list from which they choose the destination
node.
• SIP signaling messages are successfully exchanged between the two nodes.
Figure IV.11 shows the application interface with an example of virtual nodes organizing in
ring.
Figure IV.11: Example of Chord network
The interface makes available some buttons that allow performing important functionalities.
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Button “Join Chord Net” allows physical (real) nodes to join the overlay. Buttons “Add Node”
and “Remove Node”, respectively allow adding and removing virtual nodes from the network.
Buttons “Play SIP Call” and “Receive SIP Call” allow initiating and terminating SIP call session.
In addition, it is possible to view the finger table of a given node. Note that the finger table
contains a list of keys and their successor’ IPs, and is organized such that each node holds the IP
of an exponential sequence of nodes that follow it, (i.e. entry i of node k’ finger table holds the
IP of node k + 2ˆi with i being the key size). In Figure IV.11, we can see the finger table of node
with ID=0 that contains five rows because i=5.
Figure IV.12 shows the network, we effectively used to make SIP calls. The network contains
two real Chord nodes.
Figure IV.12: Real Chord network
The interface shown in figure IV.13 appears when the call is initiated by pushing “Play SIP
Call” button. It shows the list of the connected peers and allows choosing the called peer. In our
scenario node with ID 30 wants to call node with ID 0.
Figure IV.13: Real Chord network: call interface
Figure IV.14 depicts the SIP INVITE created by the caller and sent to the callee.
Figure IV.15 shows the SIP INVITE received by the callee.
When the caller received the OK, it creates a SIP ACK that it sends to the callee. Figure IV.16
shows the SIP OK message sent by the callee and the ACK message that it receives from the caller.
The SIP final dialog state is also shown to prove the successful establishment of the call session.
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Figure IV.14: INVITE message sent by the caller
Figure IV.15: INVITE message received by the callee
Figure IV.16: Final dialog state on the callee side
c) Conclusion
By implementing our prototype on two different middleware, it becomes evident the strength
of our architecture. We implemented first the three modules (“P2P SIP”, “SIP to Overlay” and
the “Overlay Peer Management”) for the JXTA-based prototype. In order to get completed the
Chord-based prototype, it was not necessary to modify the P2P SIP module. Only the “SIP to
Overlay” and the “Overlay Peer Management” have been suitably modified to work with the new
middleware. This has been possible because, no overlay mechanism and message is implied during
the SIP call establishment procedure. In addition, the JAIN SIP API has been used without
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modifications to implement the SIP functionalities. Hence, the proof of our main requirements
that are the middleware-independence and the SIP compliance features.
IV.7 Evaluation
We used OverSim [15], an open source P2P network simulation framework, to evaluate the
performance of our architecture. OverSim was built by the Institute of Telematics, Universita¨t
Karlsruhe to work on top of the OMNeT++/OMNEST simulation environment. It includes several
structured and unstructured P2P protocols such as Chord, Kademlia and Pastry. OverSim also
provides several common functions, including a generic lookup mechanism and a remote procedure
call interface to facilitate the implementation of additional protocols. Another important feature
of OverSim is that it provides several models for generating churn (including a lifetime-based churn
model supporting different distribution functions) and underlying network topology.
The goal of our simulations was to evaluate the performance of our architecture on top of
different P2P overlay middleware. We measured the round trip time experienced by SIP messages
and the traffic overhead introduced by the architecture for different network configuration scenarios.
We compared the obtained results to those obtained for a flat P2P SIP network (i.e., a conventional
DHT-based P2P SIP network without proxies). The goal of the comparison was to evaluate the
impact of the introduction of proxies into the P2P SIP topology on the performance of the P2P
SIP solution. We have also evaluated the effect of caching on the overall architecture.
IV.7.1 Simulation Scenario
We have designed a realistic network scenario to run our simulations. The network is made of a
set of clients that run the P2P SIP application, a set of access routers and a set of backbone routers.
The clients are connected to access routers using DSL (Digital Subscriber Line) connections (delay
= 20ms and bandwidth = 1Mbps) and the peers are connected to access routers using Ethernet
(delay = 1ms and bandwidth = 100Mbps;). Access routers are connected to backbone routers
using fiberlines (delay = 1ms and bandwidth = 10Gbps) and the backbone routers are connected
to each other using fiberlines (delay = 1ms; bandwidth = 10Gbps).
The lifetime of peers is randomly drawn from a probability function (Weibull distribution).
When this time is reached, the node is removed and a new peer is created after a dead time drawn
from the same probability function.
When a client joins the overlay, it constructs its contact list by randomly selecting 10 contacts
out of the list of available contacts on the overlay. This assumption is a simple way to model the
fact that users generally make their calls to almost the same list of contacts. During the simulation,
each client randomly starts a SIP session with one of its contacts with a mean of one new session
every five minutes. Each session lasts three minutes. Processing time for the peers is neglected
and not considered in the RTT (Round Trip Time) delay, and each simulation scenario runs for at
least three hours. The caching lifetime is set to one hour.
IV.7.2 Results and discussions
a) Round trip time
Figure IV.17 shows the SIP average end-to-end round trip delay (from request generation at
the client to the reception of the final response) as a function of the number of nodes in the overlay
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for both proxy-based architecture (our architecture) and DHT-based architecture. The simulations
were run on top two P2P middleware: Kademlia and Chord. The results were collected for different
numbers of overlay nodes.
Figure IV.17: Proxy based vs. DHT based P2P SIP RTT
From figure IV.17, we can easily see that the average round trip delay for our architecture
is always smaller than the average round trip for the DHT-based architecture. This means that
the introduction of proxies into the P2P SIP architecture helps to reduce the delay involved in
establishing a SIP session. This is a very important result, as one of the main determining factors
for user experience is the time the user spends waiting to hear the ringing back signal.
A second result, we can draw from figure IV.17 is that the round trip time in our architecture
shows almost no increase with the number of nodes, which shows that our architecture scales very
well with the number of peers.
b) Effect of caching
The caching mechanism used by the proxy is important to reach our performance requirement.
A given proxy’ cache contains the SIP URI of a given node and its corresponding IP address when
the node is in the same group as the proxy or a given node’ SIP URI and the IP address of its
corresponding proxy when the node is not in the same group as a given proxy. The cache is updated
in two cases. The first case refers to when during a call set up a new destination is required. Then,
the cache does not contain any information about this destination node. The information is added
to the cache once it is received from the proxy of the destination node. The second case refers to
when the destination node is in the proxy’s group but the information about it, is already expired
since SIP clients have to periodically refresh their registration. In this case, the cache is updated
from the GR of the group.
In the second set of our experiments, we evaluated the effect of proxy caching on performance.
We studied the effect of caching through two metrics: the round trip time and the network load
(number of SIP applications and P2P overlay maintenance packets transiting through the network).
Figure IV.18 shows the round trip measurements.
From figure IV.18, we can see that caching significantly reduces the round trip delay of SIP
calls. This result was expected, as in many cases caching spares the proxy from fetching peers’
contacts from the GR.
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Figure IV.18: Effect of proxy caching on RTT
Another important result, made visible in figure IV.19, is that proxy caching also reduces
network load. We can see that caching allows a network load gain, which tends to revolve around
30% when the number of peers increases.
Figure IV.19: Effect of caching on network load
Based on the results presented here, we can conclude that the proxy-based P2P SIP approach,
along with proxy caching, improves the round trip delay and network usage efficiency of P2P SIP
architectures.
IV.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed a novel architecture for P2P SIP. This novel architecture
focuses on the case of a single domain, and assumes that the domain may have many proxies, each
capable of managing a limited number of client peers. The peers are organized in several groups,
where each group is composed of one proxy, one group registrar and a given number of clients.
The domain has a bootstrapping node (i.e. the Domain Controller) that is responsible for creating
and managing the groups.
The architecture defines procedures for self-organization, ensures independence from P2P mid-
dleware, requires no extension to SIP messages, and provides a high performance level by imple-
menting a caching mechanism on the proxies. The proxies integrate a caching mechanism to store
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previously obtained contact information, which avoids querying before each call.
Particular software architecture was also designed and a proof-of-concept prototype built using
JXTA on one side and Chord-ProActive on other side, has been released. SIP functionalities have
been implemented using JAIN SIP. The prototype implemented the Client side modules. The use
of SIP messages for all of the procedures ensures middleware-independence. The same is applied
to the software architecture that cleanly isolates the SIP modules from the middleware through
mapping modules. We did not extend any SIP message.
The simulations show that the proxy-based P2P SIP approach along with proxy caching,
improves round trip delay and network usage efficiency of P2P SIP architectures.
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Part III
Routing issues in P2P SIP overlay
I n the previous chapter, we have proposed an architecture to integrate Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
principles into the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) so that to take advantage of all benefits in-
herent to the two paradigms. In our P2P SIP architecture, the SIP location service is integrated
in proxies that are peer entities in the P2P overlay. Therefore, having SIP proxies as first-class
entities, raises two important issues: proxy topology building and proxy-level routing. Thanks to
proxy topology building, a proxy joining the P2P overlay knows where it should insert itself in the
network of proxies. Proxy-level routing enables messages to be routed in the SIP network built by
proxy topology building.
This part of the thesis is composed of chapters V and VI. Chapter V discusses a novel frame-
work for proxy topology building and proxy-level routing. The framework is general enough to
be used on any P2P overlay that meets a minimal set of requirements. Our framework relies on
an algorithm that builds the network of proxies in a ring and uses its own routing algorithms to
route calls. We describe our novel routing algorithms used between proxies and evaluate their per-
formance through simulation. Although those algorithms work efficiently to make communication
effective between two endpoints, it is necessary to cope with NAT traversal issues inherent to SIP
communications when needed. Chapter VI provides a suitable technique for NAT traversal in our
P2P SIP framework for both SIP signaling messages and media streams.
Chapter V
Topology building and routing in
MISE-P2PSIP
T his chapter gives first the motivation of having a special topology for proxy servers in
MISE-P2PSIP and appropriate routing algorithms. Subsequently, the related work as well as the
requirements are discussed. Moreover, the framework is presented in some details. Finally, we
compare our framework on one side with OSPF (Open Shortest Path First) routing algorithm and
on other side with a DHT-based SIP message routing.
V.1 Motivation
In the architecture proposed in the previous chapter, the proxies are fully meshed. While
fully meshing proxies increases call performance and makes routing straightforward, scalability is
a major issue, making the architecture unfit for large-scale deployment. Topology maintenance
cost may become prohibitive. This indicates the need of building a topology that scales and routing
algorithms that remain simple. Our choice is based on ring topology because it is very simple and
easy to implement. Therefore, the framework proposes two main functionalities: proxy topology
building and proxy-level routing. Proxy topology building is the process that indicates where a
new proxy joining the overlay will be inserted in the network of proxies. Proxy-level routing is the
process that routes messages in the network resulting from proxy topology building. Thus, in this
chapter, we improve our architecture by proposing a topology that scales and simple yet effective
routing algorithms.
V.2 Requirements
The first requirement is that the framework should meet the key requirements of our overall
architecture. The new architecture preserves our initial proposal’s properties (independence from
P2P infrastructure, SIP extensions kept to a minimum and self-organization). Also, the new
framework supports four additional requirements.
• Firstly, our framework allows recovery from failure, automatically restoring broken routes
between the different proxies.
• Secondly, it provides simple algorithms for topology building and routing. In terms of topol-
ogy, the proxies’ topology should be as simple as possible to ensure it can be created and
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re-organized easily. Regarding routing, simplicity means that the maintenance procedure for
the routing tables should be simple, not take much time to converge, and not generate too
much traffic in the network.
• Thirdly, each proxy in a topology should be able to reach any other proxy in the same topology,
meaning that the graph formed by the proxies should be connected.
• A fourth requirement satisfied by our proposal is that the routing protocol provides the
basic properties of routing, namely efficiency, optimality, simplicity, robustness, stability, and
scalability in the number of proxies. Routing efficiency means that the routing algorithm
should always find a path to reach one node (if a path exists). Optimality refers to the
algorithm’s ability to always provide the shortest path. The routing table should also be as
smaller as possible. Robustness means that the routing algorithm should be able to cope with
changes in the topology, including node failure. A stable algorithm reaches equilibrium and
stays there.
V.3 Related work and analysis
We split the related work into two categories: P2P SIP architectures that include both topol-
ogy building and routing, and general infrastructure-independent routing protocols. We do not
consider the first category of the existing P2P SIP architectures that extend SIP [5], because we
consider compatibility with current SIP standards as key requirement. We will rather focus on the
architectures that do not extend SIP.
Several P2P SIP frameworks proposed to date like P2PNS [13], SIP usage for RELOAD [12]
belong to the first category and are similar to our framework.
RELOAD’s routing [12] relies on two basic mechanisms: Symmetric recursive routing and It-
erative routing. Symmetric recursive routing requires that a message follows the path through the
overlay to the destination without returning to the originating node. This means that each peer for-
wards the message closer to its destination. RELOAD messages contains both “Via List” attributes
(built hop-by-hop as the message is routed through the overlay) and “Destination List” attributes
(providing source-routing capabilities for requests and return-path routing for responses). The
return path of the response is then the same path followed in reverse. RELOAD also supports a
basic Iterative routing mode where the intermediate peers merely return a response indicating the
next hop, but do not actually forward the message to that next hop themselves. Iterative routing
is implemented using the “Route Query” method that allows a node to query a peer for the next
hop it will use to route a message.
P2PNS [13] uses the Key-Based Routing layer (KBR) that provides a “route” method to
efficiently route a message to an arbitrary key by successively forwarding the message to overlay
neighbors which have a nodeID closer to the destination key. Indeed, a common service which is
provided by all structured P2P networks is the KBR layer. This layer provides efficient routing
to identifiers called keys from a large identifier space. Every participating node in the overlay
chooses a unique nodeID from the same id space and maintains a routing table with nodeIDs and
IP addresses of neighbors in the overlay topology. Every node is responsible for a particular range
in the identifier space, usually for all keys close to its nodeID in the id space. P2PNS proposes to
use the Kademlia protocol as KBR layer, then uses routing protocol released by Kademlia.
Both RELOAD and P2PNS proposals explicitly do not fill our specific requirement on P2P
infrastructure-independence, by using the P2P routing mechanisms to send messages.
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The second category includes infrastructure-independent routing protocols that are classic
Internet routing protocols such as Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) [69] and Distance Vector
Routing (DVR) [70].
OSPF is a link state protocol. The Shortest Path First (SPF) routing algorithm is the basis
for OSPF [69] operations. When an SPF router is powered up, it initializes its routing-protocol
data structures and then waits for indications from lower-layer protocols that its interfaces are
functional. After a router is assured that its interfaces are functioning, it uses the OSPF Hello
protocol to acquire neighbors, which are routers with interfaces to a common network. The router
sends hello packets to its neighbors and receives their hello packets. In addition to helping acquire
neighbors, hello packets also act as keep-alive packets to let routers know that other routers
are still functional. On multi-access networks (networks supporting more than two routers), the
Hello protocol elects a designated router and a backup designated router which among other
things, is responsible for generating LSAs (Link-State Advertisement) for the entire multi-access
network. Designated routers allow a reduction in network traffic and in the size of the topological
database. When the link-state databases of two neighboring routers are synchronized, the routers
are said to be adjacent. On multi-access networks, the designated router determines which routers
should become adjacent. Topological databases are synchronized between pairs of adjacent routers.
Adjacencies control the distribution of routing-protocol packets, which are sent and received only on
adjacencies. Each router periodically sends an LSA to provide information on router’s adjacencies
or to inform others when a router’s state changes. By comparing established adjacencies to link
states, failed routers can be detected quickly and the network’s topology altered appropriately.
From the topological database generated from LSAs, each router calculates a shortest-path tree,
with itself as root. The shortest-path tree, in turn, yields a routing table.
Many routing protocols fall in the category of DVR protocols. There are for instance RIP
(Routing Information Protocol) [120] and IGRP (Internet Gateway Routing Protocol) [121]. The
methods used to calculate the best path for a network are different for each routing protocol but
the fundamental features of Distance Vector (DV) algorithms are the same across all DV-based
protocols. Distance Vector means that routers are advertised as vector of distance and direction.
Direction is simply the next hop address and exit interface and distance means hop count. Routers
using distance vector protocol do not have knowledge of the entire path to a destination. The DV
protocol is based on calculating the direction and distance to any link in a network. The cost
of reaching a destination is calculated using various route metrics. For instance, RIP uses the
hop count of the destination whereas IGRP takes into account other information such as node
delay and available bandwidth. Updates are performed periodically where all or part of a router’s
routing table is sent to all its neighbors that are configured to use the same distance vector routing
protocol. Once a router has this information, it is able to amend its own routing table to reflect
the changes and informs its neighbors of the changes. This process is usually called “routing by
rumor” because routers are relying on the information they receive from other routers and cannot
determine if the information is actually valid and true.
OSPF and DVR protocols meet most of the routing requirements (e.g. efficiency and opti-
mality). However, in the specific case of the topology we propose, they generate more network
traffic.
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V.4 Proposed framework
We assume that the P2P SIP nodes are in a single SIP domain. The domain may have many
proxies, and each proxy can manage a limited number of client peers. However, our middleware-
independent approach can support handling multiple domains even when they rely on heteroge-
neous P2P overlays.
In this section, we first introduce the architectural principles on which our framework is based,
followed by the topology creation. The routing is then discussed and an example of application is
presented in the last sub-section.
V.4.1 Architectural principles
The entities are the same as in the previous architecture (figure IV.1). So, the peer nodes are
organized in several groups. Each group is composed of one proxy, one GR (Group Registrar) and
0 to N clients. The proxies are organized into a ring; we chose a ring topology because it is simple
to implement and easy to maintain. Each domain has a single DC (Domain Controller), which is
the overlay bootstrap node. Each node joining the overlay SIP domain should first contact the DC.
The DC is responsible for creating and managing the groups, and for creating and maintaining
the proxies’ ring. The DC keeps the list of the groups and for each group, it maintains the GR
address and the number of clients. To allow recovery from failure, we select the alternative which
consists of putting the recovery functionality in the topology building instead of in the routing
procedure. The ring architecture is depicted in figure V.1. Unlike many existing architectures
with proxies, the algorithms used by our architecture for topology creation and for routing are
P2P infrastructure-independent, thereby ensuring portability.
Figure V.1: New topology building proxies in ring
V.4.2 Topology creation and maintenance
The proxies’ ring is organized following a clockwise direction, where the new node is inserted
between the first and the last node in the ring. The first and the last nodes will be the successor to
and the predecessor of the new node, respectively. We choose this alternative (clockwise direction)
because it makes new node insertion simple and minimizes the information maintained by the DC.
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The DC maintains a topology table that includes the first and the last node in the ring. When
a new node is inserted, only the table entry corresponding to the last node is updated. Each
proxy has also a topology table which contains its successor and predecessor in the ring. This
section describes how a new proxy is added to or removed from the ring. The joining and leaving
procedures for the other nodes (Client, GR and DC) are the same as those described in the previous
chapter. It is the reason why they are not presented here.
a) A proxy joins the network
When a proxy (Pi) joins the network, it sends a SIP REGISTER message to the DC. The DC
sends to Pi the address of the GR, the addresses of Pi’s predecessor and successor, and the total
number of the proxies in the ring (N), including the new incoming (Pi). This information is sent
in the 200 OK SIP message. The DC also forwards the Pi’s registration to the GR.
Then, Pi sends a SUBSCRIBE message to the GR to subscribe to events notification, and the
GR does the same. Pi subscribes to its neighbors as well, to notify its place in the ring (i.e. as
predecessor or successor) and to receive future notifications from them. Subsequently, each of the
two neighbors also subscribes to the Pi. Pi sets a TTL (TTL=(N/2)-1) variable in the message.
TTL is used to control the number of times the information about the new proxy is forwarded
inside the ring.
When a neighbor (Ni) receives the SUBSCRIBE, it sends a SUBSCRIBE to Pi and updates its
routing table using the procedure “Routing table update” described in the next section. If TTL>0,
Ni notifies (via a SIP NOTIFY ) its other neighbor (i.e. other than the one from which it receives
the information) about Pi. It sends the following information: new node=Pi; distance=D(Ni→Pi);
TTL=TTL-1. The SUBSCRIBE messages sent by the first neighbors contains D(Ni→Pi)=1.
At this step, the receiving proxy (Pj) updates its routing table by using the procedure “Routing
table update”. If TTL-1>0, the proxy forwards the information in a NOTIFY message to the next
hop with: new node=Pi; distance=D(Pj→Pi); TTL=TTL-1. If a proxy receives the information
twice (from its successor and predecessor), it chooses the first path it receives.
b) A proxy leaves the network
The leaving proxy (Ni) sends a NOTIFY message to the GR of its group, along with its
predecessor (Pr-i) and successor (Su-i), and then unregisters from the GR.
If there is at least one client in the group, the GR chooses one client in the same group and
sets it as the new proxy (the clients SUBSCRIBE to the GR when they enter the network). The
newly-elected proxy will have the same proxy-ID as the departing one. It is informed about its
new role via a NOTIFY message and it is given its successor (i.e. Su-i) and predecessor (i.e. Pr-i).
It then sends a SUBSCRIBE to its neighbors as in the joining procedure. Next, the neighbors
update the address of the proxy in their routing tables. The GR also notifies all the clients in the
group about the new proxy, and informs (using a SIP NOTIFY ) the DC about the new elected
proxy and the departure of the old one. The DC had subscribed to the GR when the GR joined
the network. If the departing proxy is the first or the last entering in the ring, the DC updates its
topology table.
If there is no client in the group, the GR notifies Pr-i that Ni has left and that its new successor
is Su-i. Pr-i subscribes to Su-i and informs it to be its new predecessor. Then, the remaining proxies
in the ring will use the algorithm described in figure V.4 to update their respective routing table.
In this way, the proxy ring is always kept connected. The GR also notifies the DC that Ni has
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left, and gives Pr-i and Su-i. DC updates its topology table if Ni was the last or the first proxy in
the ring.
V.4.3 Routing algorithms
Each proxy maintains a routing table that includes an entry for every other proxy in the ring.
Each entry has three columns: destination (i.e. the proxy to reach), send (i.e. right or left), and
distance (i.e. the distance needed to reach the destination).
The distance is calculated as the number of hops towards the destination. The “send” column
is set to “left” if the shortest path to reach the destination is in the clockwise direction. Otherwise,
the column is set to right. This section describes how the routing tables of the different proxies
are created and updated.
Basically three (3) routing algorithms have been proposed:
1. The procedure for an existing proxy to update its routing table when a new proxy joins the
ring
2. The procedure for the joining proxy to create its routing table
3. The procedure for an existing proxy to update its routing table when a proxy leaves the ring
The following legend is applied to all algorithms described in this section:
• D(pi→pj): The distance between Pi and Pj,
• Right(Pj) and Left(Pj): The list of the proxies that Pj reaches from its right or its left,
respectively,
• Candidates(Pj): equal to Right(Pj) or Left(Pj) depending whether Pj receives the message
(i.e. a proxy is joining or a proxy is leaving) from its right or from its left.
Following is the description of each algorithm.
a) Creation/update of the routing tables when a proxy joins
i. Routing table update
When a proxy (Pi) joins the ring and sends a SUBSCRIBE message to its neighbors, it includes
a TTL variable in the message. The TTL is equal to the integer value of: (N/2)-1, where N is the
number of proxies in the ring. It is used to control the number of times the information about the
new proxy is forwarded inside the ring. When a neighbor (Ni) receives a SUBSCRIBE, it updates
its routing table using the procedure described in figure V.2. Among others, it adds a new entry
to its local routing table as follows: destination=Pi; distance=1; send=left (or right, depending
on if Pi is the predecessor or the successor). If TTL>0, Ni notifies (via a SIP NOTIFY ) its
other neighbor about Pi. It sends the following information: new node=Pi; distance=D(Ni→Pi);
TTL=TTL-1; D(Ni→Pi) is the distance between Ni and Pi.
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Algorithm 1 The procedure for an existing proxy to update its routing table when a new proxy joins the ring
1: Begin
2: A proxy Pj receives information that a new proxy Pi is added to the ring (via SUBSCRIBE or NOTIFY),
with the attributes: new node=Pi; distance=di; TTL=TTLi;
3: Pj updates N value: N=N+1
4: If D(pj→pi)<=N/2 then :::: there may be some proxies that Pj should now reach via Pi
5: For each proxy pk in Candidates(Pj)
6: If (D(pj→pk)>=D(pi→pj)) then :::: If Pk is now reachable via the new proxy Pi
7: If (D(pj→pk)+1<=N/2) then :::: If the new distance to Pk is still less than the maximum distance
that we can get inside the ring (i.e. int(N/2))
8: Change D(pj→pk): D(pj→pk) += 1:::: update the distance, but keep the same path
9: Else
10: Switch the “send” column corresponding to pk in the routing table :::: Keep the same distance
but specify that Pk is now reachable via the opposite path (not via Pj)
11: End
Figure V.2: Routing table creation/update for other proxies when a new proxy joins
ii. Routing table creation for a new proxy
The receiving proxy (Pj) executes the same procedure as Ni (i.e. it updates its routing table
and notifies its other neighbor if appropriate) and the procedure is repeated until TTL=0. If a
proxy receives the notification twice (from its successor and from its predecessor), it chooses the
first path it receives. This will happen if N is even, and the two paths will have the same length.
The new proxy creates its own routing table using the procedure described in figure V.3.
Algorithm 2 The procedure for the joining proxy to create its routing table
1: Begin
2: When a proxy Pi is added to the ring, it gets its successor (Su) and predecessor (Pr).
3: Pi adds Su to its routing table, with “send”=left & distance=1.
4: When Pi sends a SUBSCRIBE message to its successor, it receives a NOTIFY message including the routing
table of the successor (Tsu).
5: Pi updates its own routing table from its successor’s routing table.
6: For each Pk ∈ Left(Su)
7: If (D(Su→pk)+1) <= N/2 then
8: Pi adds Pk to its routing table with the same “send” attribute as in Tsu,
and with distance = D(Su→pk)+1
9: Else
10: Pi adds Pk to its routing table with a switched value of “send” attribute in Tsu,
and with the same distance as in Tsu.
11: For each Pk ∈ Right(Su)
12: Pi adds Pk to its routing table with the same “send” attribute and distance as in Tsu.
13: End
Figure V.3: Creation of routing table of joining proxy
b) Update of the routing tables when a proxy leaves
When a proxy Pi leaves the ring and there is no client to replace it, its predecessor Pr is
notified. Pr notifies its neighbors that Pi has left and the information is propagated inside the ring
using the same procedure as for a node joining, by using TTL=(N/2)-1. When a proxy receives the
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leaving notification, it removes the entry corresponding to Pi from its routing table and recalculates
its distances to the other proxies using the procedure in figure V.4.
Algorithm 3 The procedure for an existing proxy to update its routing table when a proxy leaves the ring
1: Begin
2: A proxy Pj receives the news that a proxy Pi has left the ring with attributes:
leaving node=Pi; distance=di; TTL=TTLi;
3: If D(pj→pi)<N/2 then :::: there may be some proxies that Pj is reaching via Pi
4: For each proxy pk in Candidates(Pj)
5: If (D(pj→pk)>=D(pj→pi)) then :::: If Pk is currently reachable via the leaving proxy Pi
6: Change D(pj→pk): D(pj→pk) -= 1:::: update the distance
7: For each proxy pm in Candidates ={p, p is a proxy and p /∈ Candidates}
8: If (D(pj→pm) =N/2) then
9: Switch the “send” attribute corresponding to Pm and switch direction
10: Pj updates N value: N=N-1
11: End
Figure V.4: Update of remaining proxies routing tables upon leaving
V.4.4 Example of routing table update
This section gives an example of the execution of the routing table update algorithm described
above in figure V.2, upon node joining.
Figure V.5 shows the initial state of the ring in our scenario. We will follow step by step, the
change of the routing table of proxy P2 while nodes P5, P6 and P7 join the ring.
Figure V.5: Initial state of the proxy ring in the scenario
Table V.1 shows the content of the routing table of P2 in the first three columns. The
path column is added to make easy the understanding of the example and indicates the shortest
path used to reach a proxy. So P2 routing table contains the “Destination”, the “Send” and the
“Distance” columns.
Destination Send Distance Path
P1 Right 1 P2P1
P2 - 0 P2
P3 Left 1 P2P3
P4 Left 2 P2P3P4
Table V.1: P2 initial routing table
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4 Step 1 : P5 joins the ring
Figure V.6 illustrates the ring with five participating proxies
Figure V.6: Proxy ring after P5 joining
What happens is:
• P2 receives a notification that P5 is added to the ring from its right (P1) and updates N the
number of nodes. N=5 (after new proxy joining)
• The distance between P2 and P5, D(p2→p5)=2 < N/2. N/2 is the maximum shortest distance
that we can get inside the ring. When N is not even the maximum distance is equal to the
integer part of N/2. In this case the maximum shortest distance is equal to 2.
• Right(p2)={P1} ; the list of the nodes that P2 reaches from its right according the P2’ routing
table. Then, the distance between P2 and each of these nodes is calculated and compared to
the distance between P2 and the new joining node (P5).
• D(p2→p1)=1<2 (D(p2→p5). This infers that no change on P1’ entry in the routing table is
needed.
• P2 adds to its routing table, a new entry about P5. The “Distance” is equal to “2” and the
“Send” field is set to “Right” because P2 has received the notification from its right.
P2’ updated routing table, looks like the first three columns of table V.2.
Destination Send Distance Path
P1 Right 1 P2P1
P2 - 0 P2
P3 Left 1 P2P3
P4 Left 2 P2P3P4
P5 Right 2 P2P1P5
Table V.2: P2 routing table after P5 joining
4 Step 2 : P6 joins the ring
Figure V.7 illustrates the ring with six participating proxies.
What happens is:
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Figure V.7: Proxy ring after P6 joining
• P2 receives the message that P6 is added to the ring from its right and updates N. N=6,
N/2=3.
• The distance between P2 and P6, D(p2→p6)=2 < (N/2);
• Right(p2)={P1, P5} is the list of the nodes that P2 reaches from its right according to its
routing table. The distance between P2 and each of these nodes is calculated and compared
to the distance between P2 and the new joining node (P6).
• D(p2→p1)=1<2. This means that there is no change to P1 entry in the routing table.
• D(p2→p5)=2>=2. This means that the distance may be changed. The new distance could
be D(p2→p5) +1 =3. In order to know if the distance should be changed or not, it is useful to
make a further comparison of this distance with the maximum shortest distance in the ring.
Then, D(p2→p5)=3<=N/2. This infers that the distance effectively changes and there is no
need to change the “send” column in the routing table. To summarize, the unique change to
P5 entry in P2 routing table is the distance that is set to 3.
• P2 adds to its routing table a new entry about P6. The “Distance” is equal to “2” and the
“Send” field is set to “Right” because P2 has received the notification from its right.
At this step, P2’ routing table looks like the first three columns of table V.3.
Destination Send Distance Path
P1 Right 1 P2P1
P2 - 0 P2
P3 Left 1 P2P3
P4 Left 2 P2P3P4
P5 Right 3 P2P1P6P5
P6 Right 2 P2P1P6
Table V.3: P2 routing table after P6 joining
4 Step 3 : P7 joins the ring
Figure V.8 illustrates the ring with seven participating proxies.
What happens is:
66
V. TOPOLOGY BUILDING AND ROUTING IN MISE-P2PSIP
Figure V.8: Proxy ring after P7 joining
• P2 receives the message that P7 is inserted to the ring from its right and updates N. N=7,
N/2=3 (integer part).
• The distance between P2 and P7 is D(p2→p7)=2 < N/2.
• Right(p2)={P1, P6, P5} is the list of the nodes that P2 can reach from its right. The distance
between P2 and each of these nodes is calculated and compared to the distance between P2
and the new joining node (P7).
• D(p2→p1)=1<2. This means that no change to P1 entry in the routing table is needed.
• D(p2→p6)=2>=2. This means that the distance may change. The new distance could be
D(p2→p6) +1=3. In addition, the new distance D(p2→p6)=3<=N/2. This means that the
distance effectively changes but the value of the “send” column does not change.
• D(p2→p5)=3>=2. This means that the distance may change. The new distance could be
D(p2→p5) +1 =4. In addition, the new distance D(p2→p5)=4>N/2. This means that the
distance does not change but the “send” column in the routing table should be switched.
Thus, for entry regarding P5 in the routing table of P2, the distance should be kept (i.e. D
(p2→p5)=3) and the “send” column should be set to “Left”.
• P2 adds to its routing table a new entry about P7. The “Distance” is equal to “2” and the
“Send” field is set to “Right” because P2 has received the notification from its right.
At this step, P2’ routing table looks like the first three columns of table V.4.
Destination Send Distance Path
P1 Right 1 P2P1
P2 - 0 P2
P3 Left 1 P2P3
P4 Left 2 P2P3P4
P5 Left 3 P2P3P4P5
P6 Right 3 P2P1P7P6
P7 Right 2 P2P1P7
Table V.4: P2 routing table after P7 joining
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V.4.5 Call scenario
Let’s consider figure V.9. We assume that there are five node groups in the overlay and that
Client C2 in group 2 wants to call Client C5 in group 5. First, the two clients register to their
respective GR (Steps 1-4). In step 5, C2 sends a SIP INVITE message to its proxy (i.e. P2). P2
checks its cache and asks its GR but does not get C5’ IP address (steps 6-8). Then, the proxy
forwards the message to its successor and its predecessor. The successor and predecessor should
forward the message to their neighbors except the node from which they receive the message. Each
time that the message is received by a proxy, the proxy should check in its cache or in its GR (steps
9, 9’). If the target node’ IP address is found, the message is stopped being forwarded. Otherwise,
it is sent to the following proxy. In this scenario, P2 sends the INVITE message to P1 and P3. P1
will forward the message to P5. On the other side, the message will go from P3 to P5 through P4.
But notice that P5 already got the same message from P1 and then should process only the first
received message and should ignore the second one. Therefore, P5 checks its caching (step 9) or
its GR and gets the target node IP address (steps 10-11) and then forwards the INVITE message
to it (step 12). The targeted node should create a SIP OK message and send it to its proxy P5
at step 13. P5 then checks the OK message and sent it in the back way. Notice here that we
don’t need to check the routing table to know where to send the OK message because the proxies
addresses are recorded in the message. When the OK message is being sent back to the source
node, each proxy on the route stores in its cache, not only the binding between a SIP URI of a
given node and its IP address, but also its related proxy (steps 14-16). This is useful for the next
time the proxy will receive a SIP INVITE message targeted to the same node. In that case, the
proxy will check its cache and find out that the target client is client X whose proxy is Y. Then,
it will check in its routing table the way to reach this proxy. This will prevent the proxy to send
the message to its two neighbors and the road chosen is surely the shortest one. When the source
node’s proxy receives the OK message, it sends it to the source node at step 17 and the rest of
SIP signaling messages are sent following the same route.
Figure V.9: Call establishment scenario
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V.4.6 Evaluation
We used OverSim [15], an open source P2P network simulation framework, to evaluate the
proxy topology building and proxy-level routing performance in our architecture. The goal of
our simulations is to evaluate the performance of our routing algorithm and compare it to other
techniques such as the usage of OSPF [69] routing algorithm in our architecture and the usage of
DHT-based routing to send the SIP message to the destination. In addition, we show the benefit
of implementing a routing table in each proxy node, instead of using for instance, the alternative
to always route the message to one direction.
First, we discuss how OSPF can be used as the routing protocol of our architecture. Sub-
sequently, we describe the DHT-based routing framework that has been simulated. Finally, we
present and analyze the obtained results.
a) OSPF simulation on our architecture
This section describes how we adapted and implemented OSPF on our architecture using the
simulation framework. In this simulation, we only focus on proxy node joining.
When a proxy Pj enters the ring, it creates a Link State Packet (LSP) containing its two
neighbors and the distance to reach them (1 in this case) and sends it to all of the proxies in the
ring. The LSP is sent following the same procedure, we described earlier for node joining, meaning
that the LSP is sent to the neighbors using a SUBSCRIBE message and the neighbors forward it
to all of the other proxies using NOTIFY. Each of the other proxies, creates a similar LSP and
sends it to all of the other proxies (using NOTIFY ).
After a proxy receives N-1 LSP (i.e. LSPs are received from all other proxies), it computes its
routing table using the Shortest Path First (SPF) algorithm.
The main difference between this implementation of OSPF and our routing algorithm is in the
number of messages exchanged on the ring, in order to allow the correct update of their routing
tables when a proxy joins or leaves the P2P SIP network.
b) DHT-based routing
Let us describe now the framework used to allow DHT-based routing of the SIP message.
Oversim has made available a simple application for testing the DHT called DHTTestApp [137].
Basically, DHTTestApp is an application that is used to demonstrate the functionality of adding,
updating, and querying resources/contents using a DHT. We simply modify the DHTTestApp
application and allow it to process the SIP message as any P2P message. The peer that creates a
SIP message sends it to its neighbor. The message is then routed used Key-based Routing (KBR)
strategy, based on the underlying DHT (Chord, Kademlia, etc), until it reaches its destination.
Indeed, KBR is a lookup method used in conjunction with distributed hash tables and certain
other overlay networks. While DHTs provide a method to find a host responsible for a certain
piece of data, KBR provides a method to find the closest host for that data.
c) Experimentation Results
i. Comparison with OSPF
We evaluate and compare first the traffic overhead introduced by our algorithm and that gen-
erated using OSPF as the routing protocol of our P2P SIP architecture. Second, we compare the
convergence time of the two algorithms. The convergence time, we measured is the time between
the new proxy entering the ring and the time when all of the proxies participating in the overlay
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receive the information about the new proxy and update their routing tables. The evaluations
show that our protocol outperforms OSPF.
1. Network load
Figure V.10 shows the network load in terms of the number of messages transmitted in the
network. The figure clearly shows that OSPF generates more messages than our algorithm. This
can be explained as follows: When a proxy joins the overlay, with our algorithm, only the joining
proxy sends an LSP to all of the other proxies. In OSPF, an LSP is sent by each of the proxies in
the overlay. The difference between the two algorithms becomes more noticeable as the number of
proxies in the overlay grows.
Figure V.10: Proxy level routing algorithm vs.
OSPF: network load
Figure V.11: Proxy level routing algorithm vs.
OSPF: convergence time
2. Convergence time
The convergence time is the time that all nodes participating to the overlay spend to update
their routing tables. Figure V.11 shows the convergence time of the two routing algorithms (i.e.
our algorithms and OSPF) as a function of the number of proxies in the overlay. The simulations
are run on top of the Chord P2P middleware. The results are collected for different numbers of
overlay proxies.
We can easily observe that the convergence time of our algorithm is much smaller than the
OSPF convergence time. This is because a large number of messages are exchanged in OSPF,
and each proxy needs to wait until it gets an LSP from other proxies. Furthermore, each proxy
needs to build the entire proxy graph in order to update its routing table. Instead, our algorithm
encapsulates the distance between the new incoming proxy and all other proxies, in the proxy
joining information packet.
ii. Comparison with DHT-based routing
The simulations have been run on top of Kademlia P2P middleware. We evaluate first the
SIP average end-to-end round trip delay (two-way latency), from request generation (INVITE
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message) at the client to the reception of the final response (OK message). Then, we compare the
RTT registered with our algorithm and those getting using a DHT-based routing for SIP. Second,
we compare the network traffic generated by each of the two frameworks. The network traffic
measured includes all SIP messages and the overlay maintenance and lookup messages.
Figure V.13 shows the RTT as a function of the number of nodes in the overlay for both
proxy-level routing and DHT-based routing. The results were collected for different numbers of
overlay nodes. The network overload measurements are shown in figure V.12. The results show
that our framework generates much less traffic than a DHT-based routing framework. However,
in our framework, the RTT increases much quickly than in the DHT-based routing as long as
the number of node increases. But the RTT provided by our algorithm is still reasonable (under
250ms) to offer a good quality of service for SIP calls with up to 700 nodes in the overlay.
Figure V.12: Proxy level routing algorithm vs.
DHT-based routing: Network load
Figure V.13: Proxy level routing algorithm vs. DHT-
based routing: RTT
iii. Comparison with “fixed direction” alternative
This simulation is performed to show the utility of having in the routing table the shortest path
towards each destination. Our routing algorithm always uses the shortest path to send the INVITE
message to the destination client (except the first time the client is called). Another alternative
could be to send always the INVITE in one direction (left or right). Using this alternative, in some
cases the message could take much time to reach the destination proxy. We have simulated the
alternative of always sending the INVITE request to right (i.e. to the predecessor) and compare
it to our framework by measuring the RTT of sending an INVITE and the network traffic that
it generates. The results show that our framework generates much less traffic and significantly
reduces the RTT delay with respect to the simulated alternative. RTT measurements are shown
in figure V.14 and the network load is shown in figure V.15.
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Figure V.14: Proxy level routing versus “Right alternative”: RTT measurements
Figure V.15: Proxy level routing versus “Right alternative”: Network load
V.5 Conclusion
We have presented in this chapter a novel framework for proxy topology building and proxy-
level routing on top of MISE-P2PSIP architecture. We have described an algorithm that builds
the network of proxies in a ring, and our own routing algorithms that outperform existing routing
algorithms such as OSPF when used on the ring topology. The novel algorithms are fully described
and their performance evaluated via simulations. In comparison with a DHT-based routing scheme,
our routing algorithms reveal to be much better in term of network load and provide reasonable
RTT for SIP-based communications. Furthermore, we have shown the impact of having at proxy
level, a routing table that always provides the shortest path instead of sending almost randomly
the SIP message.
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Chapter VI
NAT traversal solution for signaling
messages and media streams
T his chapter firstly defines NAT traversal issues and gives short background. Following, we
outline the motivation and the requirements of our NAT (Network Address Translation) traversal
approach. Moreover, the chapter discusses the related work and details the proposed solutions.
Finally, we define an implementation plan and present some relevant experimental results.
VI.1 Definition and background
Network Address Translation (NAT) is a technology that has revolutionized Internet Com-
munications. NAT allows multiple computers on a LAN to share a single public IP address for
accessing to Internet. Without NAT, the IPv4 protocol’s number of available addresses would reach
its limits. NAT also provides some measures of “cloaking” of internal computers, since they are
“hidden” from external (Internet) computers that can only “see” the NAT device through which
they connect. The immediate benefit of NAT is that it allows a single internet connection with a
single IP address to be shared. However, NAT has traditionally suffered from a big shortcoming.
NAT breaks protocols/applications that require incoming connections and protocols that carry IP
addresses in them. An example of these applications is VoIP. Actually, a VoIP client (computer
with a “softphone” or VoIP phone) registers with a VoIP server, and then the server inform a VoIP
client about an incoming call. The packets that carry the actual conversation are then exchanged
directly between the calling parties with no involvement from the server. But, in order to connect
calling parties, the server must be able to tell each VoIP client, where to send the VoIP packets.
This must be a real, public address, and not the private address the VoIP application thinks it
has. Each end VoIP client must be able to receive those incoming packets, which do not match a
prior outgoing session in the NAT. The solution to this issue is NAT Traversal.
RFC 5389 [66] defines a terminology for different NAT types depending on their address bind-
ing schemes for UDP traffic. In particular, it uses the terms “Full Cone”, “Restricted Cone”, “Port
Restricted Cone” and “Symmetric” to refer to different variations of NATs/firewalls. Following we
describe the characteristic of each type.
• Full Cone: A full cone NAT is one where all requests from the same internal IP address and
port are mapped to the same external IP address and port. Furthermore, any external host
can send a packet to the internal host, by sending a packet to the mapped external address.
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• Restricted Cone: A restricted cone NAT is one where all requests from the same internal
IP address and port are mapped to the same external IP address and port. Unlike a full cone
NAT, an external host (with IP address X) can send a packet to the internal host only if the
internal host had previously sent a packet to IP address X.
• Port Restricted Cone: A port restricted cone NAT is like a restricted cone NAT, but the
restriction includes port numbers. Specifically, an external host can send a packet, with source
IP address X and source port P, to the internal host only if the internal host had previously
sent a packet to IP address X and port P.
• Symmetric: A symmetric NAT is one where all requests from the same internal IP address
and port, to a specific destination IP address and port, are mapped to the same external IP
address and port. If the same host sends a packet with the same source address and port, but
to a different destination, a different mapping is used. Furthermore, only the external host
that receives a packet can send a UDP packet back to the internal host.
VI.2 Motivation
Traversing NAT is one of the major issues that hinder SIP communications. The reason is
that, in SIP, many of the communication parameters are transmitted within the SIP messages;
such parameters include the IP and port numbers used for signaling and media. A SIP device
behind NAT does not know much about how it will be seen from the public network. It only
knows its own private IP address and the ports where the SIP application runs. These addresses,
being private, cannot be used by the destination node for answering. Therefore, SIP cannot work
efficiently through a NAT device without using a NAT traversal mechanism.
In the previous chapter, we have proposed a scalable proxy topology building and routing in
P2P SIP network, where SIP location service is integrated in proxies that run over peer entities.
Although P2P SIP comes with numerous benefits, it should cope with NAT traversal issues. Our
proposed architecture needs an efficient NAT traversal technique which can work easily and make
end-to-end communication by meeting our requirements. We need to modify our P2P SIP frame-
work in order to provide a suitable technique for NAT traversal for both SIP signaling messages
and media streams.
Since in our P2P SIP framework, any P2P node can play any SIP role, taking into account
networks with NAT can raise some roles incompatibility with respect to the location of the joining
node. For sake of simplicity, we assume that only node located in the public network could play
SIP server roles (Proxy or Registrar) in order to be easily and efficiently reachable without specific
NAT traversal procedures. Consequently, node behind the NAT could only play the role of client.
Thus, the role of a given node could not be any more assigned only by taking into account the
node entering order in the overlay. Figure VI.1 shows an example of our architecture deployment
over a NAT-ted network.
VI.3 Requirements
As described in chapter III, the main requirements of MISE-P2PSIP framework could be
summarized into three key features that are Independence from P2P middleware, compliance to
SIP standard and support for a “pure” P2P overlay.
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Figure VI.1: Example of nodes’ topology behind NATs
In addition to the requirements cited above, in order to handle NAT traversal issue in MISE-
P2PSIP architecture, we define two more relevant requirements. The first one is about the perfor-
mance of the communication. This means that our proposed solution should not lead to communi-
cation quality degradation (e.g. in terms of latency or delay). The second requirement is that our
proposed solution should not require modifications in SIP clients in order to allow interoperability,
because many NAT traversal solutions require SIP client to support other protocols.
VI.4 Related work and analysis
NAT traversal is a true-honored problem for all VoIP-related protocols. The existing NAT
traversal solutions could be classified in two categories. The first category includes standardized
techniques. The non-standardized techniques include solutions proposed by some research activities
and will be part of the second category. We review these solutions in light of our requirements.
VI.4.1 Standardized techniques
In order to allow NAT traversal for SIP, RFC 3581 [74] defines a SIP extension for symmetric
response routing when SIP request operates over User Datagram Protocol (UDP). Indeed, this
extension defines a new parameter for the Via header field, called “rport”, that allows a client to
request that the server sends the response back to the source IP address and port from which the
request originated. This solution does not fit our basic requirement on no SIP extensions.
STUN (Session Traversal Utilities for NAT) [66] allows a device behind the NAT to deter-
mine the NAT’s behavior and bindings indirectly, and to modify the protocol messages appro-
priately. Using STUN different mappings are open in the NAT device for each new IP address:
port combination. This renders the information provided by the STUN server useless for initiating
communication to other addresses than the STUN server address. The defect of STUN is that it
cannot work with symmetric NAT, which is widely used in today’s enterprises. Therefore STUN
cannot provide a complete solution. TURN (Traversal Using Relay NAT) [72] solves this problem
by relaying data through a server that resides on the public Internet. A device behind NAT would
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use TURN protocol to get the address and port on the TURN server. Then, the device uses them
to invite its peers. TURN also assumes the clients have a trust relationship with a TURN server
and requests session allocation based on shared credentials. This has scalability issues and requires
complex changes in the SIP clients. Both STUN and TURN require that SIP client device supports
them and do not fit our second requirement.
Another methodology called ICE (Interactive Connection Establishment) [73] allows direct
communication. ICE allows the traversal of all devices and all topologies except the case where
firewalls are used. ICE does not allow this crossing, since firewalls are devices that filter packages by
static rules. Therefore, since ICE technique consists of identifying all possibilities of communication
between a client’s device and a public network and between two client devices, it increases the time
needed to set up a call. This does not fit our performance requirement. In addition, client’s device
has to be modified to be able to negotiate dynamically a communication path. Thus, this does
not fit our second requirement.
There are also Hole punching techniques using UDP or TCP [78][79] that belong to this
category. Indeed, the hole punching NAT traversal mechanism of UDP packets, allows each peer
behind a NAT to discover the presence and types of NATs and firewalls between them and the
public network. This discovery includes the NAT’s treatment of UDP traffic and the public IP
address and port assigned to the peer. Afterward, the public address and the NAT behavior
obtained are used to predict the address and port number for a subsequent session between the
peers. Instead, using the NAT traversal Hole Punching of TCP, each host behind a NAT has to
not only detect the presence of NAT and predict the public address/port assigned to it by the
NAT, but has also to obtain the initial sequence number in the first SYN packet sent by the other
hosts to establish a TCP connection. As STUN and TURN, Hole punching techniques requires
modifications in the SIP device and do not fit our second requirement.
VI.4.2 Non-standardized techniques
Some research activities have provided solutions to handle NAT traversal issue.
The authors of [77] have proposed a technique called TAB (Triggering Address Binding). TAB
technique deployed a proprietary server that allows SIP client to know whether it is behind a NAT
device or not. TAB makes use of the NAT characteristic by triggering address bindings on the
NAT and keeping these bindings alive for NAT traversal of SIP messages and media traffic. The
TAB assigns to the client, different public transport addresses for signaling messages exchange and
media stream transport. The SIP client and the TAB server communicate by using specific TAB
messages. This means that the SIP client should support TAB messages. This solution is not
suitable because it is proprietary and could lead to interoperability issues.
Another approach on distributed NAT traversal mechanism called SMBR (Selective-Message
Buddy Relaying) for structured P2P [80] has been proposed. SMBR distinguishes control messages
from data based on DHT messages types. For control messages, SMBR uses the method of buddy’s
relay while for data, a direct connection is built between the peer nodes with the help of a buddy.
Indeed, a buddy is a peer in the overlay having a public IP address. A buddy of the source peer
has the duty to communicate with the buddy of the destination peer, using specific messages, in
order to allow direct connection between the two peers that wish to exchange data. Therefore,
the framework is not middleware-independent as our NAT traversal approach should be, since it
is strongly based on Kademlia protocol. Moreover, the technique is based on DHT messages types
and is not suitable to SIP messages exchange through NAT.
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VI.5 NAT traversal solution
This section handles NAT traversal issues in MISE-P2PSIP network. Firstly, we summarize
the techniques that we use to handle NAT traversal issue. Subsequently, we define the procedure
used for nodes’ group creation. Moreover, the procedures used for signaling messages and media
flows are described. Finally, we explain how SIP session can be established from and towards nodes
behind a NAT, through some call scenarios.
VI.5.1 Used techniques
Our NAT traversal techniques reuse some solutions that are currently used in many enterprises
and adapt them to our framework [75].
In order to allow efficient SIP signaling exchange in presence of NAT device, we simply im-
plement a “smart registrar” which does not save the contact address as presented by the device
in the REGISTER message but rather save the real IP:Port combination, the message originates
from. Subsequently, the smart registrar server maintains the communication channel open with the
SIP client by exchanging with it dummy keep-alive packets so that it will be always possible to ring
the device behind the NAT and to start negotiating a SIP session. The only requirement, which
fortunately is available in most of the SIP devices, is to use symmetric signaling, that requires
the device to send and receive data on the same port number. This solution is currently used by
OpenSER [129].
On the other side in order to allow media transport, we use “media relay” technique which
allows exchanging media stream between the two SIP clients in presence of NAT through a trusted
third party. However, this functionality is performed by one of the SIP servers already present in
the framework. MediaProxy [59] is a distributed NAT traversal solution based on this technique.
VI.5.2 Node group creation
Some roles incompatibility can occur with respect to the location of the joining node by making
more complex NAT traversal handling. Thus, we assume to assign node role by taking into account
their location (i.e. behind a NAT device or not) in our architecture. Thereby, we need to revise
our node group creation procedure proposed in the previous chapters. Based on this assumption,
nodes behind a NAT device cannot play the role of GR (Group Registrar) server or Proxy server.
Therefore, a node behind a NAT can act only as Client node. The nodes are also organized in
several groups as explained in the previous chapters. A group is identified by its ID. Let’s recall
that a group (Gi) is composed of one GR, one Proxy and N client nodes where N is a configurable
number. Role assignment procedure flow chart is shown in figure VI.2. The description is the
following.
When a node (Ni) joins the overlay, it contacts the DC by sending to it a SIP REGISTER
request. This SIP REGISTER message aims to get useful information from the DC. Afterward,
the DC checks if the node is behind a NAT device. The checking is performed by comparing the IP
address the packet came from and the one that is listed in the “via header”. If there is a difference,
the node is assumed to be behind a NAT.
If the joining node is behind a NAT, the DC sets the node as client and sends it back the
role in the SIP 200 OK response. Notice that the 200 OK response contains in addition to the
node’s role, the GR address, the Proxy address and the group ID of the group assigned to the
Client node. Basically, the information is piggybacked in the optional attribute “u” (containing
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the URI of description) of the body of the message. An example of a piggybacked 200 OK message
is shown in figure VI.3.
Figure VI.2: Role assignment procedure flow chart
Figure VI.3: Piggybacked 200 OK response
The 200 OK message is sent automatically to the client node if a group is available (if there
is a group with number of client less than N). Otherwise, it will be sent later when a new group
is created. In this later case, the DC should send periodically keep-alive messages until it will be
able to assign a group to the Client node. Of course waiting for a new group to become available,
introduces a level of latency not known a priori. In order to alleviate this problem, a suitable SIP
202 message could be introduced to notify that the request is accepted but cannot be actually
processed.
The DC would normally send the 200 OK message to the port inserted in the “via header” of
the SIP REGISTER request, but since the client is behind a NAT, it will use the real IP/Port, the
packet is received from. After getting its Registrar server and Proxy server addresses, the client
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node creates another SIP REGISTER request that it sends to its GR for real registration.
Let us now consider the case where the joining node is not behind a NAT device. The DC
should set this node as GR or as Proxy and send it the OK response. Indeed, the joining node
is set as proxy if there is a group with no proxy. Therefore, for a given group, the GR is set first
and the Proxy later. The DC maintains the list of the groups and for each group, it updates and
stores the GR and proxy addresses, and the number of clients.
Else if there is no group without proxy, the DC creates a new group and sets a new joining
node (not behind a NAT device) as GR of this group.
VI.5.3 NAT traversal for SIP signaling messages
When a SIP device with private addresses (IP and port), wishes to be reachable from the
outside of its private network, it must first initiate a connection to the public network. Many
techniques like STUN [66] and ICE [73] can be used to allow the client knowing how it is seen from
Internet. But, they do not fit our requirements.
In our architecture, the SIP client device does not need to know its public IP address and
port. We simply implement a smart Group Registrar which does not save the contact address
as presented by the Client node in the SIP REGISTER message during the registration phase.
Instead, the registrar server (GR in our architecture), stores the real IP:Port (public) combination,
the message originates from. The procedure used to exchange SIP signaling messages between two
clients behind different NATs devices is summarized in figure VI.4. PRA represents the proxy of
the client device A and PRB is the proxy of the client device B. The same definition is applied
for the smart GR. Once, the GR has successfully registered the Client, it must maintain the
communication channel open by sending periodically keep-alive packets to the Client node before
the binding expires in the NAT device table [75]. The keep-alive packets could be a PING request
sent by the GR to the Client node. The Client node answers by sending back a PING response.
The goal of sending keep-alive packets is to maintain the public contact information (IP address
and port) of a given Client node, on the NAT device table. In order to allow Client node to
always receive SIP INVITE messages, its proxy should always check the Client node external IP
address/port on the GR before sending the request to it. The delivery of the SIP 200 OK response
to the SIP INVITE request will follow the same procedure as the other signaling messages. The
proxy queries its GR to get the destination node public IP as stated in SIP protocol standard
specification [1]. In our architecture, the registrar server stores information in the overlay and
retrieves it when needed.
VI.5.4 NAT traversal for media flows
Media consists of one or multiple flows which are negotiated in the SIP signaling messages.
The media stream may be added or subtracted to the communication set between SIP devices. As
this happens dynamically, one must be able to translate in real-time the mappings between the
internal and public addresses.
Starting with the SIP INVITE message, the SIP devices negotiate a common media. The
initial negotiation is performed by SDP (Session Description Protocol), a protocol used by SIP
to convey information about the media stream (address where the media will be received, codec
types, bandwidth and others). The problem is that, when a device is behind NAT, the SDP
conveys information about the private IP of the SIP client device.
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Figure VI.4: NAT traversal for signaling messages
Some solutions to this problem are already proposed in the literature. One solution is to
improve the SIP devices to be able to negotiate dynamically a communication path for the media
even after the initial SIP session has been setup. This can be achieved by ICE. In fact, before
sending the INVITE message to the proxy, a Client inserts in the message, the list of available IP
addresses/ports for media stream. This allows devices to probe for multiple paths of communication
by trying to use different port numbers and STUN techniques. This media path discovery step by
both caller and callee can introduce more delay in the communication.
Another alternative is to use a “Media relay”. With the Media relay technique, the media flows
travel via a third party location on the Internet. Media relay technique reveals to be simple and
efficient. Mediaproxy [59] and RTPProxy [57] are examples of applications that use this technique
with Kamailio [48].
To enable efficient transport of media in our P2P SIP network, we define a suitable technique
based on media relay technique. Our technique consists on relaying media through one of the
servers in our P2P SIP network. We attribute the media relay role to the DC (Domain Controller)
server because, we assume that it is trusted by the other nodes of the network. Let us recall that
the DC and all servers (proxy and registrar) are located in the public network. Then, the address
of the media relay is always known (being a public IP), so that the two endpoints know where to
send RTP packets. Our technique allows a proxy node to perform the required modifications in the
signaling message body in order to allow the two endpoints to exchange RTP packets through the
DC server. To achieve this goal, we simply allow proxies to replace the private addresses provided
by the originator of the signaling messages for media purpose, by the public addresses (IP address
and available transport port for media) of the DC. Figure VI.5 shows our NAT traversal procedure
for RTP packets during a SIP communication between two Client devices A and B.
Indeed, during the SIP signaling messages exchange, when the proxy of the caller receives a
SIP INVITE, it asks to the DC to attribute to a given node an available port for media. The
request is piggybacked in the body of a SIP NOTIFY message. The DC answers the proxy, by
sending to it the port number in the OK response. Upon receiving the port number, the proxy of
the caller inserts the port and the public IP of the DC in the attribute “o” (Owner/creator and
session identifier) and/or in the attribute “c” (Connection information) of the body of the message,
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Figure VI.5: NAT traversal procedure for media flows
by deleting the private address before transmitting the message to the proxy of the callee node.
By the same way, the proxy substitutes the private port number in the “m” (Media name and
transport address) attribute of the body by the port number received from the DC. The proxy of
the callee node performs the same procedure (it requests available port from the DC and inserts the
DC’ public address and the port number in the message) upon receiving the SIP OK message from
the callee. These operations are reasonably fast on modern CPUs and do not introduce additional
delay. When the proxy of the caller device gets the SIP ACK message, it simply forwards it. In
this way, the two endpoints will get the public addresses where the media streams should be sent.
At the end of the signaling phase, the two nodes send media stream to the DC. In order to be able
to receive the media from other endpoint, a node behind a NAT should send first media stream to
the DC. Upon receiving the first media flows from both endpoints, the DC records the addresses
they came from and will know where to forward RTP packets received from the other endpoint.
This is an important step because the address/port, the NAT device will allocate for the media
stream, is not known before the media flows are actually sent through the NAT device. Afterward,
the DC learns their addresses and can efficiently forward packets between them.
When the two endpoints are behind the same NAT device, the media streams do not take
through the DC, but are exchanged directly through the two endpoints. An example of this use
case, is given in the next sub-section and depicted in figure VI.6.
VI.6 Call scenarios
Based on our group creation procedure, we distinguish four (4) different call scenarios in our
framework.
• Caller and callee are behind the same NAT and are connected to the same proxy server.
• Caller and callee are behind the same NAT and are connected to different proxy servers.
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• Caller and callee are behind different NATs and are connected to the same proxy server.
• Caller and callee are behind different NATs and are connected to different proxy servers.
In this chapter, we will explain two scenarios. The other scenarios can be easily derived from
the ones, we explain.
VI.6.1 The two Client devices are behind the same NAT and are connected to the
same proxy
Let’s consider the scenario depicted in figure VI.6. Let assume, there are two SIP clients C1
and C2 behind the same NAT device and connected to the same SIP proxy located in the public
network. Client C1 initiates a SIP session toward C2. C1 is not aware that C2 is in the same local
network with him. C1 forwards the SIP INVITE to its proxy P1 through its NAT (steps 1 and 2).
P1 checks its routing table and notices that the destination client C2 is located in its group and
gets its public IP address from GR1 (steps 3 and 4). At this step, P1 should check if the source
node C1 and the destination client are located behind the same NAT. To achieve this it suffices to
compare the IP address it received from GR1 with the real address the SIP INVITE packet came
from.
Figure VI.6: Call scenario for two nodes behind the same NATs
If the IP addresses are the same, the two clients are behind a common NAT. Subsequently,
P1 forwards the SIP INVITE message to C2 through its NAT. But when P1 receives the 200 OK
response from C2 it does not need to make any modifications. At step 9 and 10, P1 checks again
its GR to get the current public addresses (IP and port) of C1 in order to forward to it the SIP
200 OK response. The rest of the signaling communication goes on, normally between C1 and
C2 through P1. Thus, at the end of the signaling messages exchange, the media can flow directly
between the two clients.
VI.6.2 The two Client devices are behind different NATs and are connected to dif-
ferent proxies
Let’s consider now the scenario depicted in figure VI.7. There are two SIP clients C1 and
C2 behind different NAT devices and connected to two different SIP proxies located in the public
network. Client C1 wants to initiate a SIP session toward C2. C1 forwards the SIP INVITE to its
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proxy P1 through its NAT device at steps 1 and 2. Then, P1 checks its routing table and notices
that the destination client C2 is connected to proxy P3 which is reachable through proxy P2 along
the shortest path. P1 sends a NOTIFY message to the DC to ask him to open a new port for
media stream at step 3. The DC answers P1 using the OK response at step 4. P1 substitutes
the private addresses (IP and port) provided by C1 in the body of the SIP INVITE message, in
order to receive the media stream, through the IP address of the DC and the media port number
on the DC, before sending the message to P3 through the proxies ring at steps 5 and 6. This
substitution is useful to allow the DC relaying the media through the two endpoints. Otherwise,
they will not be able to exchange RTP packets. When P3 gets the INVITE, it queries the public
addresses of C2 to GR3 (steps 7 and 8). Once P3 gets the required information, it forwards the
SIP INVITE to C2 (steps 9 and 10). C2 creates a 200 OK message and sends it to P3 (at steps
11 and 12). At this step, P3 should check if C1 and C2 are behind the same NAT or not. To do
this, P2 compares as before the public addresses of node C1 in the SIP INVITE with the public
addresses of node C2. If these addresses are the same, it means that both nodes are behind the
same NAT. Then, the 200 OK message will not be modified. Otherwise both clients are behind
different NATs and consequently the OK message needs to be modified. In this scenario, C1 and
C2 are behind different NAT devices. Then, P3 requests a new port for media from the DC (steps
13 and 14) and inserts in the 200 OK message received from C2, the public IP address of the DC
and the new port before forwarding back the message (steps 15 and 16). Once it gets the message,
P1 retrieves C1 public addresses from the GR (steps 17 and 18) and sends the 200 OK message
to C1 through its NAT device (steps 19 and 20). C1 answers with the SIP ACK message, that
it sends to P1 at steps 21 and 22. Note that the modification of the ACK message is not needed
here because it does not contain any information in its body. P1 forwards the ACK to C2 through
P2 and P3 (steps 23 to 26). At this step, both clients are aware of where they might send RTP
packets and are able to successfully exchange media streams through the DC server.
Figure VI.7: Call scenario for two nodes behind different NATs
VI.7 Implementation plan
This section aims to give the basic idea of an implementation plan for our NAT traversal
solutions in P2P environments.
We will design a realistic network scenario to run our network with some nodes behind NAT
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devices simulations with OverSim. The network is made of a set of nodes that run the P2P SIP
application, a set of access routers and a set of backbone routers. The clients are connected to
access routers using DSL (Digital Subscriber Line) connections (delay = 20ms and bandwidth =
1Mbps) and the peers are connected to access routers using Ethernet (delay = 1ms and bandwidth
= 100Mbps). Access routers are connected to backbone routers using fiberlines (delay = 1ms
and bandwidth = 10Gbps) and the backbone routers are connected to each other using fiberlines
(delay = 1ms; bandwidth = 10Gbps). In order to test our NAT traversal solutions, some access
routers will be configured with NAT support. The node linked to an access router with NAT
support will have one private address attributed upon joining. A public address will be attributed
to a given client by its access router when it attempts to contact a node outside of its private
network. The nodes will run using Chord as P2P protocol. Any other P2P protocol can be used
without modifying our NAT traversal procedures since our overlay is maintained by using only SIP
messages.
Following, we define the basic procedures which will be implemented to simulate our NAT
traversal solutions:
• Initialization: This procedure allows the Domain Controller (DC) to send to the joining node,
useful information like Peer ID, SIP URI, Group ID, GR’ IP, Proxy’ IP, and role. This
procedure calls the Group management procedure to get this information.
• Create Peer: Attributes to the new joining node, a Peer ID and a SIP URI.
• Group management: This procedure stores in the cache, each group ID, the GR’ IP, Proxy’
IP and the current number of clients in each group. This procedure will attribute a role to
the joining node accordingly to its related access routers (with NAT support or not). It also
creates a new group when needed.
• SIP request: This procedure allows the creation of all types of SIP request (REGISTER,
INVITE, etc).
• SIP response: allows answering suitably to a given SIP request.
• Store IP address: This procedure allows the GR to retrieve and store the public address of
the client node upon registration.
• Retrieve IP address: This procedure allows a proxy to retrieve the public addresses of a given
client from the GR in order to correctly deliver the SIP message.
• Keep Binding: This procedure allows the GR of a given client to send periodically to it,
keep-alive packets in order to maintain the public addresses of the client in the NAT device.
• Modify SIP message: In general, this procedure allows piggybacking the SIP messages. For
instance, it allows to substitute in the SIP INVITE or in the SIP OK response, the private
addresses of the message originator by the public IP address and media port of the DC.
• Send SIP message: this procedure allows sending SIP message from one node to another node.
VI.8 Experimental results
We have setup an experimental environment. The goal of this experimentation is to show
that our solution for NAT traversal is simple and can enable two nodes inside two different private
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networks to efficiently exchange SIP signaling messages and media streams. Our experimental
environment is composed of seven (7) Virtual Machines (VM) running on Linux Operating System.
Figure VI.8 depicts our experimental environment. Basically, we implemented a scenario of two
SIP clients, each behind its NAT device. Each SIP client has one network interface with a private
address and has its proxy server located in the public network. The DC server which acts as media
relay is also located in the public network.
The NAT devices have one public network interface (192.0.2.X) and one private network
interface (10.10.8.X or 10.10.9.X). Instead, the proxy servers and the media relay have each, a
single network interface in the public network.
Figure VI.8: Experimental environment
To make effective our experimental test, firstly, we have installed and configure suitability
Asterisk 1.8 [76] on each computer which might act as SIP proxy server. Asterisk is open source
software which transforms easily a computer into a communication server. The two proxies com-
municate using a SIP trunk. In our test, the registration function is integrated into each proxy.
The media relay is configured using Kamailio [48] with RTPProxy module [57] for NAT traversal.
Kamailio is an Open Source SIP server released under GPL, able to handle thousands of call setups
per second.
We have installed a Linphone softphone on each computer which might act as SIP client.
Linphone is an open source VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) software which can be used to
make computer to computer calls or computer to phone calls.
We implemented our NAT devices using Iptables. We have set up many reliable Iptables rules
to allow each NAT device to accept SIP packets, to know where to redirect the SIP packets (port
and IP address). In addition, those rules permit to the NAT device to change SIP packets’ payload
(Prerouting or Postrouting) when needed before forwarding the packets.
Following are two examples of rules that we have set up on NAT 1 to authorize SIP signaling
packets delivery:
• sudo iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i eth1 -p udp –dport 5060 -j DNAT –to-destination
10.10.8.1
This rule called Destination NAT (DNAT) translation, allows all packets received from the
public network and targeted to eth1 (public interface of NAT 1), with destination port 5060, to
be redirected to the private address 10.10.8.1 (IP address of client 1).
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• sudo iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth1 -p udp -s 10.10.8.0/24 –dport 5060 -j SNAT
–to-source 192.0.2.6
This rule called Source NAT (SNAT) translation, allows replacing the original source address
of a SIP outbound packet from the network 10.10.8.0/24 with destination port 5060 by the public
address of the NAT device (192.0.2.6).
We use Wireshark software to capture the packets on Client 1. Our tests reveal to be en-
couraging since each SIP client device inside a private network can successfully register itself to
the proxy server (integrating the registration function) in the public network through its NAT
device. Moreover, the SIP signaling messages are able to be efficiently exchanged between the two
SIP clients behind different NATs by traversing their respective NAT devices and Proxies servers.
Furthermore, the RTP streams are sent between the two SIP clients through the DC.
Figure VI.9 shows the SIP signaling flows on Client 1. In this test, SIP Client 1 initiates a
call towards SIP Client 2. The SIP INVITE has been sent to the proxy of Client 1 (192.0.2.10).
The SIP OK sent by SIP Client 2 has also been successfully received by Client 1 through its proxy
server. The same applied to the SIP ACK message. Instead, figure VI.10 shows RTP flows on the
media relay.
Figure VI.9: SIP signaling flows
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Figure VI.10: RTP packets through media relay
VI.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a simple solution to deal with NAT traversal issue in our P2P
SIP framework. Our NAT traversal solution provides a way to efficiently set up end-to-end VoIP
call. It also allows RTP streams to be exchanged through the DC server that acts as media
relay and is located in the public network, precisely when the two SIP client’s devices are behind
different NATs. We have set up a virtual environment in which we implemented a full SIP-based
communication system between two private networks and performed some relevant tests to show
that our approach is feasible and can easily work in real world.
Although we did not perform our tests in P2P environment, the satisfying results, currently
obtained in a pure SIP environment could be observed as well in P2P SIP overlay since the NAT
traversal issue is only related to SIP world.
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Part IV
Secure routing
I n the previous chapters, we have proposed a P2P SIP architecture with specific require-
ments that we called MISE-P2PSIP and suitable proxy topology building and routing algorithms.
Therefore, MISE-P2PSIP network can be subject to many attacks due to the fact that the node
acting as server can misbehave. Many servers can also cooperate to misbehave. In particular, the
proxy node which has the role to transmit signaling messages could drop, wrongly alter, delay or
misroute the SIP messages. Those misbehaviors can severely affect the quality of service in P2P
SIP environments. Then, it is important to secure the routing of SIP signaling messages in such a
way that they are processed and delivered correctly. In this part of the thesis, we mainly focus on
tackling two important attacks that can create unneglected inconveniences to SIP-based communi-
cations. Those attacks are call hijacking attack and misrouting attack. By performing misrouting
attack, a given proxy server can send the signaling message on left instead of sending it to right
and vice versa. This misbehavior can lead to the delaying of the transmission or the suppression of
the message. On the other side, a malicious proxy can substitute a legitimate node during a SIP
session establishment by performing call hijacking attack. We provide secure solutions for those
two attacks.
This part of the thesis is composed of two chapters. Chapter VII outlines the motivations and
the requirements and provides the related work on secure messages routing. Instead, chapter VIII
gives the details of our secure schemes against attacks in MISE-P2PSIP.
Chapter VII
Related work on secure routing
protocols and mechanisms
T his chapter gives first the motivations for providing solutions to secure messages routing
in MISE-P2PSIP. Subsequently, the requirements of our secure solutions are defined. Finally, we
discuss the related work on the existing secure routing protocols and mechanisms.
VII.1 Motivations
In P2P SIP overlay, instead of servers, a distributed hash table can be used for registering and
locating a user-ID. However, the lack of a central authority (proxy or registrar server) makes au-
thentication of users and nodes difficult to do. Without trusted node that certifies users identities,
malicious nodes can control a large fraction of a distributed system. Regarding our MISE-P2PSIP
architecture, because of our requirement on independence from specific P2P middleware, many
functions like node registration, location lookup, message routing are performed at SIP level. This
leads to the assignment of many important duties to the proxy servers. However, a single proxy
server can misbehave or many proxy servers can also cooperate to misbehave. For instance, a
misbehavior proxy can drop, wrongly alter, delay or misroute the SIP messages. Then, nodes
acting as servers need to be trusted in SIP environment. There is a need to secure the routing
of SIP signaling messages in such a way that those messages are treated and delivered in right
way because firstly, they convey sensitive information like caller and callee addresses, Call ID, etc,
that needs to be protected. Moreover, SIP signaling messages should be delivered in real-time in
order to provide acceptable quality of the call. SIP messages misrouting in general can lead to
service disruption in P2P SIP overlay. In this framework, we focus on attacks performed by the
proxy server such as signaling messages misrouting and call hijacking and propose secure schemes
to mitigate those attacks.
VII.2 Security requirements
In addition to the overall requirements of MISE-P2PSIP architecture defined in chapter III,
there are specific requirements to ensure a secure routing of SIP messages. These are the following:
• The proxy has to send the message to its right destination.
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• The proxy could not misroute the SIP message in order to increase the transmission delay or
to prevent the message to reach its destination.
• The proxy could not modify the SIP message beyond the SIP specification.
VII.3 Related work on secure routing protocols and mechanisms
This section will describe some of the existing works on secure routing protocols and mecha-
nisms. We could classify those works in three groups:
• Secure routing in mobile Ad hoc networks.
• Security in conventional SIP.
• Secure routing in Peer-to-Peer systems.
VII.3.1 Secure routing in mobile Ad hoc networks
Several research activities have been undertaken to secure routing in Mobile Ad hoc NETworks
(MANET). In general, existing strategies focus on securing routing by detecting misbehaving nodes
or by making use of cryptographic algorithms. In the next sub-sections, we will discuss only a few
part of the existing secure routing protocols in this area.
a) Detecting misbehaving nodes
i. Reputation and Trust based Models
The existing works in this category are based on reputation and trust based models in order
to detect and isolate a misbehaving nodes in mobile Ad hoc Networks.
Several Reputation and Trust based Models (RTMs) for mobile networks have been proposed
over the years. These models aim to provide information that allows nodes to distinguish between
trustworthy and untrustworthy nodes and encourage nodes to be trustworthy. Malicious nodes are
isolated, denied service and punished in some of these models [81, 82].
A COllaborative REputation (CORE) mechanism to enforce node cooperation in mobile ad-
hoc networks model [86] was proposed by Michiardi and Molva. Reputation in this model is
formed and updated with time by direct observations and information provided by other members
of the network. Nodes have to contribute continuously to the community to remain trusted.
Otherwise, their reputation will be degraded until they are eventually excluded from the network.
Only positive information is shared and consequently, CORE prevents the distribution of false
information about other entities.
Another scheme called the Cooperation Of Nodes: Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTworks
(CONFIDANT) has been proposed by Buchegger et al [83]. The protocol aims at detecting and
isolating misbehaving nodes, making it unattractive to any node to deny cooperation. In this
model, each node maintains a reputation rating and a trust rating about every other node of inter-
est. Only fresh reputation is propagated, with more weight given to current behavior of a node than
the past. This prevents the possibility of a node from obtaining good reputation initially and sub-
sequently misbehaving. Nodes monitor and detect misbehavior in their neighbourhood by means of
an enhanced packet acknowledgment (PACK) mechanism where confirmation of acknowledgment
comes indirectly by overhearing the next node forward the packet [84, 85].
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Marti et al. [87] proposed a watchdog and pathrater schemes to improve the throughput of
an ad hoc network in the presence of misbehaving nodes. Watchdog keeps track of misbehaving
nodes. Pathrater avoids routing through those misbehaving nodes.
Awerbuch et al. [88] proposed a fault detection scheme to detect malicious links on a route
between a source and a destination. The scheme is based on acknowledgements from some probe
nodes on the route, which are specified by the source node. If the number of acknowledgement
loss exceeds a particular threshold, a faulty link is considered to exist in the route. Then, a binary
search can detect the faulty link.
ii. Sending packets via trustworthy routes
Yi et al. [89] developed a Secure Aware Routing (SAR) protocol for ad hoc networks, which
extended the Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol. In their protocol, the
nodes in an ad hoc network have different security attributes and are classified into different trust
levels. The trust level can be decided by an internal hierarchy of privileges in an organization.
The nodes of the same trust level share a secret key. When a source constructs a route discovery
message, it also specifies the required security level for the route. The route discovery message can
also be encrypted by using the secret key shared by nodes of same trust level. Only the intermediate
nodes that satisfy the required security level can process the message since only these nodes can
decrypt the message. The other nodes just drop it. This protocol provides some protection to
routing messages.
Papagiotis and Haas [90] proposed a Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) for ad hoc networks.
The assumption of SRP is the existence of a “Security Association” between a source node and a
destination node, through which the source node and the destination node can authenticate each
other. SRP is based on source routing. The source node broadcasts a route request to discover a
route to the destination node. When an intermediate node receives the route request, it appends its
identifier in the request packet and relays the request. When the destination node receives the route
request, a route has been set up and carried in the route request. The destination node generates a
route reply containing the route and sends it back to the source node along the reverse of the route.
The most important secure measure used in SRP is called Message Authentication Code (MAC)
and is calculated by using the shared secret key between the two ends. Both the unchanged fields
of route request and the route reply are covered by a MAC so that modification and IP spoofing
from non-colluding attackers can be prevented during the process of route discovery.
b) Public Key Cryptography
Venkatraman and Agrawal [91] proposed a protocol based on public key cryptography. They
assume the existence of a governing authority for the distribution of public keys. A source node
generates a route request and digitally signs it using its private key. When a destination node sends
a route reply back to the source node, public key cryptography is used for pair-wise authentication
to exclude malicious nodes. If a node does not know a forwarding node’s public key, they have
to exchange public keys first. This pair-wise authentication is done by challenge and response
process. The purpose of this protocol is to prevent external attacks.
A different approach called, Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ARAN), was devel-
oped by Dahill et al. [92]. ARAN relies on public key cryptography for authentication. Authors
assume that each node has a public/private key pair, and that there exists a trusted certificate
server to issue a certificate to each node. The goal is to allow a source node to set up a route to a
destination node. The source node broadcasts a route discovery packet, containing its certificate
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and digitally signs it by using its private key. Upon receiving the packet, an intermediary node
verifies the signature with the attached certificate. The node then removes the signature of the
broadcasting node, signs the packet with its private key, attaches its certificate, and re-broadcasts
the packet. Eventually, the destination node receives the packet and validates the signatures of the
source node and the forwarding node with their certificates. The signature protects the routing
information and prevents spoofing attacks. The destination node constructs a reply, signs it and
unicasts the reply back to the source over the reverse path. The same process is applied by the
intermediate nodes. Finally, the source node can receive the reply.
c) Analysis
The general purpose of securing ad hoc routing protocols is to protect the routing messages, to
prevent attackers from modifying these messages or even injecting harmful routing messages into
the network. So, integrity and authenticity of routing messages should be guaranteed. Confiden-
tiality can be ensured easily by encryption. Therefore, those protocols cannot prevent a malicious
node to misbehave for instance by misrouting the message. In addition, most of these secure
routing mechanisms are designed for a specific routing protocol in ad hoc network.
VII.3.2 Security in conventional SIP
Privacy and security are mandatory requirements for any telephony system. SIP standard
defines security mechanisms to be used for protecting SIP signaling messages and media transac-
tions. We highlight in this sub-section the most important existing SIP mechanisms that provide
authentication and security features for SIP signaling messages. These secure protocols comprise
PGP (Pretty Good Privacy), S-MIME, IPsec, TLS and SIPS [97].
a) Authentication
SIP provides a stateless, challenge-based mechanism for authentication that is based on au-
thentication in HTTP [93]. HTTP provides a simple challenge-response authentication mechanism
that may be used by a server to challenge a client request and by a client to provide authenti-
cation information. Authentication is needed to prevent against several kinds of attacks, such as
registration hijacking, call hijacking, and impersonation. It uses an extensible, case-insensitive
token to identify the authentication scheme, followed by a comma-separated list of attribute-value
pairs which carry the parameters necessary for achieving authentication via that scheme. The
HTTP Authentication framework includes two authentication schemes: “Basic” and “Digest”.
Both schemes employ a shared secret based mechanism for access authentication. When UA sends
a request message to SIP server, the server answers with “401 Unauthorized” or “407 Proxy Au-
thentication Required” asking for user’s credential. The “401 Unauthorized” header is used in SIP
registrar or redirect server, and the “407 Proxy Authentication Required” is used in SIP proxy. In
addition, to prevent replay attack, SIP server challenges the UA with a unique random nonce. This
nonce is used only one time. Digest authentication also provides an optional integrity protection
using an “auth-int” parameter. When the “auth-int” parameter is indicated, the entire body is
hashed and attached to authentication messages.
Besides basic and digest authentication, SIP can also use digital certificate to authenticate SIP
servers. For example, if TLS is used, UA can receive a server’s certificate during the handshake
protocol and check whether the certificate is signed by a known authority. If the UA trusts the
authority, the connection is then authenticated.
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Note that due to its weak security, the usage of “Basic” authentication has been deprecated
from RFC 2543. However, it is possible to use basic authentication with secure transport-layer or
network layer tunnel such as TLS and IPsec.
b) SIP Signaling Security
i. Pretty Good Privacy
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [94] is proposed by Phil Zimmerman. Initially, PGP is designed to
protect email privacy but it can also be used for other applications like SIP. PGP offers encryption,
authentication, and integrity for SIP signaling messages using both symmetric and asymmetric en-
cryption. Each PGP user requires a public/private key pair as well as a certificate. This certificate
is signed by other PGP user which is called introducer of that key. PGP uses a concept of “web of
trust” as an alternative to Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). If a user trusts the introducer, the cer-
tificate is verified. In PGP, before submitting a SIP message to a SIP server, UA signs the message
with user’s private key to provide integrity. Moreover, PGP also provides an encryption function
to conceal SIP message body with a generated session key. The session key is then encrypted with
the recipient’s public key and attached to an encrypted message body. PGP has been replaced by
S/MIME in SIP RFC 3261.
ii. Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension (S/MIME)
S/MIME [95] is designed as a standard for securing an email message in MIME (Multipur-
pose Internet Mail Extensions) format and later adopted for other applications such as SIP. RFC
3261 recommends S/MIME for securing SIP messages. S/MIME is based on RSA (Rivest-Shamir-
Adleman) public key cryptography. It requires RSA for digital signature, SHA-1 for message
digest, and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) for symmetric encryption. In RFC 3261, the
mandatory cipher suite requirement was Triple-DES. However, it has been changed to AES in
RFC 3853 since it is faster and more efficient. Each participant in the system, needs to have a
public/private key pair and a certificate which is signed by a trusted authority. The certificate is
then distributed to other parties. Nonetheless, SIP does not specify how to manage public/private
key and certificate. S/MIME provides integrity to SIP message. Before sending a message to a
recipient, UA can sign the entire message using its private key and set the SIP “Content-Type”
header to “multipart/signed”. Once the recipient UA receives a packet, it uses the sender’s public
key to determine whether the message comes from the real originator. S/MIME also provides
confidentiality to SDP and message body. UA can use the recipient’s public key to encrypt the
SIP message body and set the “Content-Type” header to “application/pkcs7-mime”. This cipher
message can only be decrypted using the recipient’s private key. In other words, only the recipient
who possesses a legitimate key can have knowledge of the information.
iii. IP Security (IPsec)
IPsec acts at network layer by offering confidentiality, authentication, and integrity [96]. IPsec
consists of three main components that are Authentication Header (AH) [100], Encapsulation
Security Protocol (ESP) [101], and Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE) [102]. IPsec has two
different modes of operation: transport and tunnel modes.
In AH service, an AH header of entire packet (i.e. all header fields and payload) will be
generated and attached to every packet for source authentication and message integrity check.
AH defines a set of cryptographic algorithms that can be used for computing an authentication
value, such as Message Authentication Code (MAC) or one-way hash function like MD5, SHA-1,
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and SHA-256. Besides the authentication value, the AH header also consists of a sequence num-
ber and index for recipient to determine which algorithm has been used. In general, AH is not
widely deployed as it does not offer any confidentiality mechanism. Unlike, ESP covers all the
services that AH has and also provides confidentiality of IP packets. In transport mode, only the
payload will be protected and an ESP header will be interposed between an IP header and the
encrypted payload. Meanwhile, in tunnel mode, the entire packet (i.e. IP header and payload)
is encrypted. Thus, tunnel mode ESP provides packet confidentiality as well as protects against
traffic analysis. Instead, Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE), is a key protocol in the IPSec
architecture, that is a hybrid protocol using part of Oakley [103] and part of SKEME (Secure Key
Exchange MEchanism for Internet) [105] in conjunction with ISAKMP (Internet Security Associ-
ation and Key Management Protocol) [104] to obtain authenticated keying material for use with
ISAKMP. ISAKMP provides a framework for authentication and key exchange but does not define
them. ISAKMP is designed to be key exchange independent, which supports many different key
exchanges. IKE’ processes can be used for negotiating virtual private networks (VPNs). IPsec can
be used to protect both SIP signaling and media stream. However, the protocol is not aware by
the higher layer protocol. In other word, it is difficult for SIP application to detect whether the
IPsec is operating or not, in contrast to TLS which is visible to SIP applications.
iv. Transport Layer Security (TLS)
TLS supports hop-by-hop security for SIP signaling messages [98]. It provides the ability to
perform mutual authentication (client and server), confidentiality and integrity. The protocol is
composed of two layers: the TLS Record Protocol and the TLS Handshake Protocol.
The TLS Record Protocol aims to maintain a secure connection between two endpoints (for
example, client and server). The negotiation of the cryptographic properties (for example, cipher
suites, encryption keys) for the corresponding connection is performed by the TLS Handshake
Protocol, which is encapsulated within the TLS Record Protocol.
The TLS Handshake Protocol is used for mutual client/server authentication and to negotiate
cryptographic properties (for example, encryption algorithms and keys) of the respective session.
The TLS Handshake has to be completed successfully before transmitting any data.
TLS is designed to be used over a reliable transport such as TCP or SCTP [99] (Stream
Control Transmission Protocol). This introduces a limitation for implementations that use UDP
as their transport protocol because TLS cannot be used with UDP to protect SIP messages. IETF
has published RFC 4347, “Datagram Transport Layer Security,” to address this limitation. The
RFC recommends the use of TLS to provide the necessary protection against attacks such as
eavesdropping, message tampering, message replay, and so on.
Although TLS provides confidentiality between two endpoints (client/server relationship), it
does not support direct end-to-end confidentiality between two users that are connected through
intermediate SIP proxies. For each segment, a distinct TLS connection has to be established.
v. Secure SIP URI
RFC 3261 defines a secure SIP URI Scheme (SIPS) which offers end-to-end session confiden-
tiality using TLS. When SIPS is used, TLS connections are established between two nodes at every
hop along the routing path. Then, users can maintain a level of privacy, by using SIPS URI (SIP
over TLS) to guarantee that secure, encrypted transport is used to protect the signaling messages
between the two communication parties [98].
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The SIPS message is similar to a SIP (unencrypted) message that is transported over UDP,
TCP, or STCP. The major differences are as follows:
• The URI syntax is defined as sips:alice@domain-b.com.
• The transport is TLS, instead of UDP or TCP.
• The SIPS port is 5061, instead of 5060, which is reserved for UDP and TCP.
When SIPS is used, all SIP messages are transported over TLS, which provides an adequate
level of protection against attacks such as eavesdropping, replay, and message manipulation. In
addition, TLS provides the means for mutual authentication using certificates to protect against
“man-in-the-middle” attack. The device can authenticate itself to the network, but it can also
verify the authenticity of the SIP proxy (or SIP registrar).
The recommended cipher suite to be used with SIPS is AES, using a 128-bit key in CBC
(Cipher Block Chaining) mode, and the message authentication code is SHA-1 to provide integrity.
Another added benefit of using SIPS is the ability to exchange encryption keys to encrypt
the media stream using SRTP (Secure Real Time Protocol). For example, SDescriptions can be
used within a SIPS INVITE message to exchange the master key between two participants. The
encryption key is provided in the SDP portion of the SIPS INVITE in the a=crypto attribute.
c) Analysis
Many efficient schemes have already been provided to secure SIP signaling messages. Those
protocols provide confidentiality, integrity and authentication between participants but are not
suitable to MISE-P2PSIP networks as they are currently defined. Indeed, the SIP Digest authen-
tication mechanism cannot prevent proxies in MISE-P2PSIP to misroute the SIP signaling message
or to perform call hijacking. Moreover, if SIP Digest authentication mechanism is used between
proxies in our framework, it will generate too much traffic in the network. Also, the secure proto-
cols using encryption (TLS, IPsec, etc) are not sufficient to avoid call hijacking attack. Therefore,
our framework needs an appropriate combination of authentication mechanism, encryption and
signature techniques to alleviate misrouting and call hijacking attacks.
VII.3.3 Secure routing in Peer-to-Peer systems
Many attacks can be targeted to DHT in structured P2P network, including routing attacks
[106]. Some solutions have been proposed to handle secure routing issue in P2P systems. This
sub-section summarizes some of them.
a) Secure messages routing
Existing works on secure message routing focused mainly on employing redundancy to increase
the probability of a message being delivered successfully. The goal is to maximize the probability
that at least one copy of the correct message reaches target node.
Wallach [108] presents a multiple redundant routing algorithms for Pastry. An enquirer sends
a query to all of its neighbors in Pastry overlay. Then, each neighbor forwards the query towards
the target node. If at least one copy of the query arrives, it is considered successfully delivered.
However, the technique used will inevitably cause congestion and burden in the system, especially
in a bandwidth sensitive system.
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Artigas et al. in [109] had a similar idea. It provides disjoint paths between two nodes in
DHTs. However, the routing success rate degrades greatly as the number of nodes in the system
reaches a big value.
Miguel Castro et al. [107] consider security issues in structured P2P overlay networks. They
identify attacks in which malicious nodes can prevent correct delivery of messages (by dropping,
corrupting, misrouting messages or acting as its destination), propose and evaluate techniques to
prevent such attacks. According to their approach “secure routing” requires tree main principles:
• A secure assignment of node identifiers.
• Secure routing table maintenance.
• Secure message forwarding.
Secure assignment of node identifiers and secure routing maintenance can be achieved by
minimizing the probability that nodes are controlled by attackers. In order to provide secure
message forwarding, their approach in [107] allows to route a message by performing a “failure
test” to determine if routing worked. More expensive “redundant” routing is used when the failure
test returns positive.
b) Analysis
The main issue of the proposed techniques to date to secure messages routing in structured
P2P networks is the usage of many redundant routes that obviously cause congestion and burden
in the systems, especially by increasing bandwidth consumption. Moreover, the solution does not
prevent a malicious node to perform call hijacking attack by replaying the message. Furthermore,
an adversary can prevent correct message from being delivered throughout the overlay. When one
or more nodes between originator and target nodes are malicious, a message might be dropped,
polluted or forwarded to the wrong place.
VII.4 Conclusion
This chapter provides the related work on the existing routing mechanisms and protocols for
security purposes and reviews them in light of our requirements. The next chapter will mainly
present our secure schemes for signaling messages routing in MISE-P2PSIP.
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Chapter VIII
Attack models and secure schemes for
signaling messages routing in
MISE-P2PSIP
O ur P2P SIP framework as per its topology setting up and call establishment scheme could
be opened to many attacks. The Internet Draft at [110] defines a numerous number of vulnerabili-
ties and attacks which can be targeted to P2P SIP network. Among those attacks, our proxy-level
routing scheme could be essentially exposed to two kinds of attack that we will address in this
chapter. In this work, we are more interesting on attacks generated by proxy servers in MISE-
P2PSIP network since they are in the core of the communication and are more susceptible to
misbehave. Basically, we will focus on the following two attacks.
1. Call hijacking,
2. Signaling message misrouting.
We will focus on the former first, and then the latter.
VIII.1 Call hijacking
This section describes the approach that we propose to alleviate call hijacking in MISE-
P2PSIP. Our technique is based on Identity-based encryption (IBE) to perform part of SIP message
encryption and signature during the call establishment in order to ensure messages integrity and
authenticity in addition to mutual authentication of the two communication parties. This scheme
efficiently mitigates call hijacking attack and replay attack by making use of one-time timestamp.
Firstly, we give a short background on call hijacking attack and IBE technique. Next, we describe
the usage of digest authentication mechanism among proxy servers by highlighting the limits of
such technique. Finally, we describe our secure mechanism to mitigate this attack.
VIII.1.1 Background
a) Call hijacking attack definition
In VoIP, call hijacking attack refers to a situation where one of the intended endpoints of the
conversation is exchanged with the attacker. Basically, attacker spoofs a SIP Response redirect-
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ing the caller to a rogue SIP address and intercepts the call. Call hijacking can have common
consequences with eavesdropping attacks (access to confidential information).
Different types of call hijacking attacks can be mentioned [111].
• Registration hijacking: Since SIP uses clear text, a hacker is able to read legitimate User
Agent’s registration message and then “replay” the same message using its own location
information. This effectively registers the UA with the hacker’s location.
• Session hijacking: This attack works much like registration hijacking, but is used to take over
a session in progress.
• Requests redirection: The attack uses the 3xx SIP response codes which allow redirecting.
These codes inform the requester that further actions have to be undertaken in order to
successfully accomplish the request. The 3xx SIP based attacks rely on forged responses.
• Requests replay: Also known as replay attack, it occurs when a valid message sent by a node
is captured and retransmitted for malicious purposes. A badly behaving node could replace
any newer data with the old information present in this message and resend it in the network.
Let us give an example of classical call hijacking attack using requests redirection. A graphical
illustration of the attack is given in figure VIII.1. The attack outline is the following:
• The victim issues a SIP request (an INVITE request for example) (step 1).
• The attacker sends a 3xx code response to the initiator (step 2). The attacker usurps the
identity of either the callee UA or one of the SIP components (proxy, registrar, etc).
• The victim SIP client receives the forged 3xx response and redirects its communication through
the attacker’s system (step 3). The attacker then sends the request to the destination by
impersonating the victim (step 4). The attack is then completed.
Basically, the attacker sends a 301 response (moved permanently response code) upon de-
tecting that the victim has issued an INVITE request. The victim in turn contacts the attacker
for achieving the SIP connection. Alternatively, for one-time attacks, 302 Moved Temporarily
response code is used instead of 301.
Figure VIII.1: Call hijacking attacks based on requests redirection
Attacks in call hijacking category, seek to compromise the message integrity of the conversa-
tion. To handle call hijacking, it is necessary to set up an efficient authentication mechanism in
order to always verify that the sender and/or the receiver are legitimate and that the contents of
the SIP message have not been wrongly altered in transit.
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b) Background on Identity Based Encryption scheme
In 1984, Adi Shamir [112] has proposed the concept of identity-based cryptography. In this
new paradigm of cryptography, instead of using digital certificates, the user identifier such as email
or IP address can be used as a public key for encryption or signature verification. The identity-
based cryptography reduces mostly the complexity and the cost to establish and manage the public
keys known as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
While Shamir easily constructed the pattern of Identity-Based Signature (IBS) using the
existing RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) algorithm, Boneh and Franklin [113] and Cocks [114] have
built an encryption scheme based on identity. This has been done in 2001. IBE scheme is shown
in VIII.2. This scheme follows the following steps:
• The initialization: the PKG (Private Key Generator) creates a key pair: master (private)
and public named respectively skPKG and pkPKG. The pkPKG is provided to all interested
parties and used as a constant parameter of the system for a long time.
• The private key extraction: Bob authenticates to the PKG and obtains the private key
skIDBob associated with its identity IDBob.
• Encryption: using the identity of Bob IDBob and the pkPKG obtained from the PKG, Alice
encrypts the plaintext message M and obtains the encrypted message C.
• Decryption: Upon receiving the message C, encrypted by Alice, Bob decrypts it, using its
private key skIDBob to restore the message M.
Figure VIII.2: Encryption based on Identity
The mathematical basis of the IBE is a special type of function called “bilinear map” [115].
The “bilinear map” is a pairing with the following property: Pair (a.X, b.Y) = Pair (b.X, a.Y).
The operator ”.” is the multiplication of a point on an elliptic curve by an integer. Therefore,
the multiplication itself (e.g. the calculation of a.X) is simple, but the reverse operation which
consists on finding “a” knowing X and a.X, is practically impossible.
Historically, bilinear mapping was first used to attack elliptic curve cryptosystems on super-
singular curves in the early 1990’s [116]. However, in the recent application of bilinear maps to
cryptography, they are used not for negative purposes (i.e., attacking cryptographic schemes) but
for positive purposes (i.e., designing cryptographic schemes). Two examples of bilinear maps are
the Weil Pairing and the Tate Pairing [117].
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VIII.1.2 Using HTTP Digest authentication
While HTTP digest is more suitable to centralized SIP architecture, it can in principle be used
between the proxies participating in the overlay, to authenticate the proxy servers in MISE-P2PSIP.
HTTP digest authentication can also been used to provide authentication between two SIP proxies.
Therefore, since proxies attending in MISE-P2PSIP are organized in ring, it is necessary that each
proxy authenticates itself to its neighbors. More in detail, a joining node could get its credentials
(e.g. password) from a Certificate Authority (CA) which could coincide with the Domain Controller
in our framework. Subsequently, the node could send a challenge to its neighbors requesting
authentication. After its neighbors answer successfully to the challenge, each of them will require
authentication from the joining node. This scenario is repeated at every node joining. However, this
approach could generate much traffic in the network. In addition, the authentication mechanism
used is Digest Authentication which is known to be weak and prone to man-in-the-middle attacks.
Hence, we propose a more efficient authentication mechanism suitable to MISE-P2PSIP network
topology.
VIII.1.3 Our Secure scheme against call hijacking attack
In order to efficiently counter call hijacking attacks in MISE-P2PSIP, we propose an authen-
tication mechanism based on Identity Based Encryption system during SIP call establishment.
Identity-based authentication scheme for MISE-P2PSIP has the advantages of public key cryp-
tography, provides mutual authentication without pre-shared secret and does not require PKI
support.
Our secure scheme against call hijacking uses specially three (3) main concepts: Identity-based
encryption, digital signature and one-time timestamp.
The identity-based encryption ensures user authenticity. The digital signature warrants mes-
sage integrity while the one-time timestamp avoids message replay by malicious nodes.
We assume that the DC which is Central Authority, is trusted by all nodes and cannot mis-
behave. Let us assume that SIP Client Alice, located in the group of proxy P1, wants to initiate
a call toward SIP Client Bob located in the group of proxy P3. The call will occur through
proxies P1, P2, and P3. The authentication scheme follows three phases that are: initialization,
encryption/signature and decryption/verification. The details of each phases is given below.
i. Initialization
The Domain Controller plays the role of PKG. Then, the DC takes a secret (the master) sk
and a point P of an elliptic curve using a random number generator. Subsequently, the public
parameters P and s.P (product of s = sk and P) are distributed to all users, typically through a
certificate server. Each node has two basic keys and one-time special key. We denote the basic keys,
the identity-based public key (Pubkx) and the identity-based private key (Privkx). The special key
is named one-time stamped private key (Privtskx). The identity-based public key is obtained by
applying a hash function H to the node ID and can be computed by every node. Then,
Pubkx = H(IDx) is the public key of node x.
Privkx and Privtskx are calculated by the DC and are known only by their owners.
Privkx= s.IDx and Privtskx= s.(IDx
⊕
timestamp)
The parameter “IDx
⊕
timestamp” related to node X is therefore the concatenation of the ID
of X and the timestamp. A given timestamp is related to a single SIP request/response between
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two nodes in only one direction and then is unique. The timestamp is requested by the sender of
the SIP request/response.
ii. Encryption and signature
The principle is that before sending an INVITE request to Bob, Alice requests the so called
Bob’s stamped ID (IDtsbob) from the DC. IDtsbob is IDbob (Bob’s SIP URI) concatenated with the
timestamp.
IDtsbob = IDbob
⊕
timestampA→B
The DC computes the IDtsbob and sends it to Alice. The DC keeps a copy of Bob’s stamped
ID and will use it later to calculate Bob’s stamped private key, when Bob will request it. Upon
receiving the IDtsbob, Alice will create a regular SIP INVITE. Subsequently, she will sign and
encrypt the body of the INVITE which contains important information about session negotiation,
before sending it. Figure VIII.3 depicts the steps of encryption and signature procedure.
Figure VIII.3: Identity Based Encryption/Signature scheme at Alice side
The procedure is run in 4 steps:
• Alice calculates the digest of the body of the INVITE request: let us denote Head(M) the
header of the request and Body(M) the body of the request.
Digest(Body(M)) = H(Body(M)) , meaning the hash of the message body.
• Alice signs the obtained Digest(Body(M)) with its identity-based private key PrivkA. This
signature will allow controlling the integrity of the message body.
• Alice will now apply a hash function on the stamped identity of Bob IDtsbob(previously ob-
tained from the DC) to get a point of the elliptic curve IDtsbob. Then, she will choose a random
number r and computes the key KA→B = Pair (r.IDtsbob, s.P) = Pair (r.(IDbob
⊕
timestampA→B),
s.P). The KA→B is then used by Alice to encrypt the body of the INVITE message added to
its digest.
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• Next, Alice adds to the encrypted body, the product r.P that she encrypts with Bob’s public
key (PubkB), and sends the new INVITE message to Bob through the proxies on the route.
Then, the final INVITE sent by Alice to Bob has the following structure:
Head(M) + [Body(M) + [Digest(Body(M))]PrivkA]KA→B+ [r.P]PubkB
Since we are encrypting part of the SIP message we will add the “Encryption” field to the
headers as required by SIP specification [1] which mainly contains the encryption mechanism used
and its version.
iii. Decryption and verification
When Bob receives the message, it should authenticate itself using Digest Authentication [3]
to get its stamped private key from the DC. After Bob successful authenticates itself, the DC
computes s.IDtsbob and returns it to Bob. Note that IDtsbob has been calculated and recorded by
the DC upon Alice request. Let us call this value PrivtskB. At the same time, Bob will request its
identity-based private key PrivkB from the DC. PrivkB=s.IDbob. The DC deletes the record of the
stamped ID of Bob since it will not be used anymore. The decryption and signature procedure is
summarized in figure VIII.4.
Figure VIII.4: Decryption/verification scheme at Bob side
Bob will follow the steps below in order to decrypt the message and verify the signature:
• Bob will first decrypt the last part of the message with its private key and obtain the parameter
r.P.
• Next, Bob should decrypt the body of the INVITE but will need first to recover the key
KA→B by computing KA→B = Pair (PrivtskB, r.P) = Pair (s.IDtsbob, r.P). Due to the property
of “bilinear map”, this value is the same as the key used by Alice to encrypt this part of the
INVITE. With the computed KA→B, Bob will decrypt the body of the INVITE message. He
will get the clear body and the signed digest body. Since Bob is the only one who knows his
own stamped private key, no one else will not be able to calculate KA→B.
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• Then, Bob will verify the signature by decrypting the digest using Alice public key (PubkA).
Alice public key is obtained by computing the hash of the identity in the “From” header of
the INVITE message. This step aims to verify that the message is really sent by Alice. At
this step bob gets in addition to the INVITE headers, the body in clear text and the digest
body.
• Bob will check whether the body has not been altered by a malicious node. To do this,
he computes the hash of the body in clear using the same hash algorithm as Alice and will
compare the result to the digest body. If they are the same, the body has not been modified.
If Bob decides to accept Alice’s call, he should answer with the OK message. The same
encryption/signature procedure like those used by Alice will be used by Bob to encrypt and
sign the body of the OK. On Alice side, the same decryption/verification procedure is used
to decrypt and verify the integrity of the OK message.
Note that to be fully compliant to SIP specification [1] the node receiving a request (INVITE)
or response (OK) containing an encryption part, decrypts the body and then concatenates the
plaintext to the request line and headers of the original message. Moreover, the specification
requires that if only the body of the message is being encrypted, the body has to be prefixed with
CRLF to allow proper concatenation.
iv. Call procedure
Let us assume that Alice wants to established SIP call toward Bob. SIP messages should go
through three proxies (P1, P2 and P3). Figure VIII.5 illustrates a SIP call scenario based on our
approach to mitigate call hijacking.
Following is the explanation of the secure call procedure depicted in figure VIII.5.
First of all, Alice and Bob register themselves to their registrar servers. Alice requests Bob’s
stamped ID from the DC before creating the INVITE message targeted to Bob. Subsequently, Alice
creates the INVITE, following the encryption/signature procedure described in the sub-section (ii)
and sends it to Bob through proxies P1, P2 and P3. Once Bob receives the INVITE, he asks
the stamped private key from the DC as described in the sub-section (iii). The DC computes this
private key by using the timestamp generated when Alice was initiating the call toward Bob. Thus,
Bob’s stamped private key could be used only by Bob in order to decrypt the body of the INVITE
message. Hence, the proposed solution provides high protection against replay attack, since an
attacker can use SIP RE-INVITE to spoof a legitimate user identity. Moreover, Bob verify the
signature of the sender in the body of the INVITE. This step allows authenticating the sender of
the message that is Alice.
Afterward, Bob requires Alice’s stamped ID from the DC in order to send an authenticated
SIP OK response to Alice. This requires that the DC generates a new timestamp, computes Alice’s
stamped ID and sends it to Bob. Then, the mechanism used previously by Alice to process the
INVITE request is also used by Bob to process the OK.
Finally, the SIP ACK is simply sent by Alice and the media streams are sent successfully in
secure way between Alice and Bob.
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Figure VIII.5: Call procedure against call hijacking
v. Strengths of the proposed approach against call hijacking
Our secure scheme against call hijacking attack comes on with many strengths that will be
brought to light in this section.
1. Mutual authentication
A successful processing of the INVITE message by the legitimate receiver, in our approach,
gives the proof that the originator of the message is really who it claims to be and that also the
receiver is a legitimate node. The same benefits are provided by the OK message. This scheme
provides then a mutual authentication from the handling of the INVITE and the OK which are
the most important signaling messages.
2. Identity based encryption and SIP message body encryption
Usually, SIP message is forwarded in clear text. Then, anyone having access to the network
can get access to the message content by simply capturing the message using a number of sniffing
tools. Once a malicious node has captured a message, the message body and the headers in the
SIP message can be easily modified.
In our approach, the first part of the body of the SIP message is encrypted using a key
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computed partially based on the receiver’s identity and the second part is encrypted using the
receiver’s public key. However, using Identity-based encryption, our scheme provides double level
of security and gives thereby, a strong insurance that the body of the message could only be
decrypted by the legitimate receiver. On other side, the first advantage of encrypting the body is
that a malicious node could not be able to gather confidential information like the IP address of
the message originator. Secondly, the body could not be tampered.
For instance, if a rogue proxy receives an INVITE and modifies the FROM header to reflect
his or her own SIP URI pretending to be the originator of the message, the receiver will detect it,
because the signature inside the body will not match with the public key of the attacker.
3. Usage of one-time timestamp
The usage of timestamp is the main strength of this approach. The timestamp is held by
the trusted DC and related data (stamped ID and stamped private key) are only delivered to the
legitimate node upon authentication. Moreover, the first part of the encrypted body can only be
decrypted by its legitimate receiver because the DC knows to which node belongs a given stamped
private key and sends it only to him upon authentication. On the other side, a given timestamp
is used one-time for a single SIP message between two communication parties. So, the proposed
approach highly mitigates SIP signaling messages replay, since there is no way that a malicious
proxy records a previous SIP message, impersonates another node in order to get a successful
established SIP session.
VIII.2 Signaling message misrouting
This section focuses on misrouting attack in MISE-P2PSIP. Actually, this attack is related
to the topology of our P2P SIP network. Indeed, a proxy can decide to not follow the routing
algorithm specification and send the SIP messages in the wrong direction. This behavior can
easily lead to SIP signaling message cancellation or delay on the message transmission which is not
convenient in SIP communication. Our goal is to detect nodes which misbehave and circumvent
them in the network in order to ensure effective delivery of the SIP signaling message in real-
time. Before proposing our secure solution regarding misrouting issue, we have performed some
simulation tests in order to evaluate essentially the number of messages successful delivered in
function of the number of misbehaving nodes and in function of misrouting attack frequency.
Firstly, we define how the attack can be performed and discuss the simulation results on misrouting
attack tests. Finally, we describe our secure scheme.
VIII.2.1 The misrouting attack
A proxy can decide to misroute the SIP INVITE message received from another proxy or from
a client. In our architecture, since the proxy has always two alternatives (e.g. send to right or
to left) to route the message, the message misrouting means that its sends the message on left
instead of right and vice-versa. Let us consider figure VIII.6 which shows an example of clients
and proxies organizing in ring as in MISE-P2PSIP architecture.
Following are examples of two scenario of misrouting attack in MISE-P2PSIP.
Scenario 1: Let us assume proxy P1 receives SIP INVITE message targeted to C2 from P5.
Instead to forward the message to P2, P1 decides to send it back to P5. P5 will check its routing
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Figure VIII.6: Example of MISE-P2P SIP architecture
table and will send again the message to P1. In this scenario the message will be bounced between
the nodes and will not be delivered to C2.
Scenario 2: Let us assume proxy P5 receives SIP INVITE message targeted to C2 from C1 and
sends the message to proxy P4 instead of sending the message to proxy P1 (shortest path). P4
will send the message to P3 and the message will be stopped forwarded there (N/2 hops). Then,
the message will not be delivered to P2.
Many nodes can misbehave in collaborative way or independently. In this thesis, we focus
only on many nodes misbehaving independently.
VIII.2.2 Misrouting attack tests
The purpose of simulating misrouting attack tests is to evaluate the robustness of MISE-
P2PSIP network in the presence of rogue nodes (malicious proxy). These nodes are characterized
by not following the specification of the routing algorithm.
a) Assumptions
The various tests have been conducted using OverSim [15] simulation framework. Indeed,
OverSim is a framework for simulating peer-to-peer environment for OMNeT++. The simulator
contains several models for structured P2P systems (Chord, Kademlia, Pastry) and unstructured
overlay protocols.
Four assumptions (compared to the procedures specified in our architecture) have been made:
• The rogue nodes show no abnormal behavior during the initialization of the ring, while nodes
are joining.
• The number of nodes in the ring is fixed, no joins or leaves during the simulation.
• The nodes start to exchange messages only after the ring has been completely initialized.
• The malicious proxy always behaves properly about the messages it receives from clients, it
is responsible for.
These assumptions are made to simplify the simulations. We think that the first and second
assumptions are a bit strong and should be lift in future work. Instead, the last two assumptions
are less strong and should not decrease the reliability of the obtained results.
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b) How the attack is simulated?
Basically, the attack consists in the modification of the routing algorithm by one or more
proxies that take part of the ring in the same SIP domain. Being in a ring, the only wrong decision
that the proxy could take is not forwarding a message to the side (logical) opposed to the receiving
side. Rather, the rogue proxy bounces the message to the same side from which it was received.
Each test simulated 1000 seconds of activity in the ring, in which each node, every 10 seconds
sends a SIP INVITE to a recipient chosen randomly among a list proxy participating to the ring.
The structure of the message is very simple with only some of the basic SIP headers: From:
SIP URI (sender), To: SIP URI (recipient), VIA: SIP URI (traversed node), and Call-ID: call
identifier. The message is forwarded in the ring as specified by our routing algorithm until it
reaches the recipient. When a proxy receives an INVITE message for which it is the recipient, it
forwards the message to the target client. The client creates an OK message and sends the message
back to its proxy. Instead, when a proxy receives a message for which it is not the recipient, it
checks the routing table to know in which direction the message should be sent. However, this
simulation proposed two routing policies which have been tested in several rounds:
• Default routing: The proxy reads the field “VIA” of the message, finds out from which
direction the message has arrived and forwards it in the opposite direction.
• Table lookup: The proxy reads the “To” field of the INVITE message or the “From” field
of the OK and checks the routing table to decide in which direction it has to forward the
received message.
In all tests, it has been measured the number of messages sent (not the number of those
forwarded) by each node, the number of completed transactions, the number of transactions com-
pleted in time and those delayed. Two series of simulations have been performed.
i. First category
In the first category of tests, all nodes have always applied the “default routing”. We have
distinguished three possible behaviors of malicious proxy, based on the frequency with which the
wrong decisions could be taken:
• Static: node always bounces messages to the direction from which they come;
• Alternating: node bounces towards the direction from which a message is received every two
receptions;
• Probabilistic: node bounces messages received with a probability P.
The three analyzed behaviors can be simulated through the third, with appropriate choices of
the value of probability P. In fact, putting P = 1 we obtain the static behavior, while setting P
= 0.5, we obtain the alternating behavior. This reduces the first and second types of behavior to
the particular case of probabilistic behavior.
The tests were conducted, with different behaviors defined on four rings of different sizes:
20, 60, 120 and 240 proxies. For each different size and for each behavior, the tests have been
performed with different number of malicious proxies: 0, 1, 2 and 5 malicious nodes placed at the
same distance in the ring. For the probabilistic behavior, the probability used in the tests is P =
0.4. In total 48 tests were then performed.
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ii. Second category
In the second category, the number of proxies participating to the ring is set to ten (10) for
all the tests. In addition, the probability value is fixed at 0.65 and then is a “pure” probabilistic
behavior, the only that we consider being very interesting. Four scenarios have been tested,
according to the routing policy used during the routing by good and rogue nodes. The scenarios
are:
• Scenario A: all nodes apply “Default routing”.
• Scenario B: all nodes apply “Table lookup”.
• Scenario C: good nodes apply “Table lookup” and rogue nodes apply “Default routing”.
• Scenario D: good nodes apply “Default routing” and rogue nodes apply “Table lookup”.
For each scenario, we performed 12 tests with different numbers and arrangements of rogue
nodes, for a total of 48 tests. The total number of possible dispositions, changes with respect to
the number of rogue nodes. For example, with 2 rogue nodes there are 5 possible dispositions, but
we consider sufficient to test 2 of them, while with 3 rogue nodes there are more than 8 possible
arrangements and 4 have been tested.
Table VIII.1 displays the dispositions actually tested. The columns are:
• ID: identifies the disposition.
• N◦ Rogue: indicates the number of rogue nodes.
• Disposition: is a scheme of arrangement where b indicates a good node while r indicates a
rogue one.
• Dist. Rogue: is the distance between the rogue nodes, measured in the number of good nodes
interposed between two consecutive rogue nodes.
ID N◦ Rogue Dispositions Dist. Rogue
a 0 bbbbb bbbbb -
c 2 brbbb brbbb 4,4
d 2 brbrb bbbbb 1,7
e 3 brrbb rbbbb 0,2,5
f 3 brbrb rbbbb 1,1,5
g 3 brbrb brbbb 1,2,4
h 3 brbbr bbrbb 2,2,3
i 4 brrbr brbbb 0,1,1,4
j 4 brrbb rbbrb 0,2,2,2
k 4 brbrb brbrb 1,2,1,2
l 5 brrrr brbbb 0,0,0,1,4
m 5 brbrb rbrbr 1,1,1,1,1
Table VIII.1: Rogue nodes dispositions
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c) Simulation results
i. First category
As it was easy to predict, in the case of static behavior, the consequence of the presence of rogue
nodes, is the partitioning of the ring into groups of nodes that cannot in any way communicate
with nodes of other groups. The only transactions that are completed are those between nodes
belonging to the same group. Those transactions are all completed without delay. The graphic in
figure VIII.7, shows the fraction of transactions completed according to the number of malicious
nodes in all tested dimensions of the ring.
Figure VIII.7: Completed transactions with static behavior
From the graphic, it is clear that positioning rogue nodes at equidistant position, does not
affect the results with respect to the size of the ring. The results are very similar with different
sizes. It can also be noticed that increasing malicious nodes, decreases the number of completed
transactions, with a fairly linear behavior. The graphics of alternating and probabilistic behaviors
are not reported here because less significant. Indeed, the fraction of completed transactions and
the percentage of transactions completed in time, are very similar regardless the size of the ring.
In addition, the linear correlation between the number of completed transactions and the number
of rogue nodes is noticed. For this reason, we only present in figure VIII.8, the graphic that
shows the delayed transactions (in comparison with the total completed transactions) in the case
of probabilistic behavior.
Figure VIII.8: Delayed transactions with probabilistic behavior
ii. Second category
The results obtained in the second category of simulation are certainly more interesting. We
mainly focus on the number of completed transactions and the number of transactions delivered
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in time. Figures VIII.9, VIII.10, VIII.11 and VIII.12 report respectively the graphics of scenario
A, B, C and D.
In scenario A, where “Default routing” policy is used, the equidistant dispositions of rogue
nodes as in “c”, “h”, “j” and “m”, provide the worst performance with respect to the other
dispositions with equal number of rogue nodes. The fraction of completed transactions falls below
47% with the position “m”. The positive remark comes from the number of delayed transactions.
Regardless the disposition of rogue nodes, the delayed transactions are always less than 13% of
those completed (up to 87% transactions completed in time).
The results of scenario B clearly show that the “Default routing” policy is not the cheapest.
Here, the fraction of completed transactions (compared to those initiated) falls below 70% only
with the disposition “l”. Then, in general the performance of the ring is good. But, the dispositions
that provide worst results are not only those that set the rogue nodes at the same distance (or
almost) but also those that arrange rogue nodes at variable distance like a part “l”, “d”, “e” and
“i”. Significant differences are also noticed about the delayed transactions. Delayed transactions
are always lower than 26%, but always above 13% (the upper limit of the scenario A). Then,
scenario B produces more delayed transactions compared to scenario A.
Figure VIII.9: Completed/in time transactions in scenario A
Figure VIII.10: Completed/in time transactions in scenario B
In scenario C, we got the best results. The worst disposition remains “l” with 74% of trans-
actions completed with respect to those started. This is clearly a very positive result. The degra-
dation of performance in this case is very limited (17% less than results obtained in disposition
“a”), especially given the fact that 50% of the nodes of the ring is malicious (5 malicious nodes).
The percentage of delayed transactions is compatible with those obtained in scenario B.
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Finally, considering scenario D, even from a graphical point of view the similarities with the
scenario A are obvious. The worst case for completed transactions (47%, provided by “m”), is
slightly worse than scenario A (49%). The worst case for transactions concluded without delay
(88%, provided by disposition “d” and “f”) is slightly better than scenario A (87%).
Figure VIII.11: Completed/in time transactions in scenario C
Figure VIII.12: Completed/in time transactions in scenario D
The results obtained after the performed tests on routing attack, clearly show that our P2P SIP
framework is not secure with respect to proxy misbehavior. A malicious proxy in the ring can
systematically bounce SIP messages or disregards the routing table, partitioning the proxies’ ring
and preventing SIP calls to be completed. This leads to SIP service disruption and could create
severe discomfort to the user in our framework.
VIII.2.3 Our secure routing mechanism
We have performed some misrouting tests whose results show that it is fundamental to deal
with this issue to ensure the successful achievement of call sessions in MISE-P2PSIP. To do so,
the most efficient solution is to set up a secure mechanism which will detect a misbehaving node
in order to prevent further misrouting from this node and exclude it from the proxies ring. Our
secure scheme will use two main techniques: the “nonce transformation” usually used to secure
route discovery in ad hoc network [118] and usage of “call ID caching” by a given proxy to create
the backup of the message identifier.
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a) Nonce transformation
We assume that the proxy of the source node (client) and the proxy of the destination node
do not misbehave. We also assume that rogue proxies do not collaborate to misbehave and the
message does not pass through two consecutive rogue proxies. If there are two consecutive rogue
nodes the message is unavoidably bounced between them. Our technique works as the following.
When the proxy of the source client receives the INVITE request to transmit, it might append
to the request a random nonce Ni. The nonce is piggybacked in the “Encryption” field (mentioned
in the previous section about call hijacking) present in the SIP header.
Before forwarding the INVITE to the next hop, an intermediary proxy replaces the nonce Ni
by nonce Ni+1that is the encrypted value of nonce Ni. As defined by our secure scheme to mitigate
call hijacking, each proxy holds an identity-based public key and an identity-based private key.
Therefore, the intermediary proxy used its identity-based public key to encrypt the nonce Ni in
order to get Ni+1 (Ni+1= Epuki (Ni)). Then, the proxy makes the backup of Ni and inserts Ni+1
in the INVITE and sends it to the next hop according to its routing table. Once the proxy of the
destination client receives the INVITE, it inserts its nonce and forwards the message. The recipient
client processes the message and sends the OK to its proxy. The OK response still contains the
last nonce value. The response should take back the same path as the request INVITE. Upon
receiving the response, each proxy might decrypt the nonce value receiving in the message using
its identity-based private key and replace the old value by the new obtained (Ni= Dprivki+1(Ni+1)).
The new value of the nonce should be equal to the nonce value previously backed up during the
INVITE transaction. In this way, the proxy of the source client should find its own nonce value
in the OK response upon reception. If the nonce value does not match the previous one or if the
decryption is not successfully performed then, the last proxy sending the message has wrongly
forwarded the message.
This scheme allows to efficiently detecting the misbehaving proxy that sends the OK message
in the wrong direction, at the next hop or at the source proxy. The proposed technique works well
regardless the case the proxy forwards the message without putting the nonce. Therefore, it works
only if the INVITE message is delivered correctly along the predefined path (according to proxies’
routing tables). Then, we need an extension to be able detecting the misbehaving node during the
INVITE message forwarding. To achieve this, we propose a deployment of a call ID caching in the
proxy.
b) Call ID caching
In order to detect misrouting proxy from the INVITE message, a given proxy needs to know
whether a given message already went through itself or not. Then, each proxy needs to cache
information that can identify in unique way the INVITE message before inserting a nonce value
(as described in the previous section) and forwarding the INVITE. The cache contains the Call ID
(that uniquely identify a given invitation of a particular client) and the SIP URI of the initiator
of the call. Then, upon receiving an INVITE, an intermediate proxy checks whether the binding
of call ID and the originator of the call is already present in its cache. If the binding is found
then the message has been misrouted by the last proxy. Notice that based on our assumption on
trusting the outbound and inbound proxies, the misrouting attack is summarized to bounce the
message to the proxy that sent it.
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c) Denunciation procedure
Using the techniques, we have described above, both misrouted INVITE and OK messages can
be detected. The misbehavior proxy is easily identified and can be excluded from the overlay. The
proxy that discovers the misbehaving proxy should send to the DC a SIP NOTIFY that contains
in the body of the message, the address of the misbehaving node. The DC will then inform the
successor and the predecessor of the misbehaving node, that their neighbor has left, allowing them
to establish direct connection (virtual link) between them, bypassing the misbehaving node. This
operation will lead to the update of the routing tables of all proxies attending to the ring.
VIII.3 Conclusion
The chapter has proposed secure solutions to mitigate both call hijacking and misrouting in
MISE-P2PSIP. The secure scheme against call hijacking, uses the combination of three power-
ful techniques that are the identity-based encryption, digital signature and the usage of one-time
timestamp. The identity-based encryption ensures user authenticity. The digital signature war-
rants message integrity while the one-time timestamp prevents message replay by malicious nodes.
Moreover, we have performed misrouting tests on MISE-P2PSIP in order to test the resistance of
the network. Many performance measurements have been taken and analyzed. Finally, we have
proposed efficient solution to detect nodes that misroute SIP signaling messages and bypass them
in the overlay.
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Conclusions and future works
T his part presents the summary of our main contributions and the future works.
Chapter IX
Conclusions and future works
T he goal of this thesis was to give useful contributions to SIP-based communications in
P2P environment by proposing a secure P2P SIP architecture that is independent from the P2P
protocol and does not extend SIP standard. In this conclusion, we provide the summary of our
contributions and formulate some relevant future works.
IX.1 Summary of the problems and contributions
The thesis describes P2P SIP-based communication system which enables effective end-to-
end communication by being fully compliant to SIP standard and allows portability by being
middleware-independent. The proposed system uses its own routing algorithms among its proxy
servers and handles NAT traversal issue. In addition, the thesis defines new mechanisms to secure
SIP signaling messages routing. The main contributions are fourfold:
• Interoperable and portable P2P SIP architecture: A P2P middleware-independent
system for SIP-based communication has been proposed. The maintenance of the system is
performed by using only standard SIP messages. It thereby overcomes the main drawbacks
of existing P2P SIP architectures by providing interoperability and portability. We have
provided a prototype upon two different middleware to show how easy the implementation
is when no P2P message is involved in the SIP client lookup and the network maintenance.
In addition, we have demonstrated through simulations the benefits of relaying SIP messages
through proxy instead of using the overlay mechanisms (used in conventional DHT-based
P2P SIP architectures). Finally, we have brought out the impact of setting up a caching
mechanism in our proxy entity, on the system performance.
• Topology building and Proxy level routing: Having SIP proxies as first-class entities
raises two important issues in our P2P SIP architecture: proxy topology building and proxy-
level routing. Thanks to our proxy topology building, a proxy joining the P2P overlay knows
how to find its neighbors in the network of proxies. In addition, our proxy-level routing enables
messages to be routed in the SIP network built by proxy topology building. Then, suitable
routing algorithms have been defined for our framework. We have evaluated our approach
and shown that the well-known routing algorithms are not suitable to be used in our proxies’
network to perform routing.
• NAT traversal solutions in P2P SIP: Our P2P SIP architecture comes up with several
benefits, but also inherits Network Address Translation (NAT) traversal issues from SIP
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world. Indeed, SIP clients are not aware of how they are seen from the public network.
Consequently, SIP packets sent by a client behind a NAT, contain private IP addresses in
the message headers and in the message body. These addresses being private, cannot be
used by destination for answering. We have described techniques adapted to our P2P SIP
architecture, that provide efficient NAT traversal solutions and have shown the feasibility of
our solution through experimentations.
• Secure SIP signaling message routing: In P2P SIP overlay, each node acting as a server
can misbehave because of the absence of centralized authority. More servers can also collude
to misbehave. A malicious proxy node could drop, wrongly alter, delay or misroute a message.
It is then important to secure the routing of SIP signaling messages in such a way that they
are delivered correctly, because misrouting may disrupt call set up. Our simulations have
shown that the system could become useless under misrouting attack. For this reason, we
have focused on proposing secure schemes to alleviate misrouting attack and call hijacking.
IX.2 Future directions
The thesis has given several important contributions to P2P SIP research. However, it can
be improved and extended along several directions. This section discusses a non-exhaustive list of
works that will be the continuation of the thesis.
IX.2.1 Additional experimentations
We plan to provide full implementation of MISE-P2PSIP by also taking into consideration
nodes departure. Moreover, we will experiment our NAT traversal solution in P2P SIP environment
by considering firewall and cascade layers of NATs. Furthermore, an evaluation of the impact of
using encryption/decryption techniques (in the SIP signaling messages) on the Quality of Service
of calls could be provided along with full implementation of proposed secure solutions.
IX.2.2 SIP service reliability
The dynamicity of large-scale P2P SIP networks can make SIP service more unreliable than
traditional SIP networks. Service nodes are very likely to fail or leave the P2P SIP networks when
they are offering SIP service. The departure or breakdown of the service node has side effect on
P2P SIP networks, corrupting the reliability of SIP service. Even if some procedures have been
proposed to allow SIP services recovery from failure in MISE-P2PSIP, they do not handle the case
when failure occurs during SIP call establishment. A typical example is when a Proxy server (in
the transaction path) leaves or fails after caller and callee have exchanged a SIP INVITE message.
This could lead to three issues: first, the downstream SIP elements (SIP proxies and client) cannot
release the memory of the corresponding SIP transactions; second, the SIP transactions information
is lost, and third, the SIP signaling cannot be forwarded to the destination correctly. Conventional
SIP telephony networks address SIP service reliability by using the traditional redundancy and
failover methods, such as reliable server pooling [125] and IP address takeover [126]. However,
these solutions may not be suitable for large-scale P2P SIP networks because the cost of the two
techniques is too high for service providers. To deal with this issue in MISE-P2PSIP, we need
an algorithm which replicates SIP transactions information (mainly client side SIP transactions)
among the nodes in the P2P overlay networks and selects one node between the neighboring proxies
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(successor or predecessor) of the failed or departed node to act as the takeover proxy. The takeover
proxy should rebuild the SIP message based on the stored transactions information in order to
ensure the reliability of SIP service.
IX.2.3 Locality-aware self-organization
Locality-awareness guarantees that applications are not shipped across long distances when
nearby resources are available. In MISE-P2PSIP, nodes are currently organized under a specific
group based on their order of entering in the overlay and their location (within public network or
not). This technique is not optimal since two logically distant nodes (distant between groups in
number of hop) can be geographically closer. Then, it is desirable that those nodes being able to
communicate without relaying their message through other distant nodes. The notion of locality-
aware DHT [127] already exists but is not suitable for us, since the proposed solutions in this field
are middleware-dependent. Our goal is to organize nodes in the same locality (country, province,
etc) in the same group. The challenge here is to identify the locality of users and create one or
more P2P SIP groups in each locality. On other hand, the proxies’ ring will be build by taking
into account proxies’ locality so that the SIP messages take through the physical shortest path.
This will significantly improve call establishment performance since it will reduce routing hop (in
the underlying physical network) and latency specifically for intra-group calls. A locality prefix
could be defined and inserted in the SIP REGISTER message when the user registers itself. Then,
a group will be assigned to a user based on its locality prefix at registration phase.
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APPENDIX
List of abbreviations
Abbreviation Meaning
1G First Generation
2G Second Generation
3G Third Generation
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AH Authentication Header
AODV Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector
AoR Address of Record
API Application Programming Interface
ARAN Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks
ASP Address Settlement by Peer-to-Peer
B2BUA Back-to-Back User Agent
C/S Client-Server
CA Certificate Authority
CAN Content Addressable Network
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CODEC COmpressor-DECompressor
CONFIDANT Cooperation Of Nodes: Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTworks
CORE Collaborative REputation
CRLF Carriage Return Line Feed
DC Domain Controller
DHT Distributed Hash Table
DNS Domain Name System
DSL Digital Subscriber Line
DV Distance Vector
DVR Distance Vector Routing
ERP Endpoint Routing Protocol
ESP Encapsulation Security Protocol
GR Group Registrar
GUID Globally Unique IDentifier
H-P2PSIP Hierarchical P2PSIP
HiLO-Peer Higher Level Overlay Peer
HTTP Hyper Text Transport Protocol
IBE Identity-Based Encryption
IBS Identity-Based Signature
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Abbreviation Meaning
ICE Interactive Connectivity Establishment
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IGRP Internet Gateway Routing Protocol
IKE Internet Key Exchange Protocol
IP Internet Protocol
ISAKMP Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
ISUP Integrated Services Digital Network User Part
JVM Java Virtual Machine
JXTA Juxtapose
KBR Key Based Routing
LAN Local Area Network
LGPL Lesser General Public License
LoLO-Peer Lower Level Overlay Peer
LSA Link-State Advertisement
LSP Link State Packet
MAC Message Authentication Code
MANET Mobile Ad hoc NETworks
MGCP Media Gateway Control Protocol
MIME Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
MISE-P2PSIP Middleware-Independent and SEcure Peer-to-Peer SIP architecture
MSCML Media Server Control Markup Language
NAT Network Address Translation
NetAnn Network Announcement Protocol
NGN Next Generation Networks
Node-ID Node Identifier
OSPF Open Shortest Path First
P2P Peer-to-Peer
P2PNS P2PSIP Name Service
P2PP Peer-to-Peer Protocol
P2PSIP Peer-to-Peer SIP
PACK Packet Acknowledgment
PBP Pipe Binding Protocol
PBX Private Branch eXchange
PCAN Passive Content Addressable Network
PDA Personal Digital Assistant
PDP Peer Discovery Protocol
PGP Pretty Good Privacy
PIP Peer Information Protocol
PKG Private Key Generator
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PRP Peer Resolver Protocol
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
RELOAD Resource LOcation And Discovery
RFC Request For Comments
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Abbreviation Meaning
RIP Routing Information Protocol
RRQ Registration Request
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
RSVP Resource ReSerVation Protocol
RTCP Real-Time Control Protocol
RTMs Reputation and Trust based Models
RTP Real-time Transport Protocol
RTSP Real-Time Streaming protocol
RTT Round Trip Time
RVP RendezVous Protocol
S/MIME Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension
SAR Secure Aware Routing
SCTP Stream Control Transmission Protocol
SDP Session Description Protocol
SEP Service Extensible Protocol
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SIP TU SIP Transaction User
SIPS SIP URI Scheme
SKEME Secure Key Exchange MEchanism for Internet
SMBR Selective-Message Buddy Relaying
SMS Short Message Service
SMTP Simple Mail Transport Protocol
SPF Shortest Path First
SRP Secure Routing Protocol
SRTP Secure Real Time Protocol
STUN Session Traversal Utilities for Network Address Translation
TAB Triggering Address Binding
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TTL Time To Live
TURN Traversal Using Relay NAT
UA User Agent
UAC User Agent Client
UAS User Agent Server
UDP User Datagram Protocol
URI Uniform Resource Identifier
URL Uniform Resource Locator
VM Virtual Machine
VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol
VPN Virtual Private Network
WAN Wide Area Network
WG Working Group
XML Extensible Markup Language
XOR eXclusive OR
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